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valiantly under less than ideal circumstances. I
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year.
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1CHAPTERI
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
In recent years, the field of comparative
government and politics has focused on the problems of
political development."^ Students of the discipline have
constructed a variety of frameworks and employed a v/lde
range of approaches for analyzing the processes of
political development. These framevjorks, or "models,**
have been employed to facilitate cross-national comparison.
Because it is impossible for any one student of
A few of the m.ost prominent examples are: Lucian
Pye, Aspects of Politica l Developirent (Boston: Little,
Brov/n. I966); C. E. Black, The ^Dynamics of Modernization
(New York: Knopf. I965); Samuel P. Huntington. PolAMii£i
Order in Changing; Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press7'T958 ; ; David Apter, Tlie Politics of Modernization
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19o5); Gabriel
Almond and G, Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Poll ticsj.
A Deve loprT'.ental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, I960J;
and Almond and James Coleman (eds.). The Politics of
Deve lopinp; Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2comparative politics to know all the emerging nations In
detail, various frameworks of national development and
modernization have been fashioned to identify commonalities
and differences among nations. Identification and
evaluation of such commonalities help provide a needed tool
for comparison of national political systems.
While many general frameworks for the comparative
analysis of political systems have been developed, it has
also been recognized that differences in cultures or other
distinctive features of individual political systems or
clusters or regional groupings of systems have to be taken
into consideration to fully understand any one national
political system. As a result, there has been a counter-
pressure to the construction of general frameworks. Thus,
area studies, the study of political culture, and
individual case studies have also retained their
2
importance in the field.
The whole concept of political development has
gained increasing importance because of the large number
Pj^e. op» c it.; Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic
Ciilture; Political Attitudes and Demoera cy__ln_FiZS.
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^3 )
;
P57~and Verba. Political Culture and Poll t leal ^Develoi^Dein^
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19o5) are among
the most important general works on political culture. In
terras of area studies, the abundant literature on Latin
America cited throughout this study attests to the
continuing Importance of that kind of focus.
3of nations currently "emerging" or attempting to develop
themselves. The Third World encompasses a large portion of
the world's population. According to I965 figures, over
seventy per cent of the world's people lived on the
3
continents of South America, Asia, and Africa,-'^ These
continents also tend to include the majority of the
so-called under-developed or developing nations of the
world
•
The importance of the process of political
development for the v/orld as a whole makes it imperative
that students of the process be clear about what it is.
The author finds a vagueness in the use of the terra
"political development" in much of the literature of
comparative politics. Thus, part of the purpose of this
study is to help clarify the term and to evaluate the ways
in which it has been used, with the hope of indicating a
useful definition of the term.
Secondly, the current work is intended to provide
an analysis of the use of the various political development
frameworks in relation to the study of Latin America.
Latin America, of course, contains about ten per cent of
Rand NcNally New Cosmopoli tan World Atlas , 1966
ed. (Chicago: Hand McNally, 1966), p. 195*
the world's population and has one of the highest birth
rates of the world. As a result, its importance is
destined to increase. For that reason alone, it is
important to understand the political systems of Latin
America. In addition, its special relationship to the
United States makes Latin America particularly important
for United States scholars to understand.
It should also be noted that the political
development frameworks usually employed in the analysis of
Third World nations originated in the works of Western
European and Anglo-American scholars and as such have been
somevihat culture-bound. The major purpose of this work is
to determine whether the general framevrorks used for
examining the process of political development are
appropriate for studying Latin American political systems.
The major hypothesis is that the Latin American historical
and cultural experience is sufficiently divergent from the
Anglo-American and Western European experience to require
different assumptions in the construction of a
developmental framework*
To test the hypothesis, this study will analyze the
literature of political development in order to identify
the frameworks and evaluate the assumptions upon which
such
frameworks are based. The basic plan of the study is to
indicate the usages of the term "political development"
and
to classify the various frameworks for greater
ease of
5analysis. The application of these frameworks to the study
of Latin America will then be analyzed. The advantages and
disadvantages of each framework as an aid in studying Latin
America will be outlined. If the hypothesis proves valid,
the concluding section will include an attempt to indicate
a framework more appropriate to the \inderstanding of the
Latin American nations.
In evalimting the applicability of these various
developmental frameworks to the study of Latin America,
three major "issue areas" will be examined: the question
of urbanization and its socio-political consequences, the
question of the role and function of bureaucracy, and the
role of the middle sectors in society. These particular
subject areas are selected because they are used as
indicators of political development in much of the
literature. The political development frameworks
attribute particular functions and/or roles to
urbanization, bureaucracy, and the middle sectors in the
development process. These roles and functions will be
examined and discussed in the body of the study. A
fundamental purpose of this study is thus to evaluate the
role or systemic function attributed to each of these
groups or socio-political forces by each of the frameworks
of analysis. After evaluating the various roles and
6fimctions attributed to each group, the author \iXll present
his oimi interpretation of the roles played by each.
Although there certainly are many other groups or
issue areas which could be singled out for analysis, those
indicated here are ones on which the frameworks of
development place substantial importance, and they do help
to illustrate the difficulties and ambiguities in the
application of the general development models to Latin
America. A final Justification for selection of these
particular indicators is that they represent three
different types of variables. One (urbanization) is a
process which usually receives much attention in the
literature. Secondly, the bureaucracy represents a part
of officialdom in being a part of the governmental
machinery itself. Finally, the middle sectors of society
represent a less organized interest group or "class" in
the society. Because of the variety represented by these
three issue areas and because of the importance attached
to them by the literature on political development, the
examination of them should provide some significant
insights into the usefulness of the frameworks being
analyzed.
7The Concept of "Development"
There are numerous meanings of the term "political
development"; almost every scholar using the term gives it
a different meaning. It will be helpful to outline the
various major usages before analyzing the frameworks used
for studying development.
One of the most common usages of the terra involves
its interrelationship with economic development. If not
equated with economic development, political development
Is often considered a necessary condition for economic
development. The developing nations themselves have
readily accepted this framework and have pushed for rapid
economic development in most cases without such attention
to the political and social consequences.
The variety of definitions is noted by Pye, op. '
cit. ; Black, or), cit. ; Alfred Dlamant, Political
DevelQ-pment (Bloomington, Ind. ; Comparative
Administration Group, I963); and Robert A. Packenham,
"Approaches to the study of Political Development,"
World Politics . XVII (October, 196if), 108-120 among
others.
See Pye, op. cit. . pp. 33-3^ for a discussion of
this usage. Others commonly associated with this
position are: Barbara VJard, The Rich Nations and the Poor
Nations (New York: Norton, 19^2); Walt W, Rostow, The
Staples of Economic Grovjth (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, I960); and to a lesser extent, A. P. K.
Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York:
8The concern with economic factors can be traced to
Karl Marx, of course. .In the superficial view of Marxist
analyses, the economic factors are the key to all other
aspects of the society's operation, mile some social
scientists have denied the influence of Marx on their
ideas, many have used variations of his analysis. Not all
have denied his influence.^ The viewpoint of many of the
authors in this tradition is that economic development
will bring these nations to maturity and as such they will
be "developed," politically as well as economically. With
a larger gross national product or voider distribution of
Knopf, 1965); and Black, op. cit. . Those citing economic
conditions as prerequisites stem from Alexis de
Toqueville's Demo cracy in America , ed. by Richard D.
Heffner (New York: The Nev: American Library, 1956).
Seymour Martin Lipset is probably the best known as a
spokesman for this position in his Political Man (Garden
City: Doubleday, I96O), and "Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,"
The American Political Science Review, LIU (March, 1959 )i
69-105.
^Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
I959T, and Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Bostonl Beacon Press, I966),
are examples of the direct influence of Marx. Others such
as Rostow, op. cit. , however, attem.pt to provide an
alternative approach to Marx, but they are still tied to
the economic factor.
9material goods, other problems will pale into
insignificance. This position is tantamount to saying that
economic development produces or determines political
development, although many scholars tend to look at the two
as more or less the same.*^
Barbara Ward's analysis explores another aspect of
the same question. In her approach, political development
precedes and actually provides the conditions for economic
8
development. Again the emphasis tends to be on the
material factor. Political development becomes the
instrument for attaining economic prosperity. The
political system is expected to provide a comfortable
environment for development of the economy. V/hile this
approach is an interesting and Important one, it is of
limited use in this study because Ward and the others
taking the same position do not really get to the point of
defining political development. The tendency seems to be
for them to adopt the standards of the United States and
De Toqueville, op. cit. ; Lipset, op. cit. ; Black,
op. c lt.; and Organski, op. c it., are good examples of
this'tradition.
Q
Ward, op. cit ..
10
Western Europe as models of politically developed nations
g
and expect other nations to follow this pattern,
A part of the economic approach to political
development relates to the process of industrialization.
For the above-noted frameworks, rapid industrialization is
often seen as the path to economic development and
therefore as an Important factor in political development.
Walt Rostow and A. F. K. Organski belong to this group. "'"^
Eldon Kenworthy analyzes the assumptions behind this
11
approach and the implications for Latin America. More
will be said about this in later chapters as these various
approaches are analyzed. Many scholars have looked at the
effects of industrialization on political development and
^Charles W. Anderson. "Political Factors in Latin
American Economic Development." Journal of International
Affairs , XX (1966), 2^2-2^3 considers this question.
^^Rostow, op. cit. , and Organski, op. cit. .
11
"Argentina: The Politics of Late
Industrialization." Foreign Affairs . XLV (April, 1967).
11
their considerations will be important as an attempt is
made by the author to provide a framework of his own."^^
Most of the discussion so far has centered on the
correlation of economic and political development. Some of
the scholars noted above have emphasized the negative
relationships between the two concepts of development.
Though writing from quite different perspectives, Moore,
Dahrendorf
,
Huntington, and Vellz focus on the problems
economic development can provide for political development.
In later chapters, these authors villi be evaluated in
greater detail. At this point, it should only be noted
that not all scholars dealing V7ith the economic factors of
political development accept a deterministic or unilinear
relationship between economic and political development.
The association of economic with political
development has been one of the most common features of the
literature on political development, particularly in the ^
In addition to those noted above, some other very
important works include Claudio Vellz (ed.), Obstacles to
Chann:e in L^tin America (Cambridge: Oxford University
Press. 1965); "The Politics of Conformity In Latin America
( London : Oxf ord University Press, 196?); and Huntington,
op. clt. ; Moore, op. clt. ; and Dahrendorf, op. cite
12
13early stages of concern with the subject. As was noted
above, the developing nations have placed a great deal of
emphasis on the development of their economies. Foreign
aid programs of the United States and others have often
been geared to Increasing the economic capacity of these
newer nations. Thus, an understanding of the
interrelationship of the two concepts is important in
understanding the new nations themselves, even if it is
decided that the economic determinist framevjork is not the
best over~all approach to studying latin America. Taking
their cue from the economic determinists, many Latin
American nations have accepted the idea that economic
development is a prerequisite to political development.
As such, the economic determinism approach will be helpful
in understanding certain aspects of the Latin American
nations' policies and expectations.
Another very com.mon approach to the concept of -
political development is to equate it with participation in
politics. This approach is very obviously based on Anglo-
American and Western European experiences. For a nation
to be considered developed, it must illustrate
•^^Almond and Coleman, op. cit. ; Rostow, op« cit.;
and Black, op. cit. .
13
characteristics approaching political democracy as
practiced in the Western nations. "^^ Since most of the
literature in this field comes from Anglo-American and
Western European scholars, it is perhaps natural that their
own experiences vilth political democracy would weigh
heavily in their analyses of development. The Western
democratic nations are seen as the most highly developed
and others must imitate them to join the "elite."
In equating development with political democracy,
these scholars evaluate several factors. First are the
basic institutions of government, especially constitutions
and governmental organization. Some suggest that having a
Many authors in comparative politics and ^
political development make this assumption either
implicitly or explicitly. Among them are: Lipset, gj^
cit. ; de Toqueville, op. cit.; Apter, op. cit« ; Almond and
Povjell, op. cit.; Almond and Coleman, op. cit. ; and
Charles W. Anderson, Piolitic s and Econ ornic Change in Latin
America (Princeton: Van No strand, 19W) f PP. 9-13 notes
this difference for Latin America.
1^
democratic constitution and stability implies political
development. The obvious problem with this analysis is
that the constitution may not indicate what is actually
practiced, a factor particularly important in studying
Latin American nations. Democratic constitutions often
become the "front" for legitimizing undemocratic regimes.
Llpset»E analysis of "constitutional government," for
example, would have to involve a much deeper analysis of
actual practices in order to claim validly that democratic
governments are in fact more stable than non-democratic
ones.
Beyond looking at the nature of constitutions, some
believe that political development involves an increase in
political participation. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba
have, perhaps, provided the most comprehensive treatment
16
of this particular approach. Their analysis professes
15
See Martin C. Needier, Political Development JLn
Latin America; Instability, Violence, and PJvolutlonary
Chan pre (New York: Random House, 19^0)' J. Lloyd Kecham,
"Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real,"
Journal of Politics , XXI (May, 1959). 258-2?2, and Glen
Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American Political
Tradition," The Hispanic American Historical Review,
XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 provide critiques of some
of the literature.
^Almond and Verba, op. cit. . Daniel Lerner, The
Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1958); Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
15
to go beyond democracy, but their "civic culture" is a form
of democracy emphasizing citizen participation in the
political process. With democratic values as a basis of
analysis, it is clear that political participation has to
be a very important Ingredient of political systems. The
question emerges as to whether it constitutes development.
Some suggest that participation accentuates impossible
demands on the system and actually leads to breakdovm
17
rather than development. Again, it is obvious that the
values of the scholars themselves play a very important
part in their use of the term "political development."
This particular usage will have to be evaluated along with
the others to determine whether or not it is appropriate
in studying I^tln America.
Often related to the equation of democracy and
political development is the viewing of political
Development," American Political Science Review , LV
(September, I9B1), 493-514; and William Kornhauser, The
jPolitlcs of Mass Society (New York: Free Press, 1959)
provide other examples of this approach.
Among them, Huntington, op. clt. , especially the
first chapter and Veliz in the introductions to his
edited volumes cited above.
development as stability of the nation-state.^^ As noted
above. Llpset is much concerned with stability in his
analysis of development and democracy. The goal of the
political system, according to this version of development,
is to maintain itself and resist challenges to its
legitimacy and stability. Orderly change becomes the
watchword and thus any change is very gradual. While
stability is all important, other features of the system
tend to be neglected. Criticisms of the systems analysis
approach abound in recent literature with special emphasis
on the limitations Imposed by concern with system
stability. One question to be pursued in this work is
whether stability by itself is worthy of being labelled
political development. A very primitive society can be
very stable, but few scholars are willing to call such
societies developed—development obviously Involves more
than stability.
18
This view has origins In Max Weber *s work and has
been transferred to contemporary analyses by Talcott
Parsons, The Social System (Nev; York: Free Press, 1951);
David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New
York: Wiley & Sons, 1965); Alinond and Powell, opT clt. ;
and Almond and Coleman, op. clt. . Among those viewing
Latin America from a stability oriented perspective is
Kalman Silvert, The Conflict Society (New York: Harper &
Row, 1968).
17
The consensus (and systems) approach can accommodate
gradual change in the system. Stability in the ••systems
approach" therefore means maintenance of the system with
change coming within the system. Rapid change and possible
destruction of the system are ruled out. The systems
approach does not necessarily represent stagnation, as
many of its critics would suggest. Nevertheless, because
the changes which do occur come through the system, there
is much opportunity for the biases of the system to filter
out and defuse pressures for the larger changes.
Another aspect of stability involves the
institutionalization of processes and organizations of
government. David Apter and Samuel P. Huntington both
tend to view development in terms of institutionalization.
Apter sees the institutionalizing of roles as particularly
important .'^ Politics for him involves the
differentiating of roles by citizens, and political
parties become the major agent for role differentiation,^^
19
Apter, op. cit.
.
Chapters I, II, and VII are
particularly instructive in this regard.
ZO
Ibid. , see Chapter VI.
18
Thus, the institutionalizing of political parties brings
about role differentiation, which is viewed as the key to
development,
Huntington feels that the institutionalization of
processes of government is the key factor. The process
of political development for him should focus on building
institutions rather than increasing democracy and
participation. "Authority and the ability to govern" are
the essential elements in stability and development.^^ In
this case, change comes very gradually and a lid must be
kept on citizen aspirations to avoid destruction of the
system.
Concern with institutionalization of processes
leads to yet another approach to development. Some
scholars equate legal and administrative development with
political development. This approach is sometimes also
21
fiuntington, op. cit. , and Samuel P. Huntington,
"Political Development and Political Decay," World
Politics , XVII (April, I965). 386-430.
22
Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies
, p. 8,
23
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^7);
and Joseph la Palombara (ed.). Bureaucracy and Political
Development (Princeton; Princeton University PressT 19^3)
19
called the legal-formal approach. Until fairly recently
much of the focus in comparative government had been on
legal-formal aspects. If the nation had the right
constitutional-legal system, usually meaning a
representative legislative body and adeqiiate legal
safeguards for citizens' rights, it would be considered
developed. This tendency is particularly true of the
early Latin American texts. Specialization of function
of agencies becomes a very important indicator of
development, especially for those concerned with
administrative factors. The administrative approach often
concerns itself with the efficiency of operation of
are good examples of this approach. In addition, Fred
Riggs* works, especially Admlnl .strati on in Developing
Countries (Boston: Houghton MlTflin Co., 196^) treat this
relationship.
Carl J. Friedrlch, Constitutional Government and ~
Democrac y (London: Methuen, 1961), and Herman J. Finer,
Theory and Practice of Modern Government (Boston: Glnn,
19507 are classic examples of such analyses.
25
See for example: William S. Stokes, Latin
American Politics (New York: Crowell, 1959); Harold
Davis (ed.). Government and Polit ics in latin America
(New York: The Ronald Press, 1958) ; and Hussel H.
Fitzgibbon (ed.). The Constitutions of the Americas
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^8).
20
government and how adequately the government performs its
Job of providing services to the citizenry.
The term political development is often used
interchangeably with political modernization,^^ This
equation of terms makes the criticism of an Anglo-
American-Western European bias in the development
literature particularly pertinent. Modernization in
government Is usually measured against the standards of the
Anglo-American-Western Eiiropean experience. Thus, v;hat is
modern can usually be translated into what is
characteristic of V/estern democratic traditions. Perhaps
to bo most accurate, modernization should be reserved as a
term to be applied to the changes in society as a whole
and political development should be limited to
27governmental factors. While such a suggestion is easy to
make, there is little question that boundaries of systems
are difficult to establish. It should be recognized,
however, that the political system is only a part of the
26
From the works discussed above, those of Apter,
Black, and Organski, among others, tend to equate the
terms in usage
•
27
Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies , was one of the first to differentiate between
political modernization and political development. Also
see Huntington, "Political Development and Political
Decay."
21
larger .social system and as such the terms "modernization"
and "political development" should be differentiated.
Hopefully this study will be able to clarify these terras.
Various definitions or usages of the concept
"political development" have been outlined in the foregoing
section of this study. The author does not suggest that
this sketch exhausts the usage of the term, but he
believes that most usages are accommodated by the foregoing
typology. Obviously, many of these usages overlap and
contradict one another. My hope is to be able to bring
more clarity to the concept and bridge some of the
inconsistencies in its usage V7ith particular reference to
Latin America,
In order to evaluate the concept in a system.atic
way, the individual approaches along the conflict-
consensus continuum of social change analysis will be
categorized. The conflict-consensus continuum is employed
because conflict and consensus represent opposing ways of
viewing plural societies* There are many alternative
classifications which could be used as the structure for
See Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives
and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism in
Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, I969). pp. 7-26.
this study, but the conflict-consensus dichotomy has been
employed in much of the literature in recent years. Both
implicitly and explicitly, the conflict and consensus
models have been applied to Latin America. For the reasons
stated above, the conflict-consensus continuum provides a
convenient method for classifying approaches to the study
of Latin American politics.
Basically, the conflict theorists view change in
plural societies as occurring because of irreconcilable
clashes among power groups. Inevitably, one group wins out
and exerts its power over the system. Eventually, new
opposition forms and a new clash results in a new
29distribution of power. ^ In the consensus approach, on
the other hand, conflicting interests compromise among
themselves and no one power group very often achieves its
goals. Instead, it is willing to give in for the benefit
of keeping the system intact. The ensuing series of
compromises characterizes the process of social change and
a basic consensus emerges on the ends and means of
30political action.
29See Kuper, op. cit. , and Diam.ant, op. cit. , for
a discussion of the differences of the models.
Ibid..
23
Latin America and the Literature
of Political Development
As has already been noted above, the various
frai^eworks of political development analysis have been
'
created chiefly by scholars with experience in the Anglo-
American and Western European traditions. This fact in
itself indicates a neglect of Latin America in the
literature of political development. In the major works
on development, very little attention is ever given Latin
American nations. Even when the literature takes note of
these nations, little in-depth analysis is provided.
Rather, surface observations are made on the basis of the
author's general concept of the Latin American
experience. Most of the authors creating frameworks for
the study of development have not been trained in Latin
American stiidiec. They cannot be taken to task for not
being experts on this region, but it is a factor which
'
must be considered in looking at the relationship of Latin
America to the literature of political development.
See Almond and Coleman, op. cit. . Huntington,
Political Order In Changing- Societies
, also devotes some
attention to Latin America,
2k
While the generalists have often Ignored Latin
America, the Latin Americanists have also usually been
divorced from the theories of political development.
Frequently they have ignored the theoretical works. Part
of the reason for ignoring development theory is that for
a long period, the Latin Americanists have been outside
the mainstreams of comparative political analysis. The
North Americans studying the region have not been fully
associated with comparative politics developments while
the Latin Americans themselves have not had a social
science tradition comparable to that of the United States.
Recent years have brought changes, but there is still a
gap between the comparative political analysis tradition
and studies of Latin America.-^
What may be more important to this study is that the
various frameworks have. been applied to the study of Latin
America with rare questioning of the appropriateness of ^
the models to the Latin American experience. -^^ Many
See Juan Marsal. Cambio social en America Latina
(Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 196?), pp. 225-226.
33This fact has been treated by Alfred Stepan,
"Political Development Theory: The Latin American
Experience,** The Journal of International Affairs , XX
(1966). 223--23^; Dealy, op. cit. ; Albert 0. Hirschman.
"How Policy is Made," Americas . XV (August. I963), 39-^1;
scholars of I^tln America have attempted to understand
Latin America In terms of the previously summarized
frameworks. Specific authors and their uses of the
frameworks will be given detailed treatment in Chapter
VIII, and selected treatment in Chapters III through VII.
The fact is, then, that there is a bias in the
literature which causes neglect of the Latin American
experience in the general developmental schemes and.
secondly, there is a misapplication of the frameworks to
the nations of Latin America. Briefly noted below are the
reasons for the bias and the problems which unquestioned
application of the models to the study of Latin America
imply.
Many students of Latin America have attempted to
evaluate the use of V/estern democratic frameworks of
analysis. Alfred Stepan suggests that the underlying
assumptions of the fram.ev/orks bear the primary
responsibility for the neglect of Latin America in the
literature. The models usually assume that as societies
Hoviard Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis," an unpublished paper,
n.d. ; and Marsal. op. cit.
.
among many others.
3^
Ibid..
beco.e more industrialized,
.ore urbanized, and better
educated, they will inevitably show changes in the nature
of their political systems, ordinarily accompanied by an
evolution toward the democratic model. According to
Stepan. however, these "indicators of development" Just do
not seem to follow the prescribed patterns in Latin
America. Scholars who apply such models usually tend to
reach conclusions consistent with the models because they
do not take notes of other factors. Juan Marsal suggests
that such models, as used by John J. Johnson, are self-
fulfilling because they ask questions of the society in
such a way that the answers will be consistent with the
model's assumptions.-^^
Glen Dealy and Charles W. Anderson point up
another very important assumption of the models—namely
that the models are based on the belief that people will
act in a rational m^anner to gain particular goals. The
Latin American experience has often placed greater value
on what the advocates of democratic models might consider
Marsal. op. cit.
. p. 108.
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op* cit.
.
and Anderson, "Political
Factors in Latin American Development."
2?
"non-rational" factors, such as personallsmo
. rather than
bureaucratic efficiency, for example. Glen Dealy goes
into much detail in comparing the Latin American
experience with the belief of many scholars that Latin
American nations have adopted the United States and
Western European democratic systems as models to strive
for. In an incisive analysis he evaluates the
constitutions and practices of the nations of Latin
America and illustrates how the values of the Latin
Americans give different meanings to the terms and
concepts of the Western democratic experience. He
concludes that these nations probably do not aspire to our
ideals or to the ideal of democracy as we think they do."^^
Related to Dealy 's analysis is Juan Marsal's
contention that much confusion has arisen in terminology
because the Latin American Intellectual tradition has not
produced an indigenous social science. Rather, social
science frameworks have been adopted from North Americans
and Europeans. Because the Spanish language has not had
37
Anderson, "Political Factors in Latin American
Development," pp. 246-247, and 251.
38
Ibid., pp. 54-58.
a social science vocabulary, many of the terms of social
scientists have been appropriated from the English.
Often, new and different meanings are given the terms by
Latin Americans and North Americans may think the Latin
American scholar means one thing when he actually means
something else.
Another reason for the bias against Latin America
in the development literature is that the historical
experience of latin America has been quite different from
that of North America. The North American colonial
experience was primarily associated with the Northern
European nations, whereas Latin America's heritage is
Southern European or more specifically. Iberian. As
traced by Richard Morse, Howard Wiarda, and others, there
is a significant difference in these traditions.
Because the values and thought of the Iberian tradition
vary tremendously from the Protestant ethic of Northern
^
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Marsal, op. cit.
. pp. 225-226.
Richard M. Morse, •Some Characteristics of Latin
American History," American Histori cal Review
. LXVII
(January, 1962), 317-33B, and "Toward a Theory of Spanish
American Government," Journal of the History of Ideas
. XV
(195^). 71-93; and Wiarda, op. cit.
. Dealy. op. cit.
. is
also very instructive in this regard.
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Europeans and North Americans, the models appropriate to
the latter traditions just do not conform to the Iberian
and I^tln American experiences. Latin America is
essentially authoritarian. Catholic, feudal, and
conservative while the tradition of the United States is
primarily democratic. Protestant, middle class bourgeois,
and liberal. A more detailed analysis of Latin
American historical experience will be presented in the
next chapter.
The significance of the question of the
appropriateness of the frameworks of political development
analysis to the study of Latin America goes beyond just
learning about Latin America. Policies of the United
States and others toward Latin America are based on our
knowledge of the area. It is important to have an
accurate understanding of the area if our foreign policies
are to make sense.
This introductory chapter provides an overview of
the analysis to be presented in the study. The remainder
of the study will provide detailed analysis of the
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(New York: Harcourt. Brace, and World, 195Tn
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various factors and Issues outlined above. Chapter II will
present a very brief review of Latin America's pattern of
political development. Chapter III will explain the
consensus model in detail and evaluate its application to
Latin America. Chapter IV will do the same with the
conflict model. Chapters V. VI, and VII actually analyze
the major issue areas under consideration and their
treatment in the literature. Chapter V deals with the
middle sectors, vzhile Chapter VI analyzes urbanization and
Chapter VII analyzes the phenomenon of bureaucracy.
Chapter VIII presents a brief review of the major points
of the arguments and the author's conclusions about the
issues considered in the study, along with some
suggestions on how one ought to approach the study of
Latin America,
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CHAPTER II
THE PATTERN OP LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
As was noted In the previous chapter, the
historical experience of the Latin American nations has
been quite different from that of the United States,
Basically, the Latin American heritage is Southern
European and Iberian while the United States* tradition
is of a North European origin. In terms of societal
differences this has meant that the Latin American
nations have inherited the essentially feudal and medieval
traditions of Spain and Portugal, whereas the United
States was colonized primarily by Northern European
nations which had already emerged from the feudal
experience into an early capitalistic oriented economic
system. Concerning religion, the Latin American
tradition is Catholic with all of the Church's
institutional and conservative Spanish moral values, while
32
the United States was colonized by a variety of sects most
of which were dominated by the Protestant ethic, with its
greater emphasis on pluralism, secularism, and material
success. The religious experiences have had much
influence on Intellectual and scientific endeavor as well.
The Thomlstlc Catholic tradition based its intellectual
traditions on logic and deductive reasoning in search of
absolute truths, while the Protestant tradition provided
greater opportunity for questioning and scientific
1inquiry.
The social and political spheres of Latin America
and the United States have been subject to different
forces as well. The feudal and medieval system was based
on rigid class lines which were transferred to Latin
1^
Leopoldo Zea, The Latin American Mind, translated"
by James H, Abbott and Lowell Dunham (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press. I963) was one of the most influential
books on the philosophical traditions of Latin America.
Kls analysis has been severely criticized recently.
Among the critics is William D. Raat, "Leopoldo Zea and
Mexican Positivism: A Reappraisal." The Hi spanic
Amgrican ..Historica l Review. XLVIII. NoTXTfSbrui^y
,
1968), 1-18^ Several of the readings in The Origins of
the_Jjj-U.n_Jlrrierican Revolutions. 1808-1826
.
ed. by R. A.
Humphreys and John LyncfrTWevi York : Knopf, I966), present
excellent analyses of the differences in philosophical
traditions as well.
America through colonization. ^ Land-holding was the source
of power m the social and political spheres. The Spanish
tradition accepted absolutism as a legitimate kind of
rule. The United States colonial experience, on the other
hand, brought the beginnings of pluralism and the
emergence of a strong middle class. In the political
sphere, pluralism began to emerge, and the concept of
limited government came from the English and French
traditions.
Since the colonial experiences of new nations
affect their future developments, the study of colonial
traditions should provide a key to understanding later
development of the systems. As a result, attention will
now be turned to an analysis of Latin America's colonial
experience; and then, its history will be traced
interpretlvely rather than exhaustively, through modern
times. The Impact of the colonial experience as well as
pertinent differences between the Latin American and
United States • experiences will be noted. This analysis
2
C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1947). especially
Chapter X notes this tradition. For discussion of the
liberal tradition of the United States, see Louis Hartz,
The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and World, 19^^.
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will provide the basis for further evaluation of the
western democratic oriented frameworks for the study of
political development in relation to Latin America.
One further note about the study of latin America
should be made. Lewis Hanke, among others, has frequently
cautioned that it is risky to treat all of Latin America
alike.
^
The author of this study realizes that there are
many conflicting forces and trends from one nation of
Latin America to another. None can be treated as exactly
alike. While it may be hazardous to generalize about the
"latin American experience." there are enough
commonalities in the historical and cultural traditions of
the Latin Americans to treat the region as a whole.
Pertinent exceptions to the general trends will be noted
as these traditions are scrutinized.
This question is considered as part of an even
broader question in Lewis Hanke (ed.). Dp th e Ameri cas
Have, A_ Common History ? (New York: Knopf. IStWf^
~~
especially the Introduction as well as in his Contemporary
I^^n Amgrl pg- ; A Short History (Princeton: Van Nostrand,
1968), pp, and 2^2^^2E5l In addition, see Luis
Mercler Vega. Roads to Power In Latin America (New York:
Praeger, I969), especially pp. I-.3.
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Colonial Traditions
The sixteenth century was one of exceptional
colonial activity by the Spaniards and Portuguese, and the
Americas provided a fertile ground for empire building.
Their colonial empires in the Americas took hold during
this century. There were several aspects of the colonial
period which are important to the evaluation of latin
American political development.
The Indians
. The native Indian population of the
Americas presented an obstacle to colonization by the
Spaniards and Portuguese. The variety of Indian
civilizations created a number of different types of
effects for the conquerors. In some instances, the Indians
of Latin America had more advanced civilizations than their
counterparts in North America. For example, the Incas,
Mayas, and Aztecs facilitated the conquest in the Valley
of Mexico, the Yucatan, and the V/estern Andean highlands.
These sedentary Indians were fairly easy to conquer because
See Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York:
Harper and Row. I966), pp. 25-32, and Chapter ?. Also
Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer, The Growth
and Culture of latin Arnerlca (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1956), Chapter II,
the Spaniards only had to get rid of the leaders and then
they could take control of the civilization. This type of
subjugation was particularly easy with the Aztec
Civilization which was highly centralized in organization.
^
The Mayas were less easily subjugated because there was no
one capital of the civilization and they did not fall to
the conquerors as a unit. Instead, various bands of
Mayas fought In an uncoordinated manner— the whole
Civilization did not submit as the result of loss of the
leadership,^
The Incas, although perhaps the most advanced
Indian civilization, proved even more difficult to
conquer. The Andean topography may have been a partial
factor in their greater resistance to conquest in that the
highlands permitted holdouts in various mountain hideouts.
Hov/ever, the situation was complicated by civil war
within the Inca civilization and various Spanish factions
vied for control of the Incan empire. The Spanish
Gibson, op. cit.
. p. 25.
6
Ibid.
. p. 29.
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factions led to conflict a.ong the conquerors and permitted
the inoas to retain some Independence late Into the
sixteenth century,'^
once the elite elements of the Aztec. Mayan, and
mean Civilizations were eliminated, the Spaniards had a
readily submissive population at their disposal. ^ These
sedentary tribes were skilled in agriculture, weaving,
and the mining of precious metals. All of these skills
were valx^ble to the Spaniards and they took advantage of
the Indians to provide for their own enrichment.
In contrast to the sedentary Indians, there were
many nomadic tribes. The nomads inhabited Southern South
America (the Puelche. Tehuelche. and Araucanian Indians)
and Northern Mexico (the Apaches).^ These nomadic
Indians were more akin to the Indians in what was to
become the United States. The nomads were difficult to
conquer and they made it difficult for settlements to
exist because of attacks on the settlements. Conflicts
Ibid.
, pp. 30-32.
Q
See Eric R. Wolf. Sons of Shakinp: Earth (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1959), pp. 213-215.
9
Worcester and Schaeffer, op. clt.
. p. 19.
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With the nomads continued throughout colonization and still
exist in some Latin American nations. Additionally, the
nomads did not represent a stable source of labor for the
colonizers as the sedentary Indians did so that there was
not so much attraction to the conquerors in areas where
nomads roamed "'"^
The Indians represented a vast source of labor to
the conquerors and use of this supply of manpower took
many forms. During the early period of colonization, the
encomienda system developed. Through this system,
Spaniards were given control over land and Indian labor on
the land, although the land still remained in the hands of
the Crown. This arrangement is different from the
hacienda system which emerged in some parts of the area,
Tl^e hacienda system Included title to land; whereas the
encomienda system extended control only over the Indians
and whatever was produced on the land.'^"'" The person
Ibid,
See Eric R. Wolf. "Aspects of Group Relations in
a Complex Society: Mexico," Contemporary Cultures and
Societ ies of Latin Ameri ca, ed. by Dwight B, Heath and
Richard N, Adams (New York: Random House, I965), pp. 90-
92, and Wolf and Edv;ard C, Hansen, "Caudlllo Politics:
A Structural Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and
History
, IX (January, 19^7), PP. 168-179 for a discussion
of these differences.
granted the encomle^ was supposed to protect and provide
for the moral well-being (n^eaning Christianization) of his
subjects. In return the Indian subject provided labor for
the grantee. In effect this system a form of slavery,
even though moral and legal obligations were imposed on
the landowner. Ronald Glassman refers to the encomienda
system as part of a «semifeudal state system," carried
over from Spain's ovm developmental experience. m this
system, there developed a very personalistic relationship
between the master and his charges thus differentiating
the system from a purely feudal arrangement with greater
emphasis on traditional-legal factors. This personalism
is an important factor in considering the modernizing
process in Latin America. Attempts at creating
bureaucratic organizations on the western model have had
12
Ronald Glassman, Political History of Lat in
America. (New York: Funk &""Wagnalls, I969), pp. 83-89;William W. Pierson and Federlco Gil. Governments of litinAmerica (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970)'.
p. 55; Stanley Stein and Barbara H. Stein. The Colonjal
H.erita.'^e of latin America (New York: ColumbiTljnT57^?iTty
Press, 1970). p. 36; and Earing, op. cit.
. Chapters III,
IV, and VI explain some of the details of the encomienda
system.
13
Glassman. op. cit.
. pp. 87-90 spells out some of
the difference betv/een feudalism and his "semi-feudal"
framework.
to consider the personallstic feature. The assuinptions
behind the rational Weberian model, for Instance, have not
always been relevant to Latin America.
Another aspect of the semi-feudal arrangement was
that the scale of organization of social relationships was
fairly small. The peasant developed loyalty to his
landholder rather than to a larger political unit such as
the Crown or its administrative officers in the colonies.
This feature was also to be of great importance for future
political development. Much of the experience of Latin
American political affairs relates to the many centers of
power which have competed for supremacy in any one
country. The caudillo system emerged partially as a
result of this experience.
The encomienda system seemed most suited to the
early period of colonization v^hen the Europeans were few
in number and the native population was large. As the
relative size of the indigenous population decreased, a
new approach was needed and the encomienda system gave way
14to repartimiento. In this system the person in need of
This discussion of the use of Indian labor is
based on Gibson's analysis, op. clt.
. pp. 157-I58.
labor applied to local authorities and the local
authorities distributed Indians among the Spanish
employers. While the Indians were paid and supposedly
treated humanely, this system was a form of forced labor.
The system of repartlrolento developed partly because of
Crovm pressure to abandon the encomlenda system. Like It
predecessor, repartlmiento failed because of abuses by
employers and because of increasing pressures by the
Crown in the late sixteenth century.
During the seventeenth century, a system of free
contract labor developed but was short-lived. The
insufficiency of Indian labor and abuses by employers led
to its demise. Peonage took the place of the
aforementioned attempts at utilization of Indian labor.
Through peonage, the Spaniard made loans to the Indians
and required repayment in work. As the debt was repaid,
new loan would be granted thus insuring obligation of the
Indian. Debts could be inherited by the children. This
system has endured even though attempts at limitation
have been made.
The hacienda and plantation systems represent a
variation on the use of Indian manpower. In this system,
the Spaniards acquired land by buying, through land grant
or by taking It away from the native population. The
hacienda would often incorporate entire Indian villages*
While the Indian was taken advantage of In this system, the
Crovm did not react to It with controls as It did with the
other forms of labor.^^ As a result, the system became
entrenched In Latin America and works hand in hand with
peonage.
The generalizations made above cannot be applied to
Brazilian Indians. In Brazil, the Indian civilizations
were generally very primitive and usually nomadic. As a
result, they either disappeared, were assimilated, or
became isolated in uncolonized regions. The coastal
areas of Brazil became devoid of Indians and even in the
interior they were not very well suited to plantation work.
In addition, the Jesuit influence in Brazil had the impact
of reducing the use of Indians as slaves. '•'^ All of these
forces led to the introduction of the African slave in
Brazil,
15
Ibid. , p. 156.
16
See Worcester and Schaeffer, op. cit.
. p. 2?.
17
Ihid
. . pp. 27-28. Also see C. R. Boxer. The
Portuguese Seaborne Empire: 1415-1825 (London:
Hutchinson. I969), pp. 96-9?.
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The African slave gave Brazil an ethnic minority
Which did not exist in such large numbers in much of the
rest of latin America. The African provided the muscle
for development of Brazil's colonial economy. Black
slavery was accepted by the Portuguese Crown until
abolition in 1888. While the Africans were imported
mainly for their labor, they also introduced new ideas to
the Brazilian social system. Brazil became a mixture of
African, Indian, and European with the result that
Brazilians represent a people very different from most
18Latin Americans. In addition to providing labor and
introducing different cultural traditions, the African
helped explore and develop Brazil as well as provide
manpower for protection against hostile Indians. Besides
Brazil, many Caribbean nations were influenced by large
African populations. This ethnic-cultural strain enriched
the cultural tradition of latin America and led to some
racial problems at times. The Africans in Latin America,
however, were assimilated to a greater extent than they
were in the United States and their culture became a part
18
See E. Bradford Burns, A History of Bi-azil (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 39-43 for an
excellent discussion of the contribution of the Africans.
Of Brazilian and Caribbean cultures; whereas in the United
States, they remained essentially a separate culture.
Generally, the ethnic-cultural make-up of Latin
America is vastly different from that of the United States.
In many cases in latin America, the Indians outnumbered
Spaniards and were not eliminated or assimilated.
Compared to the United States, the Indians have had a much
greater Impact In Latin America. m many cases,
particularly where the nomads are Involved. Indians still
exist in virtual Isolation of the rest of the nation. As
a result, integration of the nation is very difficult.
Instead, two separate cultures often exist within the
national boundaries with little bridging of the gap between
those cultures.
Administration. In colonizing the New World, the
Spanish Crown retained almost absolute control over
19acquired territories. In order to exercise the supreme
'
19
Harlng, pp. clt.. pp. 1-22 analyzes the
background to the Spanish view of the King's sovereignty
over the colonies. The subject is also treated briefly by
Stein and Stein, op
.
clt.
. pp. 3-26, William Lytle
Schurz. lat in America; A Descriptive Survey (New York:
Button, 19^3), pp. 31-33 deals specifically with the
aspects of discovery and exploration by the Spaniards.
authority, the Crov.^ set up viceroyaltles In the New World.
First came the creation of New Spain in 1535 containing
Mexico and Central America; the Viceroyalty of Peru was
created in 15^2 encompassing all of South America.
Eventually New Granada was separated from the Viceroyalty
of Peru in I7I8 and still another. La Plata, was carved
20
out in 1776. It should be remembered that the creation
of these units and the forthcoming administrative unity was
for the purpose of extending more effective control over
the regions by the colonial power.
The fact that Spain attempted to maintain extensive
control over its colonies means that the colonies did not
have opportunity for acquiring experience with self-
government except at the local level. By way of contrast,
the English colonies had some element of discretion in the
Pierson and Gil. op> cit.
. pp. 39~-li9 outline the
administrative apparatus of the Spaniards.
21
IMd.
. pp. 62-65. The authors provide an
excellent comparison of the Spanish and English colonies
in the Americas. In noting the different experiences of
the tV7o colonial traditions, they note that the English
colonies were developed by settlements of colonists going
to the New World for their ov/n reasons while the Spanish
colonies were attempts at transplanting the colonial
power's culture in the new world.
operation of their own unit, despite the fact that
authority
.tlU resided In the Crown. Hobert Potash „..es
the suggestion that It .ight be laok of preparation of the
people for life m modern society rather than the
continued existence of outmoded colonial institutions
Which is important in latin American development.
22e.Mtles. Another feature of the colonial system
v.as the fact that it involved an element of city building
on the part of the Spaniards. The cities were the centers
Of administration for the Crown as well as beine showcases
Of splendor and luxury in the tradition copied from the
Moslems by Spain. ^3 They attracted the landholders and
22
Robert A. Potash, "Colonial Institutions andContemporary I^tin Arnerica: A Commentary on Two Papers
flfe^'S^^^^ ^v^i^ (August
;
^ i^^"^^^ comments on Woodrow Borah. "ColonielInstitutions and Contemporary Latin Am.erloa: Political ^and Economic Life." pp. 371-379. and Charles Gibso^
"Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America-Social and Cult.n>al Life." pp. 38L38/in the same ?oiume.
23
•
^
John Mander, The^Unrevp Tj^eIf^lSrofL^^
for Latin America. United Nations Economic and Social
council, Soc.ial Development of Latin America in The Post-
61 deal with the issue and take a simi.lar position.
.ore wen.to.do. The development or cities in this way
has two very important implications for this study.
First of all. the fact that cities developed as
centers of grandeur by the aristocracy, who were the
landholders, meant that the landed estates were often
left in the hands of managers. The countryside eventually
experienced a legitimacy vacuum of sorts. This vacuum
may be partially responsible for much of the social
disjointed^ess and political anarchy which was to plague
latin America's rural areas in the future. The cities
became the centers of political power although land was
the source of wealth, status, and power.
Secondly, that cities developed very early in
Latin America and as showplaces of culture is important
in evaluating frameworks for the study of political
development. Many of the frameworks are based on
assumptions and result in conclusions to the effect that
urbanization is brought about by industrialization. In
Latin America, in contrast, cities long predated
Industrialization and have existed without accompanying
Industrialization. The fact of Latin American
urbanization experience will be important in considering
the validity of such frameworks. Chapter VI, dealing
with urbanization and political development, will treat
this factor in depth.
She-Church. Perhaps one of the „ost durable of
colonial institutions in I.tin America is the RoM.n
catholic Church. The relationship of church and state
was traditionally one of interdependence. The Spanish
monarchy exercised a great a.ount of control over the
selection of the ecclesiastical hierarchy during the
colonial period as a result of the Royal Patronage of the
Indies worked out by the government and the Pope.^'^
m effect, the Church operated at the pleasure of and for
the benefit of the Spanish Monarch. It provided further
assua^ances that control by the Crown would be upheld in
the colonies.
There were some limitations to the governmental'
control over the Church in the colonies, however. As
Pierson and Gil note, the Cro^vn could not revoke an
ecclesiastical appointment once made.25 ^^^^^ ^^^^
some room for independence on the part of ecclesiastical
authorities. Further, the state's authority did not
24
See Pierson and Gil, op. cit.> pp. 50^^-^-
.^^^•-•^^^ PP- 166-193; and Schurz, pp. cit. . forformation on this relationship.
25
Pierson and Gil, op. cit.
. pp.51-52.
extend to ecclesiastical matters. It is obvious that
this arrangement provided some limitations on the state.
The close relationship between Church and state
provided an opportunity for the state to further the
interests of the Church as well. The state attempted to
keep heretical ideas out of the colonies but for various
reasons, it was not always successful. For one thing,
the Indians did not accept Christianization without
resistance. Instead, they retained many of their pagan
beliefs and the result often was a mixture of pagan and
Catholic practices. In Brazil and other places where
African slaves were introduced, many slaves retained
their Moslem or African religions and thus represented a
source of heresy. In most of Spanish America, however,
the efforts of the Spaniards to keep the faith intact
paid off handsomely in terms of loyalty of the Church to
state authority. The ecclesiastical authorities often
became adjuncts of the state.
Not to be overlooked v;as the missionary zeal of
the Spaniards. Usually people were not allowed in the
colonies imless they were Christians, and the colonists
attempted to spread the faith in some instances. In
cases where the Indians were Christianized, the clergy
were usually closer to the indigenous population than
were the governmental officials n>.« ^uiix i . One reason for the
Closeness of the Indians to the clergy I3 the fact that
the Indians had been stripped of their hu:,anlty by the
conquerors but the Church defended that hu„.nlty and gave
n>eanln« to the Indian's life. A3 noted by Eric Wolf
religion provided the Indian with a .eans of coping with
his existence. It gave him hope, not in the sense of
eternal salvation, but In the meaning of everyday Ufe.^^
In addition. hw.ane considerations on the part of clerics
often tempered the brutal treatment of the Indians. As a
result, where Indians had much contact with the Spaniards
it was usmlly through the Church and loyalty tended to
be to the Church rather than government. Of course, the
ecclesiastical authority occasionally used this loyalty
against the government, but usually it was translated
Into loyalty to the Crovm.^? The close relationship of
26
Wolf. Sons of Shaking Earth , pp. 170-I75.
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See Pierson and Gil. op. clt.
. pp. 51.53.
?dei"?AaF?hf^' P''* 5o^n^ agree with thethe clergy was any less likely than others toexploit and abuse the native population. He relates
examples of physical abuse as a means of ridding Indians
?nH?of ^'''^"S!^ "^^^ t^l''^ °f destruftlon o?I dian temples. Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to LatinAmerica (Mew York. Vintage Books. r9"6o).'p. 56 states:it is important to repeat that the only contact with
51
Church and state went hand in hand in transmitting
Spanish culture to the New World.
The Church's role in Latin American political
affairs increased as time went on. largely as a result of
its acquisition of land. Much land was left to the
Church and it eventually became the largest single
landholder in Latin America. With wealth and power
dependent on land, the Church gained unprecedented
influence. Because of the system of mortmain, the lands,
once acquired by the Church, were to remain in its hands
perpetually. The Church's holdings continually
increased.
Perhaps the most important legacy of the Church
was its impact on thought. The Church's teachings
emphasized reverence for authority and acceptance of the
faith vrithout question. Anyone who questioned the
Church's teachings was considered a sinner. The idea was
carried over to acceptance of authority in general
because of the close interrelationship of church and
Europeans not imkindly to the American Indians was
through the mission." Thus, agreement does not exist
although it is generally conceded that if the Indians
received humane treatment, it was from the Church.
state. 28 The lack of questioning created a fairly
submissive population. The teaching that poverty, for
instance, was a natural condition and a form of suffering
leading to Improvement in human nature and as a partial
way to eventual salvation, caused the peasants to accept
their lot as natujral. Donald E. Worcester argues that
religious traditions created a fatalistic and passive
population. In addition he argues that incentive and
creativity were dulled by the faith put in miracles or
other acts of God.^^ Whether good or bad, there can be
little doubt that the Church was a major force in the
colonial setting and was to remain so for a long time to
come.
The Interrelationship of church and state was not
so great in Portuguese as in Spanish colonies. V/hile the
rights of patronage existed in Brazil, there was much
less rigidity in religious practices* The Portuguese
were not so likely to exclude non~ Christians and were
28
Gibson, op. cit.
.
Chapter k deals with this
aspect, especially pp. 35-86,
29
Donald E. Worcester, "The Spanish American
Past: Enemy of Change," Journal of Inter-American
Studies
. XI (January, I969), 66-75.
more open to acceptance of Indian and African practices;
thus, the Church had less influence in state affairs. ^o'
Another difference in the Church in Brazil was that the
Jesuits were dominant and because they were more open to
new ideas and developments than the secular clergy, the
Church had a different effect in Brazil.
In the other nations of Latin America, the various
religious orders fought with one another and usually the
Crown sided with the secular clergy who tended to be more
conservative and loyal to the Ci^own.^^ The Jesuits were
not controlled by a secular hierarchy in Brazil. Many
Jesuits in Brazil became spokesmen for humane treatment of
the Indians and slaves as well as for curtailing the
influence of the Crown. Brazil still has some of the
most liberal clergy in all of Latin America although not
necessarily Jesuit. As a result, there was a greater
acceptance of diversity and. because of the African input,
of racial mixtures so that discrimination did not become
as strong in Brazil as it did in other parts of Latin
America,
30
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Pierson and Gil, op. cit.
. pp. 72-73, and pp.80-81; and Stein and Stein, op. clt.
. pp. 21-2^^.
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Bourbon Reforms and Independence
The Bourbon reforms in Spain and Portugal were
carried to the American colonies but often with effects
very different from what happened in Europe. The primary
intent of the Bourbons in instituting reforms in the
Americas was to increase the amount of wealth to be
collected by the Crovm.^^ There were reforms in the
economic, political, and social areas of the system and
all were directed at increasing colonial control. The
political reforms In particular were calculated to
consolidate Crovm authority and diminish the Influence of
the Church in colonial affairs. Many attempts at
centralization of power were made with reorganization of
colonial administration. The intendant system was
intended as a means of decreasing the Influence of local
officials \}ho had been embarrassments to the Crown because
of their corruption and inefficiency.
32
See John J. Johnson, Simon Bolivar and Spanish
American Independence; 1783-1830 (Princeton! VanNostrand, 1968), pp. 16-36.
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While the Intent of the reforms seemed to be to
improve control by the mother country, there were also
some results beneficial to the people of Latin America.
Most Important, the reforms meant more humane treatment
for the Indian and slave populations. Although the lives
of Africans and Indians continued to be dreary, at least
the worst abuses v;ere abolished.^^
The effect of the Bourbon reforms was to Improve
the established order through enlightened despotism. It
did not have much Impact in reducing absolute control over
the system. However, the improvement of many elements of
administration meant eventually that new power centers
for opposition to the Crovm would develop. In addition to
new power centers, the various efforts by the Crown to
increase the efficiency of its exploitation of the
colonies only increased opposition. -^^
In Brazil, the Bourbon reforms were tied to an
increasing interest by the Crown in its colony. During
the late eighteenth century, Portugal began losing its
3^
Ibid.
, p. 21; Charles C. Griffin, "The
Enlightenment and Latin American Independence," in
Humphreys and Lynch, op. cit.
. pp. 3G-51; and Gibson,
op. cit.
. pp. 165-172,
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, p. 2k; and Griffin, op, cit. ,
p. 48.
empire and Brazil beca.e its major interest after having
been of minor importance as part of Portugal's empire in
earlier days. The Crov:n attempted to tighten its control
over the colony by talcing away much of its local autonomy
and transferring power from the landed proprietors to
agents of the Crown.^^ With the transfer of the monarchy
to Rrazil in 1808, the conflicts between the local
administration and Crovm policies grew with the eventual
result of complete autonomy for Brazil,
For nearly three hundred years, the colonial rule
of Spam remained essentially intact. The success of
Spain in retaining control over her colonies is notable in
light of the eighteenth century developments in North
America. The reasons for Spain's success in maintaining
control are not easy to pinpoint. However, Cecil Jane
suggests that a great portion of the credit for retention
of control must go to the lack of desire on the part of
the colonists for independence.^'' He argues that the
See Caio Prado Junior, "The Economic
Interpretation of Brazilian Independence," in Humphreys
and Lynch, op. cit.
, pp. 221-2^0 j and Boxer, op. cit.,
pp. 198-200. *
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Cecil Jane, Liberty and Despotism in Spanish
America (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966). ppW^50 and 57-64.
colonists were satisfied for the most part with Royal
authority and that the Church was instrumental in
instilling a loyalty to constituted authority. Another
factor may have been the colonists* fear of domination by
other European powers. At any rate, there is little
question rhat the colonists had little desire for breaking
their ties with Spain until the nineteenth century.
During the period from 1810 to 1825, however, most
Of the nations of Latin America severed their political
ties with the colonial powers. Leading to the wars of
independence, notes Lyle KcAlister. there was a general
erosion of the institutions and structures of the Spanish
colonial powers, Both Spain and Portugal had attempted
to centralize their colonial administration but. as was
noted above, their attempts produced forces leading to
sentiment for independence. Most importantly, resentment
began building up among the Creoles who were virtually
excluded from positions of political power. Instead, the
peninsulares retained almost all power. Increasingly, the
Creoles made contact with the outside v/orld and gained
exposure to new ideas. Comparing their own society to
38
Lyle N. KcAlister, "Social Structure and Social
Change in New Sfvain," The PUspanlc American Historical
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those Of Europe and North America, many Creoles became
impatient for change from authoritarian rule and. as such,
became involved in Independence movements. ^9 ^ven though^
the Cro.^ had become somewhat distant in dealings with the
colonies, the peninsulares remained in control. One of
the effects of this arrangement was to leave a power
vacuum when independence did come since the Creoles and
native population had no training or experience in
governing themselves.
Nany of the colonists regarded themselves as being
exploited by the mother country and this, combined with
the miserable lot of the peasant, created greater interest
m separation. The general feeling of repression in all
spheres of life was responsible for much of the
Independence sentiment especially when combined with a
widening horizon on the part of the colonists. Ideas from
the Enlightenment and a tendency toward greater
Intellectual and social freedom were emerging.
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Pierson and Gil, op. clt.
, p. 83 deals with this
element as well as the other ideas suggested in this
section. Also see Ben Burnett and Kenneth F. Johnson,
Political Forces in Latin America (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1968), pp. 3-6; and Schurz. op. cit.
. pp. ^3-
Probably nothing had a greater impact than the
example set by the North American colonies and the French
Revolution. With their independence from Great Britain,
the North American colonies stimulated similar activities
in other colonial dependencies. The ideas of liberty,
equality, etc., were being accepted by the colonists of
latin America. As will be seen, the ideals were not
always carried into practice in the Latin American states
While support for Independence may have increased
because of dissatisfaction with certain features of
colonial rule, the wars of Independence were not really
anti-Crom. Instead, the independence movements were
often Justified on the basis of support for the real
monarchy as opposed to the rule of Napoleon after his
subjugation of Spain, Loyalty to Spain was acceptable
but most Spanish people in the colonies could not give
loyalty to Napoleon's colonial empire and the seeds of
revolution were planted. Additionally, the colonies were
often revolting against peninsular authority imder the
guise of loyalty to the Crown, charging the penlnsulares
^0
Johnson, Simon Bolfvar and Smnlsh American
Independence; I783-I83O
. p. 36,
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with violating the will of the Crown.^^ Whatever the
source of revolt, the wars of Independence changed very
little. Although often based on lofty Ideals, the post-
independence rulers tended to be as authoritarian as were
the colonial powers. In the words of John J, Johnson:
The difference vjas that by 1825
authoritarians born in America had replaced
those sent from Spain and Portugal; except
in Brazil, which remained an empire iintil
1889. authoritarianism was wielded in the
name of republicanism. ^2
The social, economic, and political order tended to remain
the same, the only change being that different people were
holding power.
Jane, op. clt.
.
Chapters V and VI.
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John J. Johnson, Political Chanpre in Latin
America: The Emergence of the Middle Se'ctors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958). p. 1?.
61
Post-Independence 19th Century
I83O-I87O. When Independence came to Latin
America, the colonists were often ill-prepared for ruling
themselves. It will be remembered that the Spaniards
practically excluded the Creoles and natives from
governmental affairs. As a result there developed a power
vacuum when the rule of Spain and those loyal to the
empire v:ere removed in the Americas. To fill this power
vacuum the military often appeared, but even the military
was not very well organized on a national level. The era
of the QQud,UJ-0 emerged in which military heroes with the
support of their own bands would fight for peace. ^-^
The landed estate system was not changed with
independence and thus the various large landholders often
competed for political power as well. As a result of
these conflicts, the period following Independence v^as one
of confusion and frequent changes in leaders. Brazil, '
with the monarchy helping to insure peaceful change did
not experience the disruption of other Latin American
nations.
See Wolf and Hansen, op. cit.
, for an excellent
discussion of this power vacuum and its implications. In
addition, see William H. Beezley, "Caudilllsmo : An
Interpretive Note," Journal of Inter-Amerlcan Studies
,
XI (July, 1969). 3^5-357.
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In addition to the forces noted above, there was
another problem for the emerging independent nations of
Latin America. The independence movements were often
influenced by and based on the ideals of the French
Revolution and the democratic ideals of the newly-formed
United States of America. Thus, when new constitutions and
governments were established, they often copied United
States and Western European models. Whole sections of the
United States Constitution were often inserted verbatim as
parts of the new Latin American constitutions.^^ These
constitutions were supposed to provide stability and order
for the society.
Along V7lth the new constitutions, many Latin
American nations developed a political party system.
Usually the political parties were divided along the lines
of Liberals (often reformers) and the Conservatives (often
defenders of the system as it existed). Electoral reform
and participation by the people became the programs of
the Liberals in nations such as Urugviay and Mexico, for
example. In Mexico, the one-party system developed with
44
Plerson and Gil, op. cit.
.
Chapter 5 has a good
analysis of the early constitutions and their sources.
Gibson, op. cit.
, pp» 214-216.
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reform being the major doctrine of the party. Scholars
from the United States often assume that Latin American
political parties play roles comparable to those of
parties In the United States, but again, cultural bias
overshadows objective analysis. As with the constitutions
of I^tm America, the political parties may represent
somethlns very different from what they represent In the
United States.
Unfortunately, the social and economic as well as
religious Institutions of Latin America were not
conducive to the establishment or maintenance of
pluralistic democracy. The assujnptlons of democracy run
counter to the prevailing social, economic, and religious
order.
In addition, there Is some question as to whether
the Latin Americans understood the democratic ideals in
the same way Northern Europeans did. Glen Dealy takes the
position that nineteenth century latin Americans actually
rejected eighteenth century political liberalism.
Glen Dealy, "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition," The Hismnlc American HistoricaJ.
Review
, XLVIII (February, I968), 37-5B. J. Lloyd Kecham,
"Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real,"
Journal of Poll tics
.
XXI (May, 1959), 258-272 also reviews
this aspect although his attention focuses on twentieth
century constitutions.
6k
Dealy analyzes various provisions and features of
nineteenth century latin American constitutions to show
what real meaning was given the adopted concepts and
ideals of democracy. His argument is that the
constitutions of Latin America were actually aimed at
insuring control by political leaders over the populace
rather than the other way around, as assumed in
pluralistic democratic models.^"''
At any rate, the dichotomy between the ideals as
North Americans understand them and the conditions in
which they were to be used left a great deal of confusion.
As a result, the legitimacy vacuum left by Spain's
removal meant that new sources of legitimacy had to be
found. The period from I83O to I87O was one in which
attempts to establish legitimacy occurred in most Latin
American nations. Various aristocratic families and men
on horseback contended for power, alternating in rule
through the caudillo system. In effect, chaos and
anarchy reigned after independence. Partly because the
Portuguese monarchy vias successful in its reform efforts.
^7
Dealy, op, cit,
, p. 52; and Jane, op. cit.
.
Chapter VIII provide a similar analysis.
Brazil was an exception to this generalization. Some
nations of Spanish America, such as Paraguay, did not
experience such disruption either.
While there were constant changes in political
leadership in much of latin America in the first forty or
fifty years of independent rule, in reality, little had
been changed from colonial times. Instead of the Crovm.
the caudill o became the symbol of power, but the colonial
institutions survived. Moreover, change from one
caudillo to another had almost no impact on social or
economic considerations. Changes came only at the top.^^
1870-19^0 , The chaos of the early nineteenth
century was bound to give way to some form of order and
integration of the society eventually. The late
nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the emergence
of greater order in Latin America. This period is often
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See McAlister. op. clt.
. p. 370.
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Merle Kling. "Tov^ard a Theory of Power and
Instability in Latin American Society," Western Political
SHSlterl^, IX (March, 1956). 21-35 evaluates the Impict
of caudillo government on the larger system.
.ous
called the period of national consolidation. Vari<
forces combined to integrate the societies
.ore fully and
replace the caudUio system with governments capable of
controlling the whole society.
While the rest of Latin America gained independence
duz-ing the mid-nineteenth century. Brazil did not do so
until 1889- Brazil's independence also differed in the
sense that it did not bring much violent change. Instead,
a military regime deposed the monarchy with little
noticeable effect for most of the population. This
regime, however, attempted to develop the nation
economically and was a stabilizing force in this nation in
contrast to the independence periods of most of the rest
of the Latin American nations. ^"^
During the mid-nineteenth century, the Latin
American nations were caught up in the desire for economic
development. They saw economic development as the panacea
for all their ills. As a result, progress in economic
50
Howard J. Wiarda. "Elites in Crisis. « unpublished
paper, n.d.. pp. 18-20 provides a brief description of the
"consolidation" process.
Burns, op. cit.
. pp. 198-204,
spheres became the goal of Latin American governments.
To help this economic growth, the countries of northern
Europe became markets for agricultural goods of the
Americas. In addition, much immigration from Europe to
Latin America occurred during this period. Most
immigrants came in search of agricultural opportunities.
Foreign investment and foreign markets provided
tremendous economic growth for the region and also led the
Latin Americans to become dependent on agricultural
products. World War I only increased the dependency of
Europeans on the Latin American agricultural system.
The worldwide economic collapse of 1929 was to
change this situation, however, and prove disastrous to
Latin American economic and political institutions. Many
nineteenth century government leaders such as Porfirio
Diaz created economies dependent upon alien investors.
When the alien investors lost their money in the 1929
crash, the economies of Latin America suffered greatly.
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Johnson, Political ChanA-e in Latin America
.
Chapter 3 provides one of the best analyses of I^atin
American development during this time. This section of
the study borrov^s heavily from Johnson's account.
In order to spin- economic growth, the governments of
Latin America pushed various internal improvements.
Notably, transportation and communication systems were
established. Of course, this effort had important
Implications for political integration, since control is
easier to exert when geographical factors can be
diminished as forces of division.
The unprecedented economic growth of this period,
especially with its emphasis on agriculture, improved the
position of the landed elites in Latin America. They were
able to gain even greater power than before in controlling
society. The influence of the oligarchies in Latin
America increased.
To provide a climate in which economic growth
could occur, certain political changes were made. Partly
as a matter of convenience, the landholding elite
acquiesced to control by authoritarian rule and the
classic caudillo revolts diminished in frequency.
Dictatorships with mass support, as vmder Diaz, became a
way of providing stability so that economic development
could occur. Attracting foreign investors was partially
dependent on stability in the political order and thus
compromises were made among landholders to support
dictators in the more general interest of developing the
economy.
Ironically, the very success of the oligarchy m
achieving its goals was to produce forces which later
destroyed much of its power. The emphasis on economic
development created new political forces. John Johnson
sees this period of economic development as responsible
for creating the middle sectors of society, which he
considers the most important force in the modernization of
the area. ^5 The various groups in the urban centers of
trade-.managers, bureaucrats, and labor groups-were to
have a role in political development. In addition, the
improvements in transportation and communication provided
opportunities for the peasant sectors to have contact with
other elements. Eventually, they were also to demand some
share in the system.
Politically. Latin America experienced a number of
strong dictatorships during this period, but some nations
also went through the beginnings of radical social and
political change as Mexico did in the Mexican Revolution,
Being very personalistic in orientation, the dictators
seldom prepared successors to themselves. More
importantly, governmental institutions which could
Ibid.
, pp.
continue to order the society were not created. When the
dictator went, there was nothing to provide for an orderly
transition of governmental authority. With the economic
collapse of 1929 and thereafter, the political systems
became the objects of distrust and frustration. As a
result, a new era of civil wars and revolts ensued. A new
legitimacy vacuum developed and brought about chaos as
great or greater than that of the Immediate post-
independence period. With the new chaos, we begin to
^^ee the emergence of various sectors of society Involved
in political struggles. The demand for a "piece of the
pie" came from many quarters. These forces for change
produced more significant changes than any experienced in
all the previous history of the area.
5^
See Wlarda. op. clt.
. pp. 20-21 for a brief
analysis.
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Contemporary Latin Ameri ca
Many observers, looking at Latin America prior to
1930. assume that it escaped the influence of most of the
forces shaping the modem world. However, as noted in the
previous section, forces which would eventually catapult
many Latin American nations into the processes of
modernization were developing below the surface. The
attempt at economic development created some changes which
provided a great deal more communication among various
sectors of the society. As a result, those sectors which
had previously been left out began to recognize that an
alternative to their situation existed. Perhaps increased
communication and transportation networks provided the
greatest impetus to the so-called "revolution of rising
expectations." The dispossessed elements became
increasingly reluctant to accept their status as natural.
Instead, they began to demand a share in the fruits of
their labor.
The implications of the revolution of rising
expectations for the political system were immense. The
political leaders and emerging middle sectors promised
that industrialization would be a cure-all for the
problems of the area. Emphasis was put on developing
72
factories and declining dependence on foreign powers.
Unfortunately, the political leaders were unable to l.eep
these promises. Instead of curing problems,
industrialization created new ones by putting all
available resources into industrialization to the neglect
of other segments of society. Secondly, increasing
industrialization often actually brought greater influence
from outside because foreign powers provided the major
resources for the industrialization process. Because
the political systems were incapable of fulfilling the
rising expectations of the people, more chaos and systemic
breakdovm ensued. Often, of course, the political leaders
promised more than they could deliver and the results
were increased impatience with the political system.
Thus, a new era of political instability emerged.
Many changes in Latin American society have
occurred in recent decades, although it is easy to
exaggerate them. Even though the post-1930 changes may
seem small from the perspective of highly modernized
societies, the changes are significant in the light of the
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"^^^^son. Political Change in Latin America,
pp. 1S6-189. and Mander. op. cit.
. p. 2611
conditions existing in latin America prior to I930. Prior
to 1930. very little change was possible; whereas, post-
1930 experience indicates a greater probability for such
change. Numerous traditional institutions still exert
tremendous influence on the nations of Latin America.
Despite a certain continuity to the Institutions,
however, many significant changes have come about.
While large haciendas still exist in many parts of
Datin America, there has been a tendency toward
modification of the system. The product of economic
development and especially industrialization has been a
challenge to the landowners by new groups, especially
capitalists and labor elements. Thus, land reform has
been a key proposal in most leftist political circles.
The Alliance for Progress had. as part of its goals, the
reform of landholding operations.^'' Internal development
Mander. op. clt.
. pp. 10^-106. Claudlo Veliz.
The Poli t ics of Conforpilty in I^, tin America (London:
Oxford University Press. 196?). Introduction, looks at the
approaches to change and relation of the middle sectors to
the approaches.
victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York:
Praeger. I965) provides an excellent critique of the goals
and performances of the Alliance for Progress.
of Brazil by Vargas and succeeding governments has created
new power centers in the Interior to counterbalance
coastal interests. Along with these changes, the Church
has become more socially conscious in recent years. Such
pressures against the traditional elites have had
significant influence. Even the military with its
increased middle class make-up is becoming a little more
socially and politically progressive. Perhaps the change
in make-up of the military is itself partly responsible
for some of the changes noted here.
Brazil has been contrasted with Spanish America
several times in this brief analysis of Latin American
history. Perhaps it would be useful to summarize the
differences between Brazil and the rest of the region.
First of all, there was a vast difference in the
relationship of colonists to the indigenous population in
Brazil. Since the Indian in Brazil vias not suitable for
labor as in most of Spanish America and since the Indian
population was comparatively small, the colonial power
imported a large number of African slaves. The influx of
Africans gave Brazil a unique racial character among Latin
American nations. The culture of the African slaves added
to the make-up of Brazilian culture. Additionally,
slavery itself was a much more highly developed
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institution in Erazil than in any other part of Latin
America,
Secondly, the economic history of Brazil is very
different from that of much of Spanish America. In much of
Latin America, the conquerors came in search of precious
metals, many of which had been mined by the Indians.
Once the mines were exhausted, the colonial power focused
on agricultiu^e. In Brazil, on the other hand, precious
metals were not important until much later. Instead,
brazilwood, sugar, cotton, and tobacco were important
conmodities in the economy of Brazil during the colonial
period. The agricultural exploitation in Brazil helped to
create a system highly dependent on slavery from the very
earliest days of development. It was not until the
eighteenth century that gold and diamonds became important
to the Brazilian economy.
Brazil's economic development followed a reverse
pattern from most of the rest of Latin America. More
importantly. Brazil also represents the epitome of the
"boom and bust'* type of economy. -^^ Brazil's development
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See Rollie E. Poppino. Brazi l; The land and
People (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968). pp.
113-157 for an excellent analysis of Brazilian economic
development.
was cyclical with dependence on one commodity at a time.
Usually, the economy has depended on foreign markets as
well, making the nation economically dependent. As one
natural resource was depleted or as agricultural markets
fluctuated, the economy fluctuated as well. The rubber
industry is perhaps the best example of the boom and bust
character of Brazilian economy. Once the major export of
Brazil, the rubber industry is now almost non-existent
there. Now. of course. Brazil is most dependent on the
coffee market although there is some diversification in
its economy. Brazil has developed a one-crop or one-
commodity mentality—as the bottom fell out of one market
a new resource was exploited. The effect of this
approach has been disorganization and instability in the
economic sphere as well as dependence on other nations*
economies.
In effect the contemporary scene in much of Latin ^
America is one in which traditional and modernizing
forces coexist side by side. The traditional order has
not .been destroyed nor have modern institutions been
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installed. Instead, some modernizing institutions such a
new classes exist, but they have to exist with
modifications of the old order.
The political systems of Latin America still
reflect the authoritarian, personallstic. and rigidly
hierarchical traditions, although those traditions have
been modified. In addition, there are forces for
modernization existing in the same systems. The conflict
between the traditional and modernizing forces create
difficult problems for Latin American attempts at
developing social and political Institutions relevant to
this modern era.
Just because there is turmoil in Latin America
does not mean that real changes are taking place. Some
scholars note that while significant social and political
changes are occiArring in some nations, many of the
changes In government are still only changes at the top.
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Wlarda. "Law and Political Development in Latin
America: Tov/ard a Framev/ork for Analysis." American
Journal of Comparative Lqw
. XIX (Summer, 1971). ^34-463
explores the current scene. In addition, James Busey,
Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes
(New York : Random House, 196^) explains the same
characteristics.
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In fact, it has been argued that some recent "revolutions"
have really been attempts to return to the past/^
^is necessarily brief review of Latin American
history Will provide a basis for a fuller analysis of the
applicability of the various frameworks for the study of
political development to Latin America in the following
six chapters. Each chapter will provide greater detail on
particular aspects of the several development models and
on the peculiar nature of the Latin American developmental
experience.
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.leda S. Wiarda and Howard J. Wiarda, "Revolution
or Counterrevolution in Erazll, " r-Ta ssachusetts Review
.
VIII (Winter, I967). 1^9-165 take this position
concerning Brazil; and Alba, op. cit>
.
assumes the same in
discussing prospects for change in Latin America.
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CHAPTER III
THE CONSENSUS MODEL
The consensus model for the study of social change
Is based on a tradition stemming primarily from Max
Weber's works and carried into contemporary scholarly
pursuit by Talcott Parsons.^ The consensus model is also
referred to as "the equilibriiim model" by many social
scientists, but as will be illustrated in the next
chapter, equilibrium is not a concern exclusive to the
1
nv.nni..^?''
Weber ThLe_ Thepry of Social and Economicprfcanization (New Yorkl olford University Pres~T947)provides the most complete formulation of his ideas onthe subject, but other works to be noted in this studyalso provide important insights. Talcott Parsons has -
written extensively on the subject with his Societies:Evolutlonnry nnd Comparative Perspectives (EruPn^d—
Prentice-Hall. 1966). and his collaboration withEdward A. Shils. Toward a General Theory of Action(Cambridge
:
Harvard University Press. 1951) being amongtne most important. In the comparative politics area.Gabriel Almond has probably been the most ardent
spokesman for the Weberian model. In turn. Almond'sinfluence on many of the political scientists to be
examined in this study is great.
consensus model.
^ Despite the suggestion that both the
consensus and conflict models are merely different paths
toward equilibrium, some social scientists continue to
look at equilibrium and conflict as identifying opposing
models. In this study, consensus and equilibrium will
not be considered the same. Rather the consensus model is
taken to be one method of achieving equilibrium in the
system.
Many equate the consensus model with democratic
pluralism, indicating that the backgrounds of the people
most Identified with the consensus model are probably very
influential in the results of their studies.^ According
2
Leo Kuper discusses the equilibrium feature of the
two models in "Plural Societies: Perspectives and
Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.). Pluralism
in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universltv"Tf
California Press. I969), pp. 7-26. In addition", see
Edward Dow, Politics in the Altiplano; The Dynamics of
Change in Rural Peru"~TAustin : University of Texas Press,
1969), pp. 7-9.
3
In addition to Dew, ibid.
. Alfred Diamant,
Political Development; Approaches to Theory and Strategy
TBloomington, Ind. : Comparative Administration Group.
1963). pp. 26-^3, discusses the approaches in this manner.
Kuper, op. cit.
, notes this tendency on the part
of some scholars. David B. Truman, The Governmental
Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion (New
York : Knopf, I962); E. E. Schattschnelder, Party
Government (New York: Parrar and Rinehart, 1942) ; and
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to this view, consensus emerges as a result of the peaceful
resolution of conflicts of independent interests.
Consensus may be reached in a variety of ways including
compromise of interest; acceptance of less than maximum
satisfaction of interests in the interest of society as a
whole; or as voluntary subordination to group pressures or
decisions. Whatever the method of reaching agreement, a
type of equilibrium tends to emerge as a natural
progression of events.
'
The general features of the consensus model are
usually couched in terms of the experiences of the Anglo-
American industrial development experiences. According to
this model, the development process will be one in which
there is a tendency to move from an agrarian rural society
to an industrial urban society. Instead of a particular-
istic and parochial social system there is movement
toward universallsm and centralization of societal
institutions and values. In addition, it is expected that
participation by the citizenry in all aspects of society
increases with the resultant equilibrium and gradiial
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956) provide some of the
best examples of the tendency to equate the consensus
model with democratic pluralism.
Change.^ It seems that these general features of the
consensus model stem In large part from the basic
assumptions made by its advocates. It would be Instructive
to note and evaluate the basic assumptions of the
consensus model of change and then the conclusions
occasioned by those assumptions.
Elements of the Consensus Model
As£,Hrnptions of the model. The basic assumption of
the consensus model, of course, is that differing
interests exist in society. There is little doubt that
differing interests do emerge in all societies.
Regardless of what creates the differing interests, it
seems safe to accept this assumption of the conflict
model, as will be noted in the next chapter. Once these
differing interests exist conflict emerges among them for
satisfaction of their needs. At this point the consensus
and conflict models diverge both in assumptions and
conclusions.
5
Howard J. Wiarda. "Elites in Crisis." unpublished
paper, n.d., outlines these basic features of consensus
oriented models. In addition, see Kuper, op. cit. ; Dew,
op. cit.; and Mohammed Guessous, "A General Critique of
Equilibrium Theory." in Readings on Social Change
, ed. by
Wilbert E. Moore and Robert M. Cook (Englewood Cliffs
t
Prentice-Hall, 196? ), pp. 23-35.
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In looking at the general features of the consensus
model noted above, it will be remembered that one aspect
was that there would be movement from an agrarian to an
Industrialized economy, a process which would help produce
a consensus situation. Numerous assumptions lie behind
this feature. First of all. it is assumed that
industrialization produces greater pluralism in the
society which in turn brings to fruition some of the other
general features noted in the above discussion.^
Industrialization is supposed to bring about an
equalization of classes in the social system and with this
equalization would come greater cooperation among various
groups in the society. Equalization of classes would
come about because there would be a greater and more
equitable distribution of wealth throughout the
V/alt Rostow, The Stages of Econ ornic Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univernity Pres5^. I96O ) provides
one of the earliest examples of the use of this
assumption. Following closely behind him were C. E.
Black, The Dynamics of Modernizati on (New York: Ilarper
and Row, 196b) and A. F. K. Orrranski. The Stages of
Political Dovelopmont (New York: Knopf, I965). For an
excellent review of the way some of these assumptions
relate to Latin America, see Alfred Stepan, "Poiltical
Development Theory: The Latin American Experience,"
Journal o f International Affair s, XX (I966), 223-23'!|.
In addition, see the Introduction to John Kautsky*s
PoUtlcal Change in Under-developed Countries (Now York:
Wiley, 1962).
population. With wider distribution of the wealth,
greater portions of the population would have an interest
in the system and thus would woric together for the common
good. This View ignores the possibility that the
industrialists could exploit the rest of the population
and not distribute the wealth.
In addition to creating a wider distribution of
wealth, industrialization is also supposed to Increase
cross-cultural experiences. As the society becomes more
urba.nized. larger portions of the population Interact with
one another. The rural residents suddenly have much more
contact with the city residents and with the whole urban
and more modern environment because the rural inhabitants
are lured to the cities by jobs and economic benefits
accruing from industrialization. These cross-cultural
contacts tend to bring about a greater commonality in the
Interests and values of the population."^ Such a
commonality of values, it is argued, helps to override
differences in interests which might otherwise cause
disintegration of the system.
r^niel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional
Society
,
(Glencoe: The Rree Press, 1958) is one of the
best known works taking this position. Those concerned
with economic development as a prerequisite to political
development often take this position as well.
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The limitations of this view of urbanization center
in the fact that it ignores the rising expectations which
might create havoc in the system as the system proves
incapable of satisfying them. Thus, greater contact and
communication among groups may ultimately lead to
frustration and resentment, as the poor begin to realize
that modern conveniences and goods exist but that they may
never really hope to acquire them without violence.^
The idea that urbanization and industrialization
create a middle class interested in political and social
reform is also subject to question,^ As has been noted in
the previous chapter, urbanization in Latin America was
not the result of industrialization. Instead, the cities
were often built as centers of culture and luxury for the
elite. In addition, as Claudio Veliz notes, the middle
g
Claudio Veliz in the
• Introductions to his edited
volumes. The Politics of Conformity in Latin America
(London: Oxford University Press. I967), and Obstacles
to Chanp:e in Latin America (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965) notes this possibility.
9John J. Johnson, Political Chang;e in Latin
America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958) presents this position.
The point is made by Ronald Classman, Political
History of Latin America (New York: Funk and Wagnalls,
1969) , pp. 2^6-24?; John Mander, The Unrevolutionary
Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism In a
classes in Latin America are not necessarily associated
with pressures for reform. Instead, he contends that the
middle sectors merely aspire to becoming part of the upper
classes and feel no commonality with the peasantry.
Such positions are in direct contradiction to the
assumptions of the consensus model.
With the change from an agricultural to an
industrial society, the economic units change as well.
While the agricultural system can operate on a small scale,
the industrialization process creates greater
interdependence among various economic sectors. Because
the industrial sectors usually depend on one another for
raw materials, equipment, or capital, they are less likely
to maintain independence from other sectors of the
population. Only if an industry has a complete monopoly
can it expect to be totally self-sufficient. The argument
goes that increasing interdependence creates a greater
Changing V/orld (New York: Knopf, I969), p. 260; and
Economic Commission for Latin America, United Nations
Economic and Social Council. Social Development of Latin
America in the Post-War Periods (Mardel Plata. Argentina.
1963 ) .
~~
^Q^^z, op. cit. Richard N. Adams, "Political
Power and Social Structures," in Veliz (ed.). The
Politics of Conformity in Latin America
, pp. 15-^2 makes
a similar point.
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willingness to cooperate and stabilize the system. This
interaction is part of the tendency toward the
universalizing of institutions of society. People are
expected to consider broader issues rather than
concentrate on their localized interest.
While there is a movement away from
particularistic aspects on the societal level, there is a
seeming counter-tendency toward differentiation and
specialization in the society as well. This aspect of the
development process has been well analyzed by Luclan
13Pye. Differentiation and specialization provide for
greater expertise in dealing with each segment or aspect
of societal operations. The greater specialization
produces obstacles to coordination as well, in that each
segment of society tends to become concerned with its own
private Interests and does not always consider its
relationship to the other elements. In this vray, there
may be a tendency toward disintegration rather than
integration. What differentiates this type of
This assumption is made by Black, op. clt.
, pp.
64-7^, and Organskl, op. clt.
. pp. 5-10 in their
discussions of the process.
Luclan Pye, Aspects of Political Development
(Boston: Little, Brovm, I966), p. 45.
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particularism from that of more primitive societies is the
fact that the specialization is coordinated at the top in
order to reach agreed-upon goals. For example, an
economic organization has highly specialized units or
divisions which are coordinated for the ultimate
production of a particular product. In the primitive
societies particularism is characteristic of the whole
fabric of society and coordination of specialties is not
found.
The structural-functional theorists are most
concerned with the roles of various sectors in the system
and their orientation to its general goals. The charge
is often made that the only goal for structural-
functionalists is system stability. S. N. Eisenstadt,
however, takes the position that structures Just have not
existed to meet the rising demands on the system in many
modernizing societies, resulting in system breakdown. "^^
Ik
Organski. op. cit.
. p. 7. and Black, op. cit.
.
pp. 21-28 suggest this tendency,
15See David Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, I965) for a
good example of the structural-functional approach applied
to the development process—especially pp. 1-42.
16
S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernizations,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change
. XII (July,
1964), 345-36?.
Another feature of the consensus model is the
emphasis on social equality and increased citizen
participation which is to emerge. These developments have
a deterministic character. ^7 ^he assumption of increasing
participation cannot be considered apart from the other
assumptions outlined above. In order for participation to
become probable, there has to be a certain equalization in
the social system which, in turn, is brought about by the
industrialization process. If the first assumptions are
not accepted, participation is not likely to be realized.
Social equality and political participation are
particularly interlocked. The argument is made that with
social equality there is a lessening of ideological
1 ftdifferences. As the gap between haves and have-nots
17
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic
Culture; Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, I963
)
present the most detailed case for this position. In
addition, Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture
and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press", I965) employ this assumption in their
analysis,
18
See Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden
City: Doubleday, I96O), especially Chapter 13 for the
basic assumptions involved in this position. Also Daniel
Bell, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free Press,
i960), and Johnson, op. cit. , among others take this
position.
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narrows and the levelling process goes forward, people
tend to acquire similar values and do not see one another
as antagonists. As a result, they can work together to
resolve differences which are diminished in size by the
decreasing social distance.
According to this view. Increased participation in
society also contributes to a reduction of ideological
differences. As individuals participate in more and more
social groups, their Ideological loyalties tend to
decrease in Intensity. In other words, pluralism, which
is supposed to result from industrialization and
urbanization, reduces ideological conflict. Sidney
Verba argues that the greater the number of organizations
a person belongs to, the less Intense his loyalties to
any one of those organizations become. Cleavage in the
system is reduced by overlapping membership in groups.
William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass So ciety
(New York: The Free Press. 1959), Pp. 79-81, and Sidney
Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic
Consensus." The Joui'nal of Politics
, XXVII (August, I965),
467-^+97 treat this feature of the consensus model. Gino
German 1 , Polltica y Socledad en una Epoca de Transicion
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidos, I963 ) discusses
modernization in terms of social participation.
20
^®^^» op* clt.
. pp. 468-^70. Also see Truman.
op. cit.
If one accepts the argument that Industrialization brings
about greater participation In groups. Verba- s argument
becomes a povjerful one.
The other side of the participation process
Involves participation in the political system Itself.
The idea that participation itself is an indicator of
political development is Indicative of the Impact Western
political systems have had on the concept of social
change. Political participation by the citizenry is
obviously one of the most cherished ideals of democratic
beliefs. As such, the suggestion that development means
participation approaches the equating of development and
democracy. At any rate, the increase in participation is
tied very closely to all the other features of the
consensus model examined herein. Social equality enhances
the possibility of increased political participation. As
participation Increases there is more opportunity for the
expression of demands on the system; and as demands
increase, greater communication of ideas and interests
emerge. With this, the cycle starts anew with cross-
cultural experiences, and so on. The concept of
"partisan mutual adjustment" suggested by Charles E.
Lindblom is an excellent example of the way in which
differing interests impose claims on the system which are
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eventmlly^ altered in favor of more generalized
interests. 2i Every specific interest has to be
compromised in favor of the interests of all.
Conclusi ons of the.jnodel. The consensus model
provides a deterministic character to the process of
social change. Analysis of the assumptions of the model
reveals a steady march toward "progress." What this seems
to indicate is that once the initial aspects of
development are set in motion, all political systems will
move toward the Western European model. Specifically, if
a developing nation could only become industrialized or
economically developed, political development would
2?follow.^
Secondly, the process of change is seen to be a
slow and incremental one. Each economic or social change
Charles E. Lindbloro, The Intelligence of
DgmoGracy_ (New York: The Free Press, I965). Albert 0,Hirschman's Journeys Toward Progress (New York: The 20thCentury Fund. I963) takes a similar stance.
22
Most of the authors connected with the consensus
model seem to accept this view. As an indication of its
pervasiveness, a program as noble in ideals as the
Alliance for Progress was based on this idea.
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sets in motion some new change which In turn triggers
others. However, no sudden or drastic changes can be
incorporated into the model very effectively, 23
Another Implication of the assumptions is that all
people have access to the system. If participation is to
be meaningful, all interests must have some assurance of
being heard by the system. Robert Dahl, for Instance,
concludes that all elements in the society have some
opportunity of having their demands considered by the
system. If their demands cannot be aired, the people's
Interests are stifled and compromise cannot result. The
eventual outcome could be total destruction of the system
by frustrated elements.
23
Guessous, op. cit., p. 3^ makes this point,
suggesting that advocates of the model thus ignore many
"essential characteristics of social life."
Robert A. Dahl. Who Governs? Democracy and
Power in an American City (New Havens Yale University
Press, 1961). pp. 223-301.
9^
Variations on the Consensus Model
While the consensus model involves a series of
common assumptions and conclusions, there are differences
in individual models. Perhaps the most widely known
version of the model is the systems analysis version.
Parsons, Easton, and Almond are most closely associated
with this approach to the study of politics. Gabriel
Almond has been most active in applying the systems
approach to the study of comparative government. Actually,
as Robert Packenhara notes, systems analysis covers several
of the approaches considered in Chapter I of this study.
Although they do not describe formal models, de Toqueville
and Lipset must also be considered advocates of the
consensus model, since they too are concerned with the
social correlates of democracy. They analyze the roles
played by various social elements in the stability of
political systems, particularly democratic political
systems.
Robert A. Packenhara, "Approaches to the Study of
Political Development," World Politics , XVII (October,
196^1), 115.
95The analyses of Rostow, Black, and Organski
indicate another aspect of the social system approach to
studying political change. As with de Toquevllle and
Lipset. these authors do not prescribe a systems framework
for their analyses, but such a framework is implied. The
authors are concerned with the interrelationship of
economic, social, and political variables in the operation
of the system. David Truman in his concern with groups
employs a similar approach, except that his unit of
analysis differs slightly.
More explicit in the use of the systems approach
are Karl Deutsch and David Apter. Both use a structural-
functional framework in analyzing the relationship of
"communications," in one instance, and "role," in the
other, to the proper functioning of the system.
The systems analysis approach provides many
alternatives for the study of various aspects of the
political system. What is common to all, however, is that
the factors which are studied are those which are
functional for the system. Factors which can be
accommodated by the system are studied, while those which
are disruptive to the system are not considered or are
rejected because the system cannot accommodate them.
Many critics argue that systems analysis ignores certain
essential features of politics. For example, systems
analysts assume that all mjor groups are able to
participate. Without an in-depth analysis of political
resources, however, it seems clear that some groups do
find difficulty in articulating interests or demands.
Some interests are thus articulated only weakly; others
not at all.
Scholars interested in producing stability may also
be clearly identified with the consensus model. David
Apter and Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, both search
for ways of institutionalizing structures and processes as
a means of acquiring stability or equilibrium. Even
though they are concerned about possibly disruptive forces
in the system, their main concern is with finding a way of
bringing about consensus and stability through
institutionalizing the processes of change.
Lucian Pye's use of political culture provides an
example of yet another consensus orientation to political
development, even though it may be more flexible in
application. But in Pye's analysis too, with his six
crises of nation-building through which nations must pass'
before being considered developed, the basic assumptions
of the consensus model are again clearly evident. The
aspects of distribution and participation singled out in
his analyses of these crises are indicative of the
consensus orientation.
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The consensus model, whatever its variations, is a
very optimistic one which envisions harmony and
pluralistic democracy as the ideals inevitably reached in
modern societies. How this model has been applied to the
study of latin America and whether it is appropriate will
be taken up in the concluding sections of this chapter.
Application of the Consensus
Model to Latin America
Most United States students of Latin America have
used a consensus orientation in studying the process of
political development in Latin America, since the United
States is a good example of what the consensus model is
supposed to produce, it is not surprising that political
scientists trained in that tradition should apply it to
the study of other regions.
Adolf Berle, for instance, is a good example of a
United States scholar and government advisor who adopted
the consensus model orientation to the study of Latin
26America. Such studies often seem to be occasioned more
26
Adolf Berle, Latin America; Diplomacy and
Reality (New York: Harper and How, I962TT ThereTre
countless others of this nature oriented to the general
public based on prodding Latin American nations to imitate
the United States. Milton S. Elsenhower, The Wine is
Bitter; The United States and Latin America (Garden CI ty
:
Doubleday, I963 ) is another.
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by a concern for heading off Communist advances in the
area than in gaining an understanding of the Latin
Americans and their political systems. Most often the,
analyses conclude with a call for United States policle;
toward Latin /unerica which will foster social and economic
reform which will in turn create political changes
consistent with the consensus model's version of political
development. At the policy level, the Alliance for
Progress was a singular manifestation of the consensus
model.
Among Latin Americanists. John J. Johnson. Gino
Gerraani, and Martin C. Needier are perhaps most closely
associated with the consensus-equilibrium-pluralist
approach.-' Johnson's work. Political Change in Latin
America; The Emergence of the Middle Sectors , is one of
the clearest and most influential statements of the
consensus position. In this work, Johnson views the
middle sectors as the hope for political development and
stability in Latin America, His view is that the middle
sectors of the urban areas will Increase pressures for
Johnson, op. cit. ; German:-., op. cit. ; and Martin d
Needier, Political DevGlopment in J^tln America;
Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York:
Random House. l^Sjl
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governmental activity to solve the acute social problems
of latin America. The process will include gradual change
and stability of the system, Johnson's study
encompasses Uruguay, Chile. Argentina, ^3exico. and Brazil,
which are among the most developed Latin American nations
and which have the largest middle sectors. These case
studies are used to prove his hypothesis. Much of the
literature has challenged Johnson's views of the middle
sectors' role in Latin America, and that material will be
discussed in Chapter V.
victor Alba takes a view similar to Johnson's,
but his feeling is that the middle sectors and the
oligarchs have worked out a detente to prevent much of the
needed change at the moment. While Alba is very
pessimistic about the oligarchy ever supporting real
28
See Johnson, op. cit.. Introduction and Chapter 9
in particular. For a good critique of Johnson's
analysis, see Juan F. Marsal, Cambio social en America
latina (Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete, 1967), pp. 2?-29,
and 108-110.
29
victor Alba, Alliance Without Allies (New York:
Praeger. I965). in V7hich Alba presents a caustic analysis
of hovj the United States and Latin Americans have both
failed to stimulate the needed changes. His later work.
The Latin Americans (New York: Praeger, I969) is a little
less caustic but makes the same point.
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Change, his emphasis is still on social and economic
progress as the method of achieving political progress.
He sees a need for modernization of the social structure
of latin America but argues that only the latin Americans
themselves can initiate it. When the Latin Americans
modernize their own social structures, political
development will also occur. What puts Alba in the
consensus camp, even though his background is of the old-
line socialist school, is the fact that he envisions
change taking place within a fairly stable system with
gradualism as the key. Economic and social advance are
basic to political development. While certainly very
critical of the Alliance for Progress as it was
implemented. Alba is very much in agreement with its
Initial objectives, all of which of course stem from the
consensus model. The relationship of the Alliance and the
consensus model will be explained in the last section of -~
this chapter.
Robert J. Alexander is yet another student of Latin
America who follows the consensus tradition. His concern
is the means through which various sectors of society can
30
Alba. The Latin Americans.
contribute to a stable and progressive system. His
major thesis Is that democracy Is likely to emerge In
Latin America for some of the same reasons proposed by
Johnson. He particularly emphasizes the probability of
the development of democratic pluralism as the result of
economic development. Economic development, according to
Alexander, creates a diversity of Interests and,
particularly, a new Industrial wage-earning class which
exerts pressures on the system similar to those exerted by
the middle sectors In Johnson's analysis. "^^
Martin C. Needier also views Latin American
government from a consensus model orientation. His work
Is almost entirely concerned with making the Latin
American nations over In the Image of the United States or
the Western European nations he considers politically
33developed. Again, the attainment of democracy and
31
Robert J. Alexander, Today's Latin America
(Garden City; Doubleday, 1962), and Latin American
Politics and Government (New York: Harper and Row, I965).
176,
32
See Alexander, Latin American Politics
, pp. I7I-
33
Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective
(New York: Van Nostrand, I962), pp. 178-182, although all
of Chapter 4 Is relevant. Also see his Political
Development in Latin America .
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stability is the goal. This type of political development
comes about through social and economic change. Needier
devotes much of his attention to economic development in
his analysis of political development in Latin America.
A large number of social scientists concerned with
Latin America accept the positions implicit in the
consensus model, among them, Kalman Silvert, Albert 0,
Hirschman. and Gino Germani. Most of these people see
economic and social progress as the key to political
development. Social and economic changes are expected to
produce pluralism which provides for a system of
bargaining for special interests. There are variations
on the intensity of optimism on the chances of progress
being made through application of the consensus model.
Some, such as Silvert, while implicitly employing the
model, are very skeptical of the hope placed in the middle
sectors of society or in groups which are supposed to
35
emerge as the result of industrialization.
34
Hirschman, op. cit. , takes the position that a
society in which there is a plurality of interests permits
trading off on issues and insures over-all stability.
35
Kalman Silvert. The Conflict Society; Reaction
and Revolution in latin America , rev, ed. (New York:
American Universities Field Staff, 1966) is particularly
skeptical about the effects of Industrialization and the
This brief review of some of the literature on
Latin American political development indicates how
pervasive the use of the consensus model has been in
analyzing the region. Obviously the above review has
noted only some of the major works on the subject. The
review was limited mostly to political scientists,
although some historians and sociologists as well as
economists were noted. The major point emerging from the
review is that the Latin American nations have often been
studied as though they vrere on the way to becoming copies
of the United States or V/estern European democracies. The
assmption has been that Latin America would follow the
same steps as did the United States, that there is a
clear and unilinear path to development.
middle sectors. Taking a similar position are Karl M.
Schmitt and David B. Burks, Evolution or Chaos (New York:
Praeger, I963 ) . Perhaps more optimistic is Frank
Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage
Books, 1962)'.
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Implications of the Consensus Model for
the Understanding of Latin America
The consensus model is apt to ignore many aspects
of Latin America which are important to an understanding
of the area. By expecting the latin American nations to
follow the same pattern of development as the Western
European nations and the United States, students of I^tin
America have a tendency to overlook the differences in
historical experiences of the area, to say nothing of its
unique socio-cultural-political tradition. As was noted
in the previous chapter, the colonial history of Latin
America gave it a m.uch different political heritage from
that of the United States, In effect, as John Kander
notes, the consensus approach discourages consideration of
differences in cultures. "Worse, it appears to rule out
the possibility that other cultures may be striving for
goals different from those American (i.e.. United States)
society proposes for itself. ""^^
This limitation is felt not only by United States
scholars but by those of Latin America as well. To note
Mander's view again, the intelligentsia of Latin America
36
Mander, op. cit»
, p. 106.
have uncritically accepted economic development as the
criterion of maturity and as such have "bought" the
consensus model approach with little or no consideration
of Latin America's ovm cultural differences from the
industrialised nations. ^"^ The Latin Americans have
accepted the fact (or adopted the myth) of their own
"backwardness" or "underdevelopment." The fact that Latin
Americans themselves have accepted the idea may be the
ultimate in a kind of United States cultural imperialism.
If one accepts the consensus model's analysis of
the relationship of industrialization and urbanization to
political development, much of Latin American society
would be ignored or misimderstood. As was noted in the
first two chapters. Industrialization did not have the
same consequences for urbanization in Latin America as it
did in the United States. Rather, cities were purposely
built by the Conquistodores long before there was any
industrialization. In many instances industrialization '
was Introduced as a panacea for many of the problems which
already existed in Latin America. The consensus model
analysis is not very helpful in understanding these
Ibid..
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societies. As Samuel P. Huntington notes, the
industrialization process, especially if rapid, can cause
many problems for the political system and destroy the
stability for which the consensus model strives*^^ While
Huntington notes the disruptive effects of rapid economic
development and social modernization, he still accepts
the view that economic and social development are necessary
to political development.-^^
Clearly related to economic development is the
emergence of the middle sectors. The consensus model's
view of the middle sectors misinterprets the facts of the
Latin American situation. As has often been noted, the
middle sectors of Latin America just have not put much
effort into social and political reform. Instead they
have frequently aligned themselves with or been coopted
by the oligarchs, in the hope of improving their social
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pF»
^9-50. Also see Eldon Kenworthy, "Argentina: The
Politics of Late Industrialization," Foreign Affairs
.
XLV (April, 1967). ^63-/i76«
39
Kenworthy, op. cit.
. 107*
107
. .
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status. Since the consensus model does not seem to fit
the situation, the particular role played by the middle
sectors in Latin America is ignored. These middle sectors
have become more oriented to the status quo than to
41progress.
Although it is not to be examined here, one might
question the applicability of the consensus model on this
issue even to the United States. Does the so-called
•silent majority" really fit the consensus model's
characterization of the middle sector as progressive and
democratic? Do the middle sectors in the United States
really have all the solid virtues Johnson seems to think?
One doubts it.
With its emphasis on democracy and gradual change,
the consensus model creates problems for its advocates in
explaining what happens in Latin America. Even in nations
which are relatively Industrialized, the political process
often remains very chaotic and prone to violence. When
Mander, op. cit.
, pp. 122-124. and 148; and
Veliz. op. cit.
,
"Introductions." These are two of the
most incisive in their analyses of this point, but
references in Chapter II and previously in this chapter
note many others taking similar positions.
See Economic Commission for Latin America, op.
cit.
. pp. 111-115.
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democracy falls, many students of Latin America, rather
than reject the model, reason that the people were just
incapable of instituting democracy .^^ With such reasoning,
advocates of the consensus model keep their model Intact
while ignoring damaging facts, relieving them of the
necessity of questioning the assumptions and/or
conclusions of the model which might be at odds with the
facts. The consensus model advocates thus reify their
creation rather than accept the fact that it may not fit
all nations and all contingencies.
While the model misinterprets or disregards some of
the facts of the Latin American experience, there is no
reason to reject the model entirely. In fact, .it is
useful in providing some insights into the processes of
Latin American development. The positive contributions of
the model for the study, of Latin America will be evalmted
in Chapter VIII of this study. What seems more important -
at this point is what implications the model has for
42
Glen Dealy. "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition." The. Hispanic American Histori cal
Review
, XLVIII (February. 1968). 37-39 makes this" point
in his analysis of Latin America Ts "democratic"
experiments.
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policy-making on the part of the Latin American
governments as well as for United States policy toward
Latin America,
It seems that many latin American governments have
accepted the understanding and assumptions of the
development theory which emerge from the consensus model.
The attempts at modernization of an Eduardo Prei Montalva.
for instance, have involved various plans and strategies
to implement those progressive changes which would put
the nation on the road to development a la the consensus
model. Nation after nation has looked at
industrialization and economic development as the cure-all
for its social and political problems. The tragedy of it
is that resources have often been squandered on outmoded
and inefficient industrial plants with little to show for
it. Other areas of the society have suffered because
resources were drawn away from them to support
industrialization. Only recently have these nations found
that they could not compete with other more efficient
industrial nations in the world market.
Similarly, United States policy toward Latin
America has often been based on our own developmental
experience. We have simply carried over and applied our
own growth model to a society and culture which lacks our
traditions and to which it simply does not conform.
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Industrialization and economic and social reform have be
prime targets of most of our Latin American programs. The
Alliance for Progress is the most notable of these
programs. The idea behind this program is the familiar
one that social and economic development will produce good
liberal democracies in the area. A typical American view
is that people who are well-off are happy people and anti-
Communist people. The New Deal assumptions have been
brought to bear unquestioningly on the problems of Latin
American development. The lack of success of the Alliance
for Progress attests to some of the problems with such a
set of assumptions. Undoubtedly, the lack of success of
the Alliance cannot be attributed only to United States
misinterpretation of the Latin American experience. Lack
of promised United States support^ pressiires by American
economic interests, failure of the Latin Americans to plan
needed reforms and resistance of the oligarchy to broad
social and political changes are just a few of the other
reasons for failure of the Alliance. ^-^ Some of these
factors are discussed more fully in succeeding and the
^3
See Alba, Alliance Without Allies .
concluding chapters. It is clear that the United States
policies often reflect the attitude that all developing
nations will follow its model of development whether they
want to or not. A large part of the reason for this
attitude is that Americans understand Latin America from
the perspective of the consensus model, a model which is
uniquely /Lnglo-Araerican and not necessarily attuned to the
special needs of Latin America.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONFLICT MODEL
Introduction
Although Karl Marx's analysis of social change Is
used as the foundation for the conflict model, advocates
of this model do not always employ his units of analysis
—economic classes. Half Dahrendorf and Harrington
Moore, Jr», are among the more influential contemporary
scholars in the conflict tradition who have accepted
Marx's analysis complete with economic class analysis.^
Others use the general assumptions of the conflict model,
but they do not limit the conflict to class conflict.
Half Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
19o8); and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dicta tors-hip and Demooracy (Eoston: Beacon Press, "1956)
are the major works on the model. Stanley Hothraan,
"Barrlngton Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution; An
Essay Review," American Political Science Review
, LXIV
(March, 1970), 61-82 presents an excellent critique of
Moore's position.
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They see that there may be conflict among various sectors
of society including ethnic, religious, cultural, or
ideological differentiation instead of viewing all
conflict as resulting from economic class differences.^
Usually, however, those scholars employing the conflict
model tend to isolate one particular root of conflict
ordinarily class, which is used to explain all forces of
social change.
Contrary to the consensus model, social change in
the conflict analysis model does not come gradually and
orderly. Instead change tends to be rapid and often
violent because there are no mechanisms for the compromise
of particular interests in conflict model analysis.
Violence may often occiat although change is not always of
M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism." in
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
. LXXXIII
(i960), 763-777 provides one of the best statements of the
conflict model in application to modern society. Further
note Is made of it in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Pluralism
in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, I969). Lewis A. Coser has also
published several works devoted to the conflict model,
among vrhich the most Important are: Continuities in the
Study of Soc ial Conflict (New York: The Free Press,
1967); The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The
Free Press, 193^ ) and Lewis A. Coser and Bernard
Rosenberg (eds.). Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings
(Toronto: The Macmlllan Co., 19*^9 ).
a violent nature. Whether violent or non-violent, change
is brought about as a result of social conflict.^
In its most general view of society, the conflict
model has some characteristics in common Kith the
consensus model. Social diversity of groups or interests
is important to each model, although the conflict model can
accommodate a more simplistic society. The conflict model
may view society in terms of a bi-polar arrangement;
whereas the consensus model makes sense only if there is a
large number of groups competing for power in the system.
The direction of change is usimlly thought to be
similar for the consensus and conflict models. There
seems to be an inevitability of movement from the rural,
agricultural to a more complex urhan industrial society,^
In many respects, the conflict model sees progress in
terms of movement toward what exists In the Industrialized
3See Half Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis." in Lewis Coser
and Bernard Rosenberg, op. cit. « pp. 236-237.
See Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis."
unpublished paper, n.d. Also Edward Dew. Politics in the
Altlplano; The Dynamics of Change In Rural Peru (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 8-10, and "Leo Kuper,
in "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," Kuper
and Smith, op. cit.
, pp. 10-13 for further elaboration.
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societies. In some instances the deterministic feature of
the conflict model is more evident than in the consensus
model,
^
The previous chapter indicated that equilibrium is
also associated with the conflict model, l^ile on the
surface it seems that conflict analysis is antithetical to "
equilibrium, some critics of social theory view conflict
analysis as also envisioning movement toward a state of
equilibrium. According to this interpretation of
conflict analysis, conflict emerges within an orderly
social system and the over-all focus is on achieving a
particular type of society. Marx's expectation of a final
Utopia of communism is an example of the equilibrium which
might emerge.
Half mhrendorf rejects this interpretation of the
conflict model. Utopias to him are consensus models and
have no validity in the conflict analyses. He contends
that many analysts attempt to bridge the gap between
5See Dahrendorf. op. cit.
. in particular. In
addition, James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), I^tin
America: Reform or Revolution ? (Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett, 1968). in their introduction indicate the extent
of the assumption of determinism in the conflict model.
^See Kuper. op. cit.
. pp. 7-26. and Dew, op. cit.
.
pp. 7-9 for a statement of this position. Coser,
Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict
, especially
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"reality" and some Utopian scheme. Hence, conflict
theorists are being taken in by the consensus approach.
His position is that there never will be a society devoid
of conflict. Thus, there is no room for the Utopian
scheme in conflict analysis.
When applied to the analyses of developing
societies, conflict analysis often emphasizes the
dependent status of the developing society upon the
industrialized nation and the issue of imperialism or neo-
colonialism becomes an essential feature of the analysis.
Of course, the imperialism is not always external in
source; rather, many analyses focus on internal colonialism
o
or internal exploitation of one group by another. These
in the first chapter and Irving L. Horov;itz, "Consensus,
Conflict and Cooperation: A Sociological Inventory,"
Social Forces
, XLI (December 3, 1962), 177-188 also note
that conflict theory is not necessarily inconsistent with
equilibrium.
7Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a Re-
orientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 230-238.
Q
See Shlomo Avineri, Marx on Colonialism and
Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), especially
his introduction for some general discussion. In
addition, Marx's views on the issue are expressed on pp.
125-131, and p. ^39 of the work. Among Latin
Americanists, most of the authors in the Petras and
Zeitlin volume cited above express such sentiments but
especially Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About
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issues will be discussed in greater detail m later
sections of this chapter as well as in later chapters.
The important point here is that this particular aspect of
the conflict model often leads to the creation of a
scapegoat for the problems of the society. Extreme
nationalism often develops with some outside force being
blamed for the problems of the country. Anti-United
States sentiment in much of Latin America can be traced to
such perceptions of societal problems.
Although the conflict and consensus models have
some common features^ there are also many differences
between the two approaches. This chapter will spell out
the distinguishing features of the conflict model» thus
contrasting the conflict paradigm with the previously
discussed consensus model.
Latin America," pp. I3-3I takes this position. For
general discussion of the question, see Wiarda, op. cit. ;
Kuper and Smith, op. cit.
. p. 11; and Moore, op. cit.,
p. 431.
Elements of the Conflict Model
As§ug£tlonn of the mod^T_. As Indicated above, the
conflict model assumes the existence of a minimum of two
interests or classes in society with the real possibility
of a plurality of interests. In the conflict model, qs in
the consensus model, these differing interests compete for
power in the system. In contrast to the consensus model,
however, there is no natural mechanism for the compromise
of diverging Interests. In fact, compromise is alien to
the conflict approach.^
The pluralism of the conflict society is one in
which a variety of interests exist, but they do not
combine or Interact to any appreciable degree. "^^ People
tend to belong to particular groups but there is not much
overlapping of membership In the conflict society. Group
membership tends to occur along ideological or other
9
See Kuper. "Some Aspects of Violent and Non-
violent Political Change in Plural Societies," in Kuper
and Smith, op. clt .. pp. I53-I67, as well as Dahrendorf,
"Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological
Analysis.
"
10
See Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and
Problems," p. 154; and Dew, op. clt. , p. 8.
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lines so that diverging values are not cross-fertilized in
such a system. The major instrument of compromise for
the consensus model—a plurality of loyalties which
diminish intensity of loyalties— is absent in the conflict
view. With lack of communication across group lines,
there is little hope for acceptance of less than total
victory by any one interest. The groups tend to become
very close-knit and closed to outside influence s."^"^ A
defensiveness about their values and positions emerges
only to compound the difficulties in communication across
group lines.
There is also a tendency for conflict theorists to
view society as polarized between two major interests. "^^
The two groups are usually denoted as the oppressed and the
oppressors, and the source of oppression can take many
Smith, op. clt.
, provides an excellent analysis
of this point as does Dew, op. cit. . Of course, David
Truman ( ed
, ) , The Governmental Process; Political
Interests and Public Opinion (New York; Knopf, I962) and
Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago;
University of Chicago Press, 1956) offer analyses of this
point in presenting the requisites for consensus
politics.
Kuper, op. cit.
, pp. 15^-l6l analyzes this
polarization and its Implications.
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13forms. It Is easier to analyze a society if only two
opposing groups can be Isolated for analysis—there are
those in power and those out of power. If each of these
two groups can be viewed as closely-knit, all problems of
society can be analyzed in terms of the struggle between
those in and those out of power. The people in power are
not likely to give up their power without a struggle and
conflict often takes the form of violence in such a
simplistic view of society. The oppressed finally reach
the point of total frustration and resort to violence, ''"^
According to the bi-polar analysis of society,
everyone belongs to one camp or the other and there is no
middle ground between them. Thus, communication and
compromise are next to impossible. The determinants of
what constitutes the oppressed and the oppressors varies
Ibid.
, p, 154. Dahrendorf describes them as two
groups, one defending the status quo and one attempting
to disrupt the status quo in "Toward a Theory of Social
Conflict," in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and
Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, I96I), pp. ^45-451.
Kuper, op. cit.
. pp. I54-I61. Also see C.
Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19597T Of course, Vilfredo Pareto,
Mind and Society (New York: Karcourt, Brace, & Co.,
1935); Roberto Wichels, Political Parties (New York: The
Free Press, 19^9), and Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class ,
tr. by Hannah Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), are
some of the classics on this issue.
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from one analysis to another, but economic factors are most
commonly seen as the source of conflict in the conflict
^15
model. Most conflict analyses relate in one way or
another to economic power and economic class conflict tends
to be the driving force in societal change. "^^ One group
is always struggling to get a greater share of the
economic resources held by the group in control.
In some societies, of course, the economic factor
may not be primary, and conflict analysis sometimes posits
other sources of conflict as dominant. Religion, race, or
place of residence (i.e., urban versus rural) may be the
determinants of power in the system."'-'^ Whatever the
The economic factor is very explicitly stated in
Marx's analysis, of course, and is carried over into the
analysis of such as Moore and Dahrendorf . The economic
goods may be stated in terms of industrial power, land, or
other forms of wealth. See Kuper, op. cit.
. pp. II-I3 for
a brief analysis.
''"^The source of this approach is Marx's own. views
as expressed in many writings. Perhaps his, "Value,
Price, and Profit," in Marx, Engels, and Lenin, The
Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, 196TT"traces
the economic causes of change most clearly. See Henry B.
Mayo, Introduction to Marxist Theory (New York: Oxford
University Press, i960), especially Chapter 3 for an
analysis of the point.
Smith, op. cit. , notes some of these alternative
sources of conflict as does Dew, op. cit. .
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source of conflict, there tends to be a conception of
society in terms of caste or class broadly defined. If
the division in society is bi-polar. the conflict is easy
to analyze; but if divisions are multiple, the analysis
becomes increasingly difficult as the number of groups
or Interests increases. It is not difficult to see why
bi-polar analysis is so popular in the conflict tradition.
For the conflict model, industrialization is
usually seen as increasing the gaps between sectors of
the society rather than decreasing them, as the consensus
model contends. Industrialization is conceived as a
means of increasing the concentration of power,
particularly economic power. Instead of reducing
differences among groups, the industrialization process'
increases such differences. As a result, ideological
differences become more intense rather than diminished;
society becomes polarized and conflict results.
The conflict model usually accepts the consensus
view that industrialization and urbanization go to/rether.
The validity of such a claim was analyzed in the previous
chapter. The importance of the contention here, however,
is that whereas for the consensus model urbanization
Of course, this is a basic premise of Marx; and,
Dahrendorf makes a similar contention in Class and Class
Conflict in Industrial Society .
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promoted greater communication and participation, the
conflict model sees urbanization as providing still
another source of conflict. Greater differences emerge
as the urban sector moves forward and enjoys some of the
benefits of industrialization, while the rural sector is
left behind and exploited by the urban sectors. As
concentration of power is increased, the likelihood of
increasing participation by other sectors is decreased
because they become further subordinated.
Despite the tendency of conflict theorists to see
a bl-polar society, they also argue that their model
permits the opportimity for all sectors of society to
have their interests articulated in some vjay.^^ This
contention seems inconsistent with the earlier suggestion
that participation tends to be decreased as society
industrializes. Such is not the case, however, since
articulation of interests occurs in a wider range of ways
19An excellent analysis of this point is made by
Stanlslav Andre ski, Parasitism and Subversion; The Case
of Latin America (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1966), pp. 1-3.
20
See Dahrendorf particularly. In all of his
works cited above, he makes note of the continuity of
conflict and the likelihood of all participating in this
way.
in the conflict model. As noted before, violence and
revolution often result from societal conflicts, and it is
along this avenue that interest articulation can occur in
conflict analysis.
Conclusions of the model . In reviewing the
assumptions made by the conflict model, several
conclusions seem almost inescapable. First of all. if
conflict is to have any meaning as a force for social
change, as the advocates of the system envision it. all
sectors of the society have to have some possibility of
making an impression on the system. All interests may be
involved in conflicts in the society. What is difficult
however, is to talk about any order at all if conflict, is
completely unchannelled. While conflict may be a useful
concept, carrying the model to the extreme would seem to
21presuppose the existence of no social order at all.
21
Alfred Diamant, Political Development;
Approaches to Theory and Strategy (Bloomington. Ind. :
Comparative Administration Group. I963 ) , pp. 38-^1
discusses this and other features of the conflict model.
He actually argues that Dahrendorf ' s analysis can be
viewed as a group systems approach free of the constraints
of equilibrium issues. Horowitz, op. clt. , rejects the
argument that conflict analysis presupposes a lack of
social order.
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In other words. It is very difficult to envision a
society, even of conflict, without some order (i.e..
consensus) to it.
Since a certain amount of order is necessary to
even perceive the existence of a society, the advocates
of the conflict model are led to the conclusion that
restraint is in some way imposed on the system. They
reject the idea that constraints emerge from interaction
of groups, so they postulate enforced order. Order or
constraint is imposed by the stronger or oppressing power
over the weaker or oppressed. In the case of
developing nations, this may be the enforced order of
outside colonial power over the dependent nations. ^-^
Hov;ever. the requirement of the conflict theorists is
that interests be expressed in some way. Violence may
become a way of expressing interests. A problem arises
from attempts to claim that interests are expressed by
the subordinate element when it is being suppressed by
the more powerful. Since the conflict theorists
criticize consensus theory for not providing opportunity
Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," pp. 237-238;
^^^t op. cit. . p. 8; and Kuper. op. cit. . pp. 11-13.
Kuper, op. cit.
, p. 11.
for all groups to express demands, the question raised
here becomes a crucial one. Obviously, the conflict
theorists have some problems in operationalizing their
theory on this point.
What Dahrendorf argues is that constraint actually
provides the basis of conflict, and as constraint
increases, greater conflict emerges—presumably as a
result of increasing frustration on the part of those
constrained by the force of those in power. since one
group reacts to the force imposed on it by the other, an
increase In such force makes the reaction that much
greater. As Edward Dew argues, the smaller the group in
control, the greater the dependence there is on force for
constraint. ^ Following the implications of Dahrendorf »s
position, this situation would lead to increasingly
Intense conflict. At any rate, it is clear that in the
conflict paradigm there is no self-regulating mechanism
for the ordering of society as there is in the consensus
model.
2^
Dahrendorf, "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," p. 237.
25
Dew, op. clt.
. p. 8.
127
.on
Ideological polarization is a further Implicate
of the conflict model. While the advocates of the
conflict model do not necessarily spell out the
consequences, it is implied that ideological positions
become very intense and ideological loyalties increase.
If one accepts, as the model assumes, that groups must
necessarily view one another as enemies, it would seem
that all issues would have to take a highly Ideological
tone. Every problem of society can be easily reduced to
conflict among the major groups. When such conflict
occurs, especially if the bi-polar position dominates,
solutions to problems often become rather simplistic—the
solution to all problems lies in terms of destroying the
influence of the opposition group. Marx's economic
analysis and suggestion for curing society's ills is Just
one example of such a simplistic approach. Not all
conflict analysis is reducible to such simplistic
accounts, but the assumptions implicit in the model
create the possibility and tendency toward such a
conclusion.
It seems that what the conflict model posits
regarding industrialization and urbanization also leads
to increasing ideological divergence. If it is accepted
that industrialization and urbanization produce wider
gaps between sectors in the society, it seems there would
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be increasing insulation of ideological position because
there would be less communication across group lines.
If groups are not exposed to discussion of differing
views, their own ideological positions will not be
critically examined and will tend to become accepted with
greater tenacity.
Perhaps the best way to summarize the conflict
model is to use Alfred Diamant*s comparison of the
conflict and structural-functional (consensus) models:
26Structural-Fimctional Conflict
Every society is a relatively
persisting configuration of
elements
Every society is a well-
integrated configuration of
elements
Every element in society
contributes to its
functioning
Every society rests on the
consensus of its members
Every society is always
changing: change is
ubiquitous
Every society always
experiences conflict:
conflict is ubiquitous
Every element in society
contributes to its
change
Every society rests on
the constraint of some
members by others
Reproduced from Diamant, op. cit« , p. kO,
Diamant, of course, has paraphrased Dahrendorf in this
classification.
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The next task of this chapter will be to analyze
the ways In which the conflict model has been used in
studying latin America. The following sections will note
the application of the model to Latin America and
evaluate the implications of the model for the study of
Latin America,
Application of the Conflict Model
to Latin America
In recent years there has been an increasing
tendency for some scholars of Latin America to reject the
consensus model and employ the conflict model in their
analyses. Some, such as Irving Horowitz, Stanislav
Andre ski, and Merle Kling, have provided very
27
sophisticated analyses. Others, however, have produced
analyses v?hich seem more concerned with making an
Ideological point than in illuminating Latin American
Horowitz, et al. (eds.), Latin American
Radicalism (New York: Vintage Books, I969); Andreski,
op. cit
.
; and Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and
Instability in Latin America," Western Political Quarterly,
IX (March, 1956). 21-35.
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development processes. 28 Regardless of the tone of the
analyses, there is a common assumption that struggle
between groups, primarily economic classes, is the key to
understanding latin American politics. This struggle
often leads to the conclusion that an impasse results,
leaving latin America with little hope of any real social
change .^^
Most scholars using the conflict model in studying
Latin America tend to envision a form of economic
polarization of society, although there are many
variations. The Petras and Zeitlin volume noted above
contains a number of essays representing differing
interpretations of economic polarization and its effect on
political development. The authors of most of the essays
tend to accept the idea that industrialization does help
28
The author has in mind particularly Petras and
Zeitlin, op* cit.
, which consists of a number of essays
primarily oriented to bi-polar class analysis. Perhaps
John Gerassi, The Great Fear (New York: Macmillan,
1963) is another good example of such analyses.
29
See Torcuato S. Di Telia. "Stalemate or
Co-existence in Argentina." in Petras and Zeitlin, op»
cit.
. pp. 249-263 for an example of this position.
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create a new sector in society, namely, the middle
30
class.
The middle sectors are not the reform oriented
group of the consensus model view. According to the
conflict theorists, the middle sectors are often much less
unified than consensus theorists tend to assume.
Itself deeply divided, the middle class cannot be
expected to provide a very strong force for change in any
particular direction. More importantly, however, the
lack of unity has meant that there has been no development
of a strong middle class Ideology. Because the middle
30
Glauclo Ary Dillon Scares, "The New
Industrialization and the Brazilian Political System," in
Petras and Zeitlin, op> cit.
. pp. 186-201, for Instance
accepts this view, though others in the volme reject the
position.
31
Ibid_. Also see Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and
Class in Twentieth-Century Latin America," The Hispanic
American Histori cal Review , XLIX (February, 19697, 60-93
as well as Charles Wagley, "The Dilenmia of the Latin
American Middle Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of
Political Science , XXVII (May, 1965)731 0-3 18. Several
of the pieces in the Petras and Zeitlin volume make
reference to this idea as well.
32
Vanger, op. clt. » makes this point very strongly
in his analysis. John P. Gillin, "Some Signposts for
Policy," in Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change
in latin America; Its Implications for United States
Policy (New York; Harper Brothers, i960), pp. 1^-62 as
132
sectors come from varied backgrounds and do not see
themselves as a unified force, they do not develop a
common ideological stance. The usual argument regarding
their ideology is that the only concern of the middle
sectors is to achieve the status of the higher class.
This position and its advocates have already been noted
in previous chapters.
Many of the conflict theorists argue that the
landed elites, the industrialists, and now the middle
sectors have actually made an alignment against the
working class and peasantry. Specifically such theorists
reject the idea that the industrialists and landed
interests have been at odds with one another. -^-^ This
view provides an excellent example of the simplistic
well as his "The Middle Segments and Their Values," in
Latin American Politics, ed. by Robert D. Tonasek
(Garden City: Doubleday, I966), pp. 23-^0 also make this
point.
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, op. cit.
, pp. 13-31; Oscar
Delgado, "Revolution, Reform, Conservatism," pp. 38I-
398; Frederick B. Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in
Chile," PP4 202-219; and Gustavo Polit, "The
Industrialists of Argentina, " all in Petras and Zeitlin,
op. cit. , are just a few examples of those taking this
position. Victor Alba, Alliance Without All ies^ (New
York: Praeger, I965) is an essentially consensus
theorist also assuming a similar stance.
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bi-polar analysis as it is applied to Latin American
study. While the bi-polarity of the society is sometimes
a fact, the solutions recommended often ignore the
realities of a more complex society. According to this
position, the upper class and industrial sectors combine
to exploit the lower sectors. The solution of societal
problems is usually keyed to getting rid of the upper
class or putting power in the hands of workers or
peasants. John P. Gillin uses a similar approach, but
sees the society as composed of substrata within the two
larger sectors. He sees two lovier classes—the workers
and peasants; two upper classes— the industrialists and
land ov7ners; and a middle class. As such, the conflicts
emerging in Gillin* s analysis are more complex than in
the others noted here.
Some suggest that a form of "internal colonialism"
exists in Latin America. In this analysis the rural
peasantry are exploited by the combined industrial and
3
«;landed interests.-^-^ This alliance of the landed and
3^
Alba, Alliance Without Allies , and Petras and
Zeltlin, OP. cit.
35
Stavenhagen, op. cit, , pp. 19 and JO, Andreski,
op. cit. , takes a similar stand.
13^
metropolitan industrial sectors provide the greatest
obstacles to development. The rural peasantry are kept in
a dependent position by these interests. The analysis is
again bi-polar. Eventually the peasantry will reach the
point of revolution.
In looking more closely at the impact of
industrialization in Latin America, the conflict
theorists also suggest that new problems are created by
the industrial process. One of the most severe problems
is that of creating a new urban sector which cannot be
absorbed by the industrialized society. More and more
people move to the cities in expectation of a better life
and greater employment opportunity. In fact, however,
the system is incapable of absorbing the new sectors and
the gap between the workers and the middle sectors only
increases. More importantly, the newly industrialized
society seems incapable of integrating the new urban
settlers into the political system, thus creating the
^
possibility of greater disruption in the system.-^''
36
Scares, op. cit.
James Petras, "Revolution and Guerilla Movements
in Latin America: Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and
Peru," in Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit.
, pp. 329-369. He
makes the same point in his study of Chile, Political
Part of the problem of Industrialization is that
while the middle sectors may be growing, they are not
growing nearly as rapidly as the lower classes. Because
the lower class is growing at a faster rate than the
middle class, sheer numbers would indicate a greater
influence on the system by the lov/er classes. In
addition, because conflict theorists argue that the
economic factor is the source of conflict, the middle
sectors would not be able to play the role assigned to
them by the consensus theorists. They simply could not
muster the support to hold back the eventual revolt of
o o
the lower classes.
A very popular theme of conflict model analysts
is economic exploitation from the outside. In I*Iarxian
analysis of course, imperialism is necessary to the whole
argument, for without foreign capital to get the
and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969), and in "The Latin
American Middle Class," New Politics
. IV (V/inter, I965),
7^-89. Talton P. Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of
Venezuela (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, I969), p. 176, notes the problems of
Integrating migrants into the urban society.
38
Scares, op. cit. , and Stavenhagen, op. cit. .
base their analyses on this point.
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development process going, most of the underdeveloped
nations would still have "no history" in a Marxist sense;
i.e.. no production, no classes, hence no Marxian class
39analysis. In this type of analysis, foreign economic
interests are seen as the evil forces, but also
historically necessary, in conflict with the exploited
natives. One such analysis even contends that the
concept of Latin America developing a feudal character as
a result of its colonial heritage Is a distortion of the
facts. Instead, this study suggests that Latin America,
even in colonial times, was the object of capitalist
exploitation.
Others have concentrated on the more current
experiences of Latin America, Foreign Interests are seen
as taking all the profits out of Latin America and
leaving the Latin Americans nothing. There is often
envisioned an alliance betvreen native oligarchies and the
39
See Avineri, op. cit.
. Introduction.
See Stanley J. Stein, and Barbara H. Stein, The
Colonial Heritage of Ijatln America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970); and Luis Vltale. "Latin America:
Feudal or Capitalist?" in Petras and Zeltlln, op. cit.
.
pp. 32-43.
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foreign interests.^^ While one cannot ignore the fact
that Latin America has been exploited by foreign
interests, it is also too simplistic to blame all its
problems on such exploitation. It is not surprising that
many conflict theorists have viewed the United States
as the imperialist power par excellence. This analysis
suggests that greater concentration of wealth occurs and,
under foreign control, is often used to force out any
chance of indigenous industrial development.
Recurrent in the conflict analysis literature on
Latin America is the idea that rank and caste are at the
base of much of the social structure. Extreme divisions
are seen to exist among the various classes or groups.
41
Merle Kling, op. cit. ; Teontonio Dos Santos,
"The Changing Structure of Foreign Investment in Latin
America," pp 94-98, and Maurice Halperin, "Growth and
Crisis in the Latin American Economy," pp. 44-75, both in
Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit. .
42
This position is not unique to the conflict
theorists. See Charles Wagley, Th e Latin American
Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968);
Richard i^.. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin
American History," American Historical Review
, LXVII
(January, 1962), 317-338; Frederick B. Pike, Chile and
the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Eame, Ind.
:
University of Notre Dame Press, I963); and Alba, op. cit.,
for discussion of the United States role from several
perspectives.
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While on the surface such visions are valid, they probably
are overemphasized. At any rate, the conclusion emerges
that there is almost no chance for compromise among
groups because the interests of important groups are
usuiilly unalterably opposed to one another. Since no
communication among groups occurs, they cannot work out
solutions to conflicts in a very peaceful manner.
Implications of the Conflict Model for
the Understanding of Latin America
It is evident that the conflict model leads to a
very pessimistic view of the future for Latin America.
With the position that groups are unalterably opposed to
one another, the only thing to do is wait for the
explosion which will Inevitably come. Of course, the
conflict theorists are ultimately optimistic that the
explosion will bring a new order consistent with their ^
ovm Ideals. In such analysis, the only chance for
progress is to revolutionize society completely, but since
those in power are not going to give up their power,
there seems little choice but violent revolution.
The conflict analysis model also creates a tendency
to accept xenophobic nationalism on the part of Latin
Americans. Much of the policy of those nations is based
on the idea that the United States, for Instance, has as
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its only intention the exploitation of the Latin American
nations and thus anything the United States does is
suspect. Such suspicion, of course, means that there is
a great deal of difficulty in the attempts of the two
Americas to live and work together. Unfortunately, many
Latin Americans have accepted this particular premise of
the conflict theorists.^^ The danger in such an analysis
is that it might lead to everyone giving up on trying to
change anything.
Most important, however, the conflict approach
often leads to very simplistic suggestions for resolution
of problems. One group sees the millennium through
destruction of its opposition groups. No social or
political problems are subject to such simple solutions.
Those who are successful in leading revolutions on such
bases often only deceive their followers and create
greater frustration in the long run.
Obviously, as with the consensus model, there are
certain features of the conflict model which help explain
^3
Gerassi, op. cit. , for instance, suggests that
this sort of misunderstanding on both sides is
responsible for much of the trouble between the United
States and Latin America. Irving L. Horowitz, et al. ,
Latin American Radicalism , includes selections employing
similar themes.
some aspects of Latin American political development.
However, as has been noted in this chapter, there are
limitations to applicability of the model to Latin
America. Forthcoming chapters will analyze uses and
Implications of the two models relative to particular
issue areas In Latin America.
These last tvjo chapters have outlined the dominant
paradigms for study of political development—namely
. the
consensus and conflict paradigms. Of course, there are
variations on the paradigms and attempts by some to
synthesize the contrasting approaches. The following
chapters will Introduce some of the attempts at
synthesizing these approaches, as discussion of specific
application of the approaches proceeds.
CHAPTER V
THE MIDDLE SECTORS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue
Much has been written concerning the role played by
the middle sectors in the process of political
development. As was noted in Chapters III and IV, the
consensus and conflict models differ in the roles they
expect the middle groups to play. This chapter will
provide more detailed analysis of the role the middle
sectors are supposed to play in each model and then
attempt to explain what role they actually assume in
Latin America. The chapter is intended as a preliminary
examination using the argument over the middle sectors as
a case study for the consensus and conflict paradigms.
First, the term "middle sectors" is used rather
than the more familiar "middle class." The reason for
this preference is that middle class usually suggests a
fairly precise delineation of economic classes in the
society, while middle sectors or middle elements can be
1^2
used to denote a wide range of groups making up the center
position of the socio-economic scale. The literature to
be analyzed in this chapter is not consistent in the
usage of the terms. Some authors use middle class and
some use middle sectors to identify similar groups in the
society. To be consistent, middle sectors will be used
in this study."'"
Defining the term "middle sectors" or "middle
class" has presented problems for social scientists. The
terms have often been defined according to type of
occupation or amount of wealth of those included in the
groups. Such definitions lead to a great deal of
imprecision and lack of scientific rigor. Each scholar
1
John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin
America; The Emergence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), of course, has
popularized the use of the term "middle sectors" in
relation to Latin America.
This discussion is based on G. D. H. Cole*s
"The Conception of the Middle Classes," in The British
Journal of Sociology , I (December, 1950), 275-290. Also
see Alfred Meusel, "Middle Classes," Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences , X (New York: Macmlllan, 1951 )» PP» ^0?-
-if15. Regarding Latin American middle sectors, Johnson,
op. clt» ; Vfctor Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class
Revolution." New Politics , I (Winter, 1962), 66-73; and
James Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class," New
Politics , IV (V/lnter, 1965)t 7^-89 provide some of the
best analyses and discussion of the problem of defining
the groups which belong in the category.
1^3
has his own concept of which groups make up the middle
sectors of society. As a result, there Is often an
arbitrary assignment of various groups to the category.
As noted by G. D. H. Cole, another method of identifying
the middle class is to ask a random sample of the society
to identify the class to which they belong.^ Such a
method is likely to be even more imprecise than the first
method because statistics indicate that a huge majority
of people identify themselves as part of the middle
class. When studying Latin America, the difficulty is
enhanced because the middle sectors have not developed a
very strong identity of their own.^ What may be part of
the middle sectors in one country or to one scholar may
not be in another instance. The problem boils down to
Cole. op. clt«
.
discusses the two methods of
identifying the middle class.
k
Ibid.
, p. 276.
5See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About
Latin America," in latin America; Reform or Revolution?
ed. by James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (New York;
Pawcett. 1968). p. 26, and John P. Gillin. "Some
Signposts for Policy." in Council on Foreign Relations,
Social Change in Latin American Today; Its Implications
for United States Policy (New York; Harper Brothers,
I960), pp. 23-28;
whether the middle sectors are defined in economic or
social terms and which elements are encompassed In the
definition.
Because of the difficulty in giving a precise
definition to the term "middle sectors," we shall have to
look carefully at the boundaries provided by each scholar
In his own discussion of the middle sectors. What is
most important to the present analysis is what role each
scholar assigns to the middle sectors in his analysis of
political development. For our purposes, each particular
definition of the term is important as it affects the
role the middle sectors play in the development process.
For this reason, each author's definition will be stated
and examined and note will be made If his particular
definition implies a significant difference for the role
he assigns to the middle sectors.
Although giving a precise definition to the middle
sectors is difficult, there are some commonalities in use
of the terra. The general characteristics of the middle
sectors are set forth by G. D. H. Cole as follows:
1) economically they are between the very
rich and the manual labor v;age-earners ;
2) many of them receive a substantial portion
of their Incomes in the form of interest
or profits;
1^5
3) salaries provide the major source of
Income for many;
^) collective barKaining Is becoming more
prevalent as a means of dealing with
employers with this group;
5) there Is often an alignment with the
working classes regarding taxation and
government spending policies; and
6) the intelligentsia Is a part of the
middle sectors although only a small
minority of It.^
Obviously the various scholars to be analyzed here provide
variations on these general characteristics, but these
features are found in most definitions of the middle
sectors. They serve at least to provide us with a
working definition, even though all these characteristics
may not be directly related to our analysis. One other
feature of the middle sectors usually noted in the
literature is that they are made up of a variety of
backgrounds and that they are very much consumption
Cole, op« cit« , p, 28?
•
1^6
oriented."^ These factors will have significance in the
analysis of how the consensus and conflict models view
the middle sectors.
The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Political Development According to
the Consensus Model
The jgeneral l iterature. As was noted earlier, the
consensus model views the middle sectors in a very
optimistic light. According to the consensus model, the
middle sectors will be the major instrument for reform
and as such will lead developing nations to modernity.
Efeting back to the Weberian analyses of society, it can be
seen that the middle sectors vjould be the prime agents in
the move tov/ard rationality-legality in the organization
of society, which consensus theorists often interpret as
modernity.^
Ibid.
. pp. 278-281. In addition, the Economic
Commission for Latin America, United Nations Economic and
Social Council, Social Development of Latin America in
the Post V/ar Period (Mar del Plata. Argentina. May, I963),
pp. III-II5 provides a discussion of this feature
relative to Latin America.
Q
Max Weber's analysis is presented most cogently
in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New
York: Oxford University Press, 19^7). Interpretations
14?
In the Weberian analysis, the middle sectors would
make the society more rational through education and the
spread of their value system, which Includes the
Protestant ethic of hard work and savings and Investment
for the future. In the experience of Great Britain, much
of Western Europe, and the United States, the middle
sectors accepted or were conditioned to play such a role.
Some people suggest that these nations were the exceptions
to the rule rather than the standard against which others
o
should be Judged. Regardless of whether the Western
European and United States experiences were exceptions to
the rule rather than the rule, the fact Is that most
students of political development have generally assumed
that the middle sectors will assume roles in the
developing nations similar to those in the already
developed nations.
of Weber's position are provided by H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills (eds.). From Nax Weber; Essays in
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946);
Reinhard Bendix, Max V/eber : An Intellectual Portrait
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1962) ; and S. M. Miller, Max
Weber (New York: Crowell, I963).
9
See Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing; Power
and Secondary Development In L-^tln America ( San
Francisco : Chandler, I967), p. 48; Petras. op. cit. ,
pp. 74-85; and Alfred Stepan, "Discussion: The Latin
American Middle Class," New Politics , IV (Spring, 1965)»
87-90.
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Among the early writers who suggest that the
middle sectors of society have a leavening effect on
politics was Alexis de Tocquevllle.^^ In his analysis of
United States society, de Tocquevllle argues that it Is
democratic largely because of the extensive social
equality which exists. Social equality produces
political equality. De Tocquevllle 's ideas found
expression in the writings of many other scholars, among
them, Louis Hartz who suggests that the absence of a
feudal heritage is largely responsible for the particular
character of the United States* development.*''^ Perhaps
Seymour Martin Lipset is most closely identified with the
idea that the middle sectors provide for stability in the
Alexis de Tocquevllle, Democracy in America
, ed.
by Richard D. Heffner (New York: The New American
Library, 1956). Of course, the idea can be traced back
to Aristotle's "golden mean" and his idea that societies
which had the most even distribution of vjealth would be
most stable.
11
,Ibid.
, pp. ^9-55.
12
Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1955 )•
1^9
political system.^^ The idea of middle class moderation
and stability is in turn often translated into a sign of
political development by consensus oriented scholars.
Lipset's ideas have clearly had great influence on
the study of political development. Many scholars
specifically concerned with the process of development
have accepted the idea that the key to development and
political stability is in creating a large middle stratum
in the society. The specific effects of this middle
stratum will be the subject of the rest of this section
of the chapter.
One of the most pervasive ideas concerning the '
middle sectors is that they will provide for political
development because they lessen the ideological cleavages
13
Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review
. LIU
(March. 1959)» 69-105* and rolitio«.l Man (Garden Citv;
Doubleday, I960) exemplify this position. The
application of this type of analysis to the United States
is plentiful with David B. Truman, The Governmental
Procesr^! Political Interc^sts and Public Opinion TNcw
York: Knopf. 1962) providing one of the most significant
examples. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New
York: Farrar and Rinehart, 19^2); and Robert A. Itohl,
A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956) are also important works in this
tradition.
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of society. Also, the existence of a large middle class
implies the relative lack of vast gaps between rich and
poor. The argument goes that a large middle sector
provides for the emergence of a wide range of groups in
the society. With the large number of groups, there is
overlapping membership and with the overlapping
membership more exposure to differing ideas and interests.
The exposure of groups to differing ideas and interests
is supposed to broaden people's perspectives and
facilitate compromise among groups."'"^ This feature
extends beyond the emergence of middle groups as a potent
force in the society and. as was noted in Chapter III,
involves the larger issue of increased participation in
society by all groups.
Essentially, the argment of the consensus
theorists regarding the middle sectors is that the middle
sectors will provide a moderating tendency in the
political system. They will push for democratic reform
and take a very humanitarian approach to governmental
See Lipset, op. cit. ; Daniel Lerner, The Passing
of Traditional Society (Glencoe: The Free Press. 1958 );
and Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology (Glencoe: The Free
Press, i960).
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policies. They are the elements which will exert pressure
on the political system to modernize and democratize.-^^
The key to the middle sectors* role Is the value
system ascribed to the group. Most authors merely assume
that the middle sectors in all societies will behave as
they have in the United States and Western Europe. As
was noted above, however, the roles played by the middle
sectors in these nations may have been aberrations of
what can normally be expected. The United States and
Western European nations had a chance to modernize very
gradually because of the time period in which they
developed. Nations developing currently must contend
v;ith a variety of modernizing forces V7hich were
encountered one at a time by the United States and
Western Europe. .Students of Latin America often expect
the developing nations to follow the pattern of the
United States and Western Europe without critical
examination of comparability of the development
15
Most of the generalists noted in Chapter III
fall into this category. Some of the more notable
analyses using this approach are Robert L. Heilbroner,
The Great Ascent {New York; Harper and Row. I963);
V/alt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, i960); C. E. Black, The
Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row,
1966); and A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political
Development (New York: Knopf, 19655T
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experience. There may be considerable doubt as to
whether the middle sectors even in the United States or
Western Europe actually behave in the fashion and play
the role that the development theorists have assigned to
them. When one looks at the relationship between the
middle class and the lower class in our own modern
society, doubts arise.
The middle sectors are usually thought to be
willing to forestall current consumption or conveniences
for the sake of a better future. Thus, the middle
sectors are supposed to emphasize savings and investment.
The implication is that capital is put aside for use in
developing the economy. Because these groups are
concerned with a better future, they are hesitant to make
dramatic immediate demands or provide very great
disruption in the system. Instead they work within the
system to bring about social change. Somehow, in their
essentially capitalist outlook, the middle sectors are
also supposed to have a very moral outlook in the sense
of having a social conscience. They strive for social
Justice and the development of the system toward the
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ideals of modern democratic societies. Consequently,
the middle sectors are expected to align themselves with
the working elements to bring about social and political
reform.
The literature on Latin America . According to
James Petras, almost all Latin Americanists have accepted
the •middle class thesis." as outlined in the above
1?section. He believes that his analysis varies from the
generalization. VJhile it is true that both the advocates
of the consensus and conflict models often see the middle
sectors as providing much hope for modernization, there
are differences in degree and emphasis. The task nov; is
to note the position of Latin Americanists who use the
consensus orientation, while the following sections of
the chapter will deal with conflict analyses.
John J. Johnson is the Latin Americanist in the
consensus tradition most closely identified with the
16
These ascribed characteristics are noted by
'^ole, op. cit., and Alba, op. cit
.
. Petras, op. cit.
,
presents an excellent critique of this characterization.
Petras, op. cit. , p. 75*
middle sectors argument. Joining him in his views
concerning the middle sectors are others such as Victor
Alba, Richard Adams, and Robert J. Alexander . "^^ There
are variations on the theme among these analysts, but all
see a great deal of hope in the increasing strength of
the middle sectors.
Johnson's study, which concerns Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina. Chile, and Urugiiay, lists the values that the
Latin American middle sectors are urban with urban value
systems; they favor \miversal education; they favor a
high degree of state intervention to solve social and
economic problems; and they favor broad-based political
20parties oriented to social reform. Noting the
Johnson, op. cit,
, presents the most precise
statement on the issue.
19
Alba, op. cit. ; Alliance V/ithout Allies (New
York: Praeger, I965) ; and The La t in~A.mer i
c
a n's Tne
w
York: Praeger, 1969)f Richard Adams, in Council on
Foreign Relations, op. cit
.
; and Robert Alexander,
Today's Latin America (Garden City: Doubleday, I962).
Some of these authors have changed positions in more
recent works. Richard Adams, particularly in The Second
Sowing, seems to have given up much of his earlier hope
as has Alba in the last two works cited.
20
Johnson, op. cit, . See particularly the
Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3»
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unselfishness of the middle sectors. Johnson argues that
they have often subordinated some of their own desires
or Interests In order to help the i7orklng classes. ^"^
Victor Alba has exrpressed almost the same
sentiments in his I962 New Politics article. Although
Alba suggests that the middle sectors in Latin America
will follow the route set forth by Johnson, he also notes
that they may be tempted to accept efficiency over
Justice. Indicating that he tends to equate
modernization with democracy. Alba expresses the fear
that totalitarianlDm may emerge if the middle sectors
value efficiency at all costs. Nonetheless, he is
optimistic that the middle sectors will resist such
J
authoritarian tendencies.
An Indication that Alba is not completely
comfortable with Johnson's analysis emerges in his
discussion of the middle sectors as being composed of two
elements—the new middle class and the traditional middle
2k
class. The new middle class has gained Influence as
21
Ibid.
,
particularly Chapter 9»
22
Alba, "Latin America; The Middle Class
Revolution."
^•^Ibld.. pp. 68-72.
^
^Ibid.
. pp. 66-67.
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the oligarchies have diminished in Latin America, it is
made up of industrialists, merchants, technicians, and
executives of larger companies. The traditional middle
class is composed of skilled workers, artisans who have
become skilled technicians, small merchants, and
provincial industrialists. While the division into two
elements would suggest a possibility of differing views
on policies within the middle sectors. Alba shrugs that
off by saying that the new middle class has gained
enough power to be able to manipulate the traditional
middle class.
Alba's later works indicate somewhat of a shift
from this position. He argues, in The Alliance Without
Allies particularly, that the middle class has not
followed the pattern it was supposed to follow. He does
not make clear, however, whether he thinks they have
submitted to the temptation to accept efficiency at all
costs or whether they have perceived greater self interest
in aligning with the oligarchy. While he is unclear on
this point, it is implied that the latter is the more
Ibid.
, p. 67. Some of the Latin Americanists to
be noted in connection with conflict analysis also accept
the idea of a divided middle sector but with quite
different consequences.
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26likely explanation. Even though his analysis in later
works indicates growing pessimism on the role of the
middle sectors. Alba still feels they are on the side of
the liberals in questions of social change.
^"^
One of the most interesting expectations of some
of the consensus analysts is that the middle sectors will
be essentially anti-military. Even those viho stress the
middle class origins of many officers of today suggest
26
It will be remembered that his analysis of the
failure of the Alliance for Progress rests on the idea
that self-serving oligarchies have used the United States
and vice-versa. For some reason, the unselfishness and
social reform values of the middle class which he noted
earlier are not evident in this work.
27
Alba, The Latin Americans
, p. 124.
28
,Alba, "Latin America: The Middle Class
Revolution," p. 67. Johnson, op. cit« , pp. 192-193,
however, notes that the middle sectors are the source of
many of the military officers and as such, it would be
expected that military policy would be dominated by
middle sector values. Edwin Lieuwin, Arms and Politics
in I^tin America (New York: Praeger, i960) also
emphasizes the middle sector roots of the modern Latin
American military. Jose Nun's "The Middle Class
Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz (ed.). The Politics of
Conformity in tin America (London; Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. ~^-ll8 provides an excellent review of
the relationship of the military and the middle class as
well as the way the military is perceived by various
models of study.
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that the middle sector values are antithetical to the
traditional military position. With a stress on the
middle sectors* values of Justice and political equality.
the military may often be seen as an instrument of the
oligarchy against such values. If Johnson's contention
that the middle sectors have actually allied with the
working classes in promotion of common interests is
accepted, the military coups which have attempted to
prevent too leftward a leaning in public policy, as in
Brazil, for example, would have to be considered contrary
to middle sector values. The problem might be in the
contention that the middle sectors and workers have
actually allied. Even Johnson seems to temper this
contention in noting that the middle sectors have been
made to feel uncomfortable as the size and strength of
29
vjorking class elements have increased.
Since much of the middle sectors* increase in size
stems from increasing governmental activity and the
expanding bureaucracy, governmental policies are again
expected to reflect middle sector values, The public
Johnson, op. cit.
,
particularly Chapter 9. deals
with some of the problems of the alliance of middle and
worker elements.
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service employees are Included as a major segment of the
middle sectors by all those writing on the subject. As a
result. It would be expected that the values of the
middle sectors would be transmitted in much of the
governmental policy made by such bureaucrats.-^^
Whether the middle sectors perform the roles
consistent with modernization and democratization as
suggested by consensus model theorists Is seriously
questioned by many. In the next section of the chapter,
some of these questions will be noted as the conflict
theories are analyzed. In the final section of the
chapter, however, the positions of both models will be
critically analyzed in the light of the Latin American
experience v/lth the middle sectors.
Ibid.
, pp. 193-19^. Alba does not deal with the
issue very specifically, but his analyses imply acceptance
of this position.
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The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Political Development According to
the Conflict Model
The general literature
. The conflict model for the
study of political development finds difficulty in
assigning a precise role to the middle sectors. The
difficulty arises from the conflict analysis tendency to
conceive of society on a bi-polar basis. The Marxian view
of the middle groups offers a very imprecise mode of
analyzing middle sectors. In Marx's view, the middle
sectors vjould be extinguished by absorption into the
31
worker groups or into the capitalist class or bourgoise.
Because his basic assumption was that there would be two
major economic antagonists In society, there was little
room for a middle group in his analysis, and the
likelihood v;as that the capitalists would exploit the
See Cole, op. cit. , pp. 280-281. For Marx's
writings on the issue see "The Manifesto of the Communist
Party," and other selections in Karl Marx, Friedrich
Engels, and V. I. Lenin, The Essent ial Left (New York:
Barnes and Noble, I96I). "interpretation and texts are
found in Shlomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism
and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, I968), and
L. S. Feuer (ed.), Basic V/ritings on Politics and
Philosophy; Marx and Engels (Garden City: Doubleday,
1959).
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middle groups relegating them to the level of the working
32
elements. In reality, according to Marxist theory, it
was the bourgeoisie that was antagonistic to the working
33
class. Many conflict analysts have uncritically applied
Marx's arguments concerning the bourgeoisie to the middle
sectors in modern society. As Cole notes, there really is
not a very close correspondence between the two concepts
and, for this reason, Marx's arguments may not be
-ill
applicable to the middle sectors.
Barrington Moore, for example, has used the Marxian
analysis in describing the way in which societies
35develop. As Moore sees it, the historical patterns of
32
Cole, op. cit.
, pp. 280-281.
33
Marx, "The Manifesto," in Avineri, op, cit.
,
pp. 31-33.
3^
Cole, op. cit.
, p. 283
•
35
Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956).
Half Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial
Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1959), and
Essays on the Theory of Society (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, I968) is another of the better known
conflict theorists applying Marx's ideas. For a good
critiaue of Moore's analysis, see Stanley Rothman,
"Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution:- An
Essay Review, " The American Political Science Review , LXIV
(March, 1970), 61-82. Moore responds in "Reply to
Rothman," pp. 83-85 of the same volume.
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development have involved the exploitation of one sector of
society by another. The capitalist elements which embody
the middle sectors tend to be in the position of
exploiting the laboring classes. E&hrendorf assumes the
same position.-^ Put very simply, the middle sectors
might as well not be considered separately because they
actually are tools of, if not actually the same as, the
upper economic level of oppressors.
One of the keys to the conceptions of the middle
sectors in conflict theory is the idea that capitalist
societies are based on greater and greater concentration of
wealth. The capitalist never satisfies his taste for
greater wealth and exploits the worker to attain it. As a
result of this view, the conflict theorists see power
being concentrated as well when industrialization occurs.-^'''
Dahrendorf's discussion of societal order relying
on constraint of some elements of society by other
elements emphasizes the factor of economic power of the
"haves" over the "have-nots" in "Out of Utopia: Towards a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Sociolop;lcal
Theory; A Book of Readings , 3rd ed., ed. by Lewis A.
Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (Toronto: The Macmillan Co.,
1969). pp. 222-240.
Dahrendorf , in Class and Class Conflict in
Industrial Society
,
particularly notes this effect of
industrialization.
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Because the working class Is seen as the exploited class
and because the neo-Marxlan analyses are most concerned
with correcting the condition for the working classes,
they tend to ignore the middle sectors or automatically
assume that they belong with the exploiters.
The literature on Latin America . Although the
temptation to Ignore the middle sectors might be great for
those adopting Marxian analyses, the Latin Americanists
using the conflict model have not been able to ignore the
middle sectors very easily because of the great eraphasls
placed on middle sector analysis by many of the consensus
theorists. Although the conflict theorists among Latin
Americanists have taken note of the middle sectors, there
Is a tendency to treat them as adjuncts of two larger
groups—the oligarchy and the workers. -^^ By suggesting
that the middle sectors become part of the oligarchy or
are shunted back among the working elements, the basic
conception of a dual society necessary to the conflict
model is kept intact.
Petras, op. cit. » and Juan Marsal, Camblno social
en America Latlna (Buenos Aires; Solar/Hachette
, 19^?!
are t\:o among many who take this position. The others will
be noted as the issue is discussed further.
16k
The major emphasis of the conflict theorists
regarding the middle sectors is that they have not
developed a value system similar to that of the middle
classes of Western Europe or the United States. Instead.
the middle sectors are viewed as adopting upper class
39attitudes. one of the reasons given for the upper class
attitudes of the middle sectors is that they have not
developed a self-identity and no middle sector ideology is
seen to exist.
Analysis of the middle sectors of Latin America
indicates the reason for lack of a middle sector ideology.
Richard Adams* study suggests that the middle sectors
actually do not exist as a very identifiable group in
39
Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States .
1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame
Press. 1963), pp. 284-28?; most of the selections in
Petras and Zeitlin, op. cit. ; Gillin, pp. cit. ; and Luis-
Mercier Vega. Roads to Power in Latin America_ '{New York:
Praeger, I969) are a few among many works which adopt this
position. Veliz, op. cit.
. presents an analysis of some
of the middle sector arguments.
All of those cited In the above note make this
point. In addition, Charles Wagley. "The Brazilian
Revolution: Social Changes Since 1930." in Council on
Foreign Relations, op. cit.
. pp. I77-23O, among others
makes the same point.
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Latin American society. Instead, he argues that the middle
sectors are spilt, with some being associated with the
oligarchy and others associated with the working classes.
He argues that Latin American society is of a dual nature
with two major value systems which are not related to
economic classes.^^ Some of the middle sectors are more
comfortable among the traditional elite and have worked
their way into it while some of the lower middle sectors
have been most comfortable with the working elements.
Even if the middle sectors can be identified as a
group, it is difficult to view them as being conscious of
feelings of unity. As Charles V/agley suggests, everywhere
in Latin America there is a dichotomous society a
division "between the dominating upper class and the
people." He says that the local upper class might be
considered lower class or part of the middle sectors on the
national scale, but in terms of the environment in which it
41
Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing
, p. 257.
Charles Wagley, "The Dilemma of the Latin American Middle
Classes," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science
,
2? (May, 1964), 31O-3I8 also suggests this point of
view.
Charles Wagley, The Latin American Tradition;
Essays on the Unity and the Diversity of Latin American
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p.
55» Pike, op. cit* , takes the same position In discussing
the "Two Chiles," pp. 292-293. and Chapter 11.
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operates. It Is upper class because Its everyday
relationships are with the people In the local co^unlty
Khlch It dominates. In Its local community, it is the
elite, and the rest of the community is the mass. In
terms of the urbanized sectors the society is divided
between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Wagley's
interpretation is a variation on the conflict model which
accounts for the middle sectors by perceiving them as
absorbed by one of the two major antagonistic elements in
society,
Wagley's analysis, however, is not totally in
accord with the conflict model. The middle sectors have
not always been upper class in attitude, but they have
tended to develop upper class attitudes as they have
succeeded in society. The fear of being dropped back into
the working class is a major force in keeping the middle
sectors in line with the oligarchy. This theme is fairly
common among Latin Americanists dealing with the middle •
sectors.
James Petras, in analyzing the "middle class
thesis" as applied to Latin America, provides perhaps the
^3
See Vega, op. cit.
. pp. 60-65; Gillln, op. cit.
.
pp. 21-28; VJagley, The Latin American Tradition , pp. 196-
197; and Nun, op. cit.
.
among many v;ho adopt this stance.
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best statement of the way conflict theorists view the
middle sectors in the area."^^ His analysis maintains that
the Latin American middle sector is non-revolutionary;
cannot be counted on as a force for democracy and
modernization; is anti-lower class; imitates United States
and Western European middle classes only in consumption
patterns and not in value systems; and is authoritarian in
outlook. The middle sector is perceived as self-interest
oriented, with the result being that it attempts to squeeze
out the working class elements. Concentration of
economic power is the key to understanding the situations.
It seems that the conflict view of the middle
sectors is evident in many analyses of Latin America, even
by those who do not necessarily accept the conflict model
in its entirety. ' Whether they hold out hope for the
44
Petras, op. cit. .
Ibid. . Also in Petras, Politics and Social
Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1969), particularly
Chapter 4.
46
Ibid.
, pp. 80-81.
47
Among non-conflict analysts, Howard J. Wiarda,
•Elites in Crisis," unpublished paper, n.d.; Alba,
especially in Alliance Without Allies ; and Veliz, op. cit. ,
provide analyses stressing the tendency of middle sectors
to adopt upper class values in much of Latin America.
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middle sectors as moderating forces in the society or not.
many of the scholars finally reach the conclusion that
they are not acting as the middle sectors in
industrialized societies of Europe and the United States
have or are supposed to have acted.
The Effects of the Middle Sectors on
Latin American Political Development
If anything is illustrated by the foregoing
analysis, it is that the middle sectors play a variety of
roles in the political development process, some of which
are contradictory. Robert F, Smith has noted the problem
in indicating that the roles of the middle sectors differ
from one nation of Latin America to another. The
problem with many of the analyses noted above is that they
indiscriminately transfer the Western European concept of
the middle classes to the study of Latin America when the_
latin American experience calls for a different approach.
In addition, many authors generalize about the middle
sectors in Latin America on the basis of their roles in
one nation without questioning whether generalization is
Robert F. Smith. "Discussion: The Latin American
Middle Class." New Politics
, IV (Spring. I965), 83-8?.
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warranted. stUl another general probZe. is in deflnln.
authors include different groups In the middle sector,
arguments. ^ depending on which part of the
.iddle sectors
is emphasized, the role ascribed to the middle sectors
varies.
The consensus model seems to miss the mark on the
role of the middle sectors by Ignoring some of the facts
Of the situation. As James Petras has noted, analysis of
some of the ^^iddle sectors Indicates that the "new middle
sectors" often present positions exactly the opposite of
what the consensus-oriented scholars say they do. 5° The
consensus theorists argue that the new middle sectors
represent the hope for the future democracy of Latin
America, while Petras indicates that it is even less
likely to support democratic practices than is the
traditional middle class. If such is the case, hope
49
Robert Alexander's reply to Petras in "Mr.
Alexander Replies," New Politics , IV (Winter, I965). 85.
«9 makes a point of the variety of groups included indefinitions of the middle sectors.
50
Petras, "The Latin American Kiddle Class," pp.
77-81. and Politics and Social Forces in Chilean
Development
, pp". 139-153.
'~
51
Ibid.
, p. 78.
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would not be very bright for the middle sectors*
assumption of a modernizing role.
Perhaps the consensus theorists reach the
conclusions they do about the middle sectors because they
are so concerned with stability. For many consensus
theorists, it will be remembered, stability is almost
equated with political development. For this reason, any
force acting in the interests of stability is considered a
modernizing force. There is little question that the
middle sectors are often effective forces for stability
for reasons opposite to the assumptions of the consensus
theorists, however. As many of the Latin Americanists
have pointed out, the middle sectors are agents of
stability because they mimic the values of the upper
sectors and fear losing their own status and privileges if
too many changes are brought about. Security and
moderation become the m.ain interests of the middle sectors
because they have much to lose with drastic changes in '
policy. What has happened in many instances is that new
52
A fevi among the many noting this tendency are:
Veliz, op. elt. ; Economic Commission for Latin America,
op
.
c 1 t
.
, pp. 111-115; John Mander, The Unrovolutlonary
Society: The Power of Latin American Conservatism In a
Changing World (New York: Knopf ,~1969 ) , pp. 122-lFj-; and
Marsal, op. clt. .
171
faces have worked their way into positions of power, but
the new faces pursue and perpetuate the same values in
policy as those they replace. The middle sectors have
provided a measure of stability but it is frequently the
stability of the traditional, elitist, olifrarchic society.
Another reason that the middle sectors are
effective agents for stability in that government work has
become one of the major paths to achievlnff middle sector
status. Because a large portion of the middle sectors is
dependent on government Jobs, the middle sectors become
defenders of the status quo rather than risk job security
in the pursuit of other ideals. In addition to the fact
of bureaucratic growth, the growing state ownership and
direct control of entrepreneurship also provides a
stabilizing influence by discouraging moves for social
action on the part of the middle sectors. Again,
governmental control over the economic destinies of these.
op« cit.
, pp. 60-65; Stcpan, op. clt.
.
p. 88; and Stanlslav Andreskl, Fa ra s 1
1
1 r,m and Subver s 1 on ;
The Case of T/^tin Amorlea (London: Wcidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1966), pp. 11-12 all note this factor.
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Middle sectors
.akes the„ support the upper classes rather
than oppose them on reform.
In addition to internal pressures influencing the
middle sectors in latin America, many argue that outside
forces also push them toward defense of the status quo,
Hichard Adams, for instance, argues that the upper sectors
have an effective weapon to hold the middle sectors in
line through their alliance with United States interests,
indeed, he states that the upper sectors have an effective
lobby in Washington. D. C. because their values coincide
With the values of United States economic interests in
latin America. 55 ^he United States economic interests
lobby to protect their interests in Latin America, meaning
that they do not want too much social change which could
lead to nationalization as well as other such "harmful"
policies. The upper sectors of Latin American society—
and now increasingly their middle sector allies-are often
tied to United States interests.
• 5^
^ ^
PP.* c^t\, pp. 6^-65 draws this point out
and also notes that the struggles for political control
assume immense significance when political control also
means effective control over the institutions and
allocations of natural resources.
55
Adams, op. cit.
, p. 271. Remember Adams argues
that parts of the middle sectors have actually been
coopted by the upper sectors in some instances and by the
working sectors in others.
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Without doubt, there have been many pressures on the
middle sectors to orient them towards stability in the
system. As Pike and Petras note, the position of the
Chilean middle sectors on values has meant that there is
almost no disruption in the political system as middle
sectors assume control. These facts create difficulties
for the consensus approach. While the consensus approach
emphasizes lack of disruption in the system, there also
have to be questions as to whether stability is to be
achieved at all costs. It seems that many of the consensus
oriented Latin Americanists have emphasized the stabilizing
influences of the middle sectors without examining exactly
why they have been agents for stability and what kind of
stability that implies.
Juan I«Iarsal»s analysis of John Johnson •s approach
suggests that the consensus orientation on this particular
issue may ignore some of the facts of the situation
precisely because the model being used is oriented to
selectivity in what is discovered. ^"^ The point is that the
Pike, op. cit.
. p. 287 t and Petras, Politics and
Social Forces in Chilean Development , pp. 139-1^0
•
Marsal. op. cit.
. p. 108, and pp. 26-2?.
expectations of the users of the model n^ay actually
influence the facts they find.^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
found are influenced by the types of questions asked. It
would be very difficult to explain the seemingly erroneous
explanations of the middle sectors by consensus theorists
in any other vjay.
There certainly is no one approach to the study of
the middle sectors in Latin America. Each nation in the
area illustrates a different experience depending on its
level of economic and social development, size of the
middle sectors, and strategic position of the middle
sectors. Thus. Chile, with a large middle sector
population has had vastly different experiences from
Nicaragua, for instance. On the other hand, the
experiences of Paraguay and Uruguay may be quite different
precisely because there is a difference in the character
and size of the middle sectors in the tv;o nations as well.,
as a difference in economic and social development.
58
This obviously is not a new idea. For an
excellent analysis of this tradition, see William E,
Connolly, Political Science and Ideology (New York:
Atherton, T9'67 )
.
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Moreover. „e ™ust recognize the diverse elements
and interests which make up the
.iddle sectors-business-
men, clergy, labor leaders, students. governn,ent
Officials. Military leaders, etc. This very diversity
helps explain why social origins analysis has been such a
weak explanatory tool in enabling us to better understand
the behavior of the I^tin American officer corps, for
example, •Hightist" military regimes as In Brazil,
"leftist" military regimes as in Peru, and "centrist"
regimes as in El Salvador are all led by middle class
military officers.
The cultural heritage of the nation is yet another
significant factor in determining the role of the middle
sectors in particular societies. Those nations such as
Chile or Uruguay which have very close cultural links to
Western Europe contain middle sectors closer to the
Western European model. On the other hand, the evidence ^
suggests that societies without close ties to such a
cultural heritage are not likely to show such
characteristics.
Despite the fact that the middle sectors show many
variations, some generalizations seem supported by the
studies noted above. It seems obvious that the middle
sectors are most concerned with assuring their own status
in society and at present that usually means supporting
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the elite elements rather than aUgnlng with the workers.
The reasons for their actions my not be Ideologlcal-in
fact, the evidence suggests there Is little ideological
unity among the middle sectors Ty.o+.««^ux . Instead, pragmatism seems
the most important characteristic of the actions of the
middle sectors. They take the positions calculated to pay
off in Job security and social and prestige positions.
Therefore, it would have to agree with Richard N. Adams
that the usefulness of the middle class concept has been
vastly exaggerated in the study of Latin America.
Many also argue that the universities and the
expansion of education provide the best prospects for
conveying the values associated with European middle
Jane Lee Yare, "The Middle Class in LatinAmerica." (Department of Political Science. University oMassachusetts, unpublished paper. 1971) suggests the
middle sectors take a very pragmatic approach to their
roles.
60
Richard N. Adams, "Political Power and Social
Structures." in Veliz. op. cit.
. pp. is^k2 at p. 16.
This is also a m.ajor hypothesis of his book: The Second
Sowi!l£« Milton I. Vanger, "Politics and Class"Tn
Tr^rentieth- Century Latin America," The Hispanic American
Historical Review
. XLVIV (February, 19597T~To^, at pT
91 makes the same point along with many other Latin
Americanists.
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sectors/^ However, the experience on this score also
indicates that such might not be the case in Latin
America. Claudio Veliz, for instance, notes that the
Latin American university students illustrate a surprising
tendency to slide back into middle class conservatism
once they leave the universities. They seem to follow
the same sort of pragmatic caution as other elements of
the middle sectors.
Unless some drastic changes occur, the middle
sectors of latin America are not likely to provide much
impetus for modernization and development. The Alliance
for Progress and other similar programs seem destined for
failure unless their orientations are changed. As many of
its critics note, the Alliance for Progress has been
ineffective because it tends to take the cautious route of
working through the elite and middle sectors rather than
identifying with the more progressive elements of
61
Richard N. Adams, The Second Sowing;
, p. 258, is
one who feels universal education may help expand middle
class consciousness.
62
Veliz, op. Pit.
, p. 7.
society. 63
^^^^^ tendency has been to place
too much faith In the middle sectors as modernizing
forces. The evidence indicates that such faith is
misplaced. Recognition of this fact should help lead to
more enlightening analysis of the issue.
63
Eduardo Frei Montalva, for instance, in "The
Alliance that Lost its Way," Foreign Affairs
, XLV (April,
1967), 437-^^8, at pp. 443-447. Also see Alba, Alliance
Without Allies.
179
CHAPTER VI
URBANIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue
The population of the world continues to grow and.
as it does» there is a tendency toward increasing
concentration of population in urban areas. For example,
predictions are that by the year 2000, approximately
fifty-five per cent of the world's population will be
living in urban areas. ^ Because the urban population is
increasing, urbanization is an important aspect in the
study of any society and particularly in the emerging
nations. For this study, a consideration of the
1
Homer Hoyt, World Urbanization; Expanding:
Population in a Shrinking: World , Urban Land Institute
Technical Bulletin ffo. 43 (Washington, D. C. : Urban Land
Institute, 1962), Table 1?, p. 50. For country by country
breakdovms of rural versus urban population for the period
1965-1969» see United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, Demographic Yearbook I969 (New York,
1970). pp. 144-.150,
180
urbanization process is especially important, as it affects
the process of political development. Little argument is
offered against the contention that urbanisation provides
various kinds of pressures on the political system.
Questions do arise, however, as to precisely what sorts of
forces urbanization sets in motion in the development
process. The task of this chapter is to analyze the
various Interpretations of the role played by urbanization
in the development process of L8.tin America.
Definition. One of the problems in studying the
process of urbanization is that there is much confusion as
to what constitutes "urban. Authors vary greatly in the
definition of the term and often use totally different
criteria. There are normally three basic types of data
taken into account in discussing urbanization, and they
are not always compatible concepts. These criteria are: '
1) population size; 2) population density; and 3) life
2
Demographic Yearbook 1969. pp. 21-22 discusses
the problems encountered in defining urban from one
country to another. The variety of definitions is found
on pp. 1^7-150,
181
style Of the population.^ Ufe
.tyle can be Independent
Of size or density of population, although these criteria
tend to «o together. The point Is that definitions vary
and the student of urban! 7n f i nr> rr.^^^^. v,j. u izat on must be aware of the
variations*
Defining urbanization in terms of population si:.e
Is a very popular method of solving the problem of
ambiguity in definition. However, the population size
which constitutes
-urban" varies from country to country
and among authors in the same country.^ if scholars were
3
Robert Daland. "Comparative Perspectives of Urbansystems in Robert T. miand (ed.). Comparative SrbanRegearcht The Admini stration and PoirfT^;:rTTirr~
l^^blications. I969), pp. 15!^ atpp. 22-26; and Louis Wirth, "Urbanism As A Way of LifeAgie^q£yi_Journal of So cj^olo^v. XLIV (July, I938). 1-24*
at discuss these differing definitions of the term!Also see Giorgio Mortara. Characteristics o f thegemographlc Structure of th e American Coun tri pT"(Washington, D. C. : Pan American Union. r9"6^77 pp. 8-10.*
See the Demographic Yearbook 1969 . pp. 147-I50.For an example of variations on studies within one
nation, see William L. Flinn, Rural to Urban Migration;
A Colomb ian Case (Madison: Land Tenure Center,
University of Wisconsin. July, I966). p. 18. There he
indicates that the official census defines urban as an
agglomeration of I.500 people or more, many studies
consider 10.000 as a minimiim population to be considered
urban, and still another study defines any tovm or city
which is the country (munlcipio ) seat as urban.
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to rely on the individual nations to define "urban." it
would soon be apparent that size standards vary greatly in
Official censuses of nations,^ m recent years, there has
been a tendency to use the official United Nations
definition of urban which means a city of 20.000
population or more/ Even if size were to be totally
agreed upon as a definition, there would still be problems
because of the inaccuracy of much of the data reported by
many of the countries. In many instances, comprehensive
censuses are not taken and estimates are substituted."^
Thus, even if the size definition can be agreed upon,
other problems emerge.
The use of the criterion of density of population
(defined as the ratio of people per square mile) also
lends itself to some problems. The question of accuracy
of data is relevant in this case as well. Nor does the
^
Demographic Yearbook I969
. pp. 1^7-150.
6
Ibid.
, pp. 21-22. Also see Philip Vi. Hauser (ed.).
Urbanization in Latin America (New York; International
Documents Service. I96I), p. 75,
Demographic Yearbook I969
. pp. 1^7-150 notes many
instances of estimated and old data.
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criterion of density necessarily take' into accouiu the
value systems or interrelationships of people. Authors
also differ as to what density constitutes "urban." The
criticisms applicable to using size as the deteri^ining
feature of urbanization are valid here as well.
The third definition is perhaps the most vague and
troublesome to use in studies, particularly empirical
studies. Urbanism as a life style is difficult to define
in itself because urbanites differ so greatly among
themselves. As Robert T. Daland notes, this definition
attempts to characterize urbanism or
-urbaneness" as the
key to defining urban society.^ Usually this definition
of urbanization relates to the values of the population
along with their interests and social relationships. Of
particular Interest to this study is that urbanism in this
sense is usually associated with modernism. According to
this view, to be urban is to be modern and many students
of development assume such a relationship even though not
always consciously.^ As the discussion of the role
Daland, op. cit«
. pp. 22-23.
9
Ifeniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society;
Modernizing the Middle F^st (Glencoe: The Rree Press.
1958) particularly equates urban society with modern
society. Warren S. Thompson, ••Urbanization," The
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
.
Vol. XV (New York:
attributed to urbanization In the development process
continues, the assumption and Its Implications will be
analyzed. Obviously, problenis wUl be encountered In
using this definition since the life styles of squatter
villages or ghettoes differ from those of the suburban
middle or upper class.
While definitions of "urban" vary according to the
author considered, we cannot permit such variation to
direct our attention amy from the more important problem
of what relationship the process of urbanization has to
political development. As a result, we will discuss each
author in terms of his own definition. If and when an
author's definition has specific implications for the role
assigned by him to urganization. special note will be made.
Macmillan, 193^), pp. 189-192; Lucian Pye, "The Political
Implications of Urbanization and the Development Process,"
Social Problems of Dovelopinent and Urbanization
(Geneva: United States Papers prepared for the United
Nations Conference on the Apolication of Science and
Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas.
Vol. 7, 1963), p. 64; and Donald J. Mc Crone and Charles F,
Cnudde, "Tov/ard a Communications Theory of Democratic
Political Development: A Cfiusal Model," The American
Political Science Review
. LXI (March. I967), 7I-79 all
make a similar assumption. For even more detailed
explanation of the assumptions see, Gabriel Almond and G.
Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics; A Developir.ental
Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 19^6) particularly pp.
93-94
•
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^^^^^^^^^LJ^-^HII^^ Before meaningful analysis
Of the effects of urbanization can be attempted, an
understanding of Its causes and characteristics is
necessary. The causes usually noted depend upon the
period of urbanization being discussed as well as the
particular society under consideration. For example, the
Western European origin of the city was related to the
medieval period and the particular economic requirements
occasioned by the decline of feudalism. From this
emergence and the development of capitalist society, many
students have considered the city a product of the
industrialization process. Originally a center of trade
and commerce, it is argued that the city provides the best
means of gaining productive efficiency in the
10
n
3M-.Ci^. translated and edited byDon Martlndale and Gertrud Neuwlrth (Glencoe : The FreePress, 1953) presents perhaDS the m.ost exhaustive
comparison of the reasons for the development of citiesfrom ancient to modern times. Pages 10^-111 provide a
city
^^^^ essential discussion of the medieval
11
^Thompson, op. cit.
. notes this approach as do
Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic and Technological
Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Bert F. Hoselitz and
Wilbert E. Moore (eds.). Industrialization and Society(Paris: Mouton, I963). pp. 199-21? at p. 200; Ernest
Weissmann, "The Urban Crisis in the World," Urban Affairs
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manufactirrlng process. The labor and market needs of
industrial society are conducive to urban living
arrangements.
As has been noted before in this study, the
development of urbanization in the Latin American countries
does not closely follow that of Western Europe or the
United States. Instead, cities were created as centers
for the elite of the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers and
their development usually bore no relationship to
industrialization.^^ Rather industrialization has been
Ouarterix. I (September. I965), 65-82; and Almond and
Powell. o£^__ci_U. pp. 93-9^. Daniel Lorner. op. cit.
.takes a little different approach in that he considers the
urban society as productive of industrialization althoughhe is somewhat vague on the specific causal relationship
between the two processes. At any rate, he believes the
tvfo are very closely interrelated,
12
Among the many authors noting this feature of
Latin American urbanization are: Jorge Enriaue Hardoy, "
"Dos mil anos de urbanizaclon en America Latina," In
Jorge Enrique Hardoy and Carlos Tobar (eds,), La
urbanizaclon en America latlna (Buenos Aires: Editorial
del Institute. I969), pp. 23-6^; Jaime Dorselaer and
Alfonso Gregory, La urbanlzaclCn en America Latlna
. tomo
II (Bogota: Centre Internacional de Investigaciones
Sociales de FERES, 19^2 ), Part I. especially Chapter II;
Richard Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American
Urban History," The Hispanic American Historical Review
,
LXVII (January. 19o2). 31?~33"^; and Ronald Glassmiin,
Political History of Latin America (New York: Funk and
Wagnalls. I969). pp. 246^2^2^ Obviously this is a very
small number of the many works which could be cited, but
others v;lll be noted in relation to specific points being
analyzed in the rest of the chapter.
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proposed as one way of solving so.e of the acute problems
Of the already existing urban areas. At any rate, the
Cities were created as cultural, administrative, and
social centers for the Spaniards and Portuguese and until
more recent times, tended to exploit the countryside
rather than serve as centers of economic development.
The question of rural-to-urban migration has also
been a subject of concern to students of the urbanization
process. The process is particularly important in Latin
America where the rate of urban population growth is among
the highest in the world. The migration process is
produced by factors characterized as "push and pull"
factors. These push and pull factors relate to the
13
MA^inr,. p^""^
Economic Commission for Latin America. United
f^^^rf t""^ Council, S^l Develo;ment ofliLtll?, Arnerica in the Post-War P^-riod IJl^FT^TTlIt^Argent inai May, 1963); Fauc^pr—^nvT Qr^o1o^ J'^'^'^'^*
TArhr^oi^-.-i ti Jr^ * ^^'^ Social, Economic andTechnological Problems of Rapid Urbanization." pp. 202-203-and Weissmann. op. ctt.
. p. 6? among many others! ^ ^
''^'^
'
1^
See International Union of Local Authorities,Urbanization in Developing: Countries (The Hague
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. 196iJ), p. 12; j\ MedinaEchavarrfa and Philip M. Hauser, 'Rapporteur 's Report." in
Hauser (ed.), op....„olt^, pp. 38-39; E. J. Hobbswawm,
Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics"in Claudio Ve3iz
The
_Politlcs of Conformity in Latin America (London:Oxford University Press, 19Tf), pp. 43-65; and Gino Germani.
Soclolof-ia de la modernlzacion ; estudios teroicas y
aplicado^; a America Latina (Buenos Aire.g! Paidos. 1969 )
.
pp. 124-132.
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differing conditions existing between urban and rural
areas. Both forces seem to be important to an
understanding of urbanization in Latin America as
indicated in the ensuing discussion.
The "push" factors are usually noted as the lack of
services and opportunities in the rural areas. Job
opportunities are scarce because dependence on agriculture
is decreasing and greater efficiency m agricultural
technology decreases the need for labor. Education in the
rural areas is either very poor or non-existent. The
"pull" factors are perhaps even more important in that
they represent the attractions of the urban centers to the
migrants. The urban centers attract migrants by offering
them employment, services, or luxuries that they think
they need."^^
The "pull" argument is that urban centers offer
better educational facilities. Job opportunities, luxuries
such as movies, and the promise of a better llfe.'^'^ The
15^ ^International Union of Local Authorities, op.
£JLL:.» VP* 13-15; Flinn, op. clt.
. pp. 10-13; and Germani,
op. clt.
International Union of Local Authorities, op.
clt.
1?
Germani, op. clt
.
; Hobbswawm, op. cl t
.
? and
Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit.
. pp. ^5-48.
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development of better transportation and communication
systems is the Immediate instrument of migration. People
learn of the "wonders" of urban life through the
communications network and by being exposed to them in
military service and in other contacts with modern life.^^
Communications also evolve from the network of family
relationships, with those in the urban centers providing
contacts for family members left in the rural areas/^
Regardless of the causes of urbanization, the fact
is that urbanization is occurring at a very rapid rate.
Of particular importance to this study is the fact that
the urban populations of developing societies are growing
at a much faster rate than in the developed societies.
Flinn, op. clt.
. p. 12.
19
T. Lynn Smith, latin American Popula t ion Studie s(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 19^6), p. 6'47
See Wilfred Woodhouse, "Urban Development: Some
International Comparisons." in G. M. Lomas (ed.). Social
Aspects of Urban Development (New York: National Council
of Social Service. 1966), pp. 64-72; Gerald Breese.
Urbanization in Newly Devel opinp: Countries (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 196~6) ; and International Union of
Local Authorities, op. cit.
. p. 12.
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The Important point Is that the effects attributed to
urbanization in the process of political development
become more significant as the rate and degree of
urbanization increase. If developing societies become
urbanized at faster rates than do developed societies, the
effects of urbanization, both good and bad. should be
greater as well. As a result, it is important to have a
clear understanding of the process and its effects.
The Effect of Urbanization on Political
Development According to the
Consensus Model
The general literature
. The consensus theorists
tend to stress the modernizing features of urbanization.
In their analyses, the Increased opportunities provided by
urban society and the political integration occasioned by
the unlversalization of value systems of the population
tend to be emphasized. In other words, the positive
features and benefits of urbanization are emphasized
while the negative, disruptive features are
21de-emphasized.
Dankwart Rustow. A World of Nations (V.'ashington,
D. C. : Brookings Institute, 196?), p. 245 notes the
negative and positive features.
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As with ^ny other aspects of the consensus model,
the treatment of urbanization by this particular model cin
be traced to Max Wphp-r tj^-k^^ix^o i.a webe . Weber's analysis of the medieval
City particularly has been accepted as the mode of
development of urban society.22 According to Weber's
analysis, the medieval city produced a form of pluralism
in which those values now associated with modernization are
most likely to emerge. People developed the cooperative
spirit for solving common problems and worked together in
the interest of all concerned. ^3 ^ effect, the city
becomes the center of the orderly and rational approach to
solving society's problems.
Among more recent analysts of the impact of
urbanization on modernization, none has been more
influential than Daniel Lerner who practically equates
urban society with modern society. His thesis is that
urbanization is the basic feature of society which sets in
22
Weber, pp. cit. . pp. lOif-111.
23
Ibid^. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Wober; An
IlLtellectual Portrait (Garden City: Doubleday, i960),
pp. 70-79 for a good interpretation of Weber's analysis.
Lerner, op. cit..
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motion various modernizing processes. Specifically,
urbanization tends to increase literacy levels
.^hich in
turn produce greater exposure of the population to the
communications media. Participation in economic and
political life is encouraged and increased by media
exposure; thus, urbanization is the stimulus of the
modernizing forces.
Obviously, this is a very brief and oversimplified
summary of Lerner's thesis, but it seems that the media
really provide the key to modernization because they permit
people to absorb a wide range of values through empathy
with a wider range of life styles. Urbanization,
however, provides the conditions productive of the media
and thus urbanization is the most important factor. Many
people have attempted to test Lerner»s thesis and most
field studies using the specific hypotheses developed by
him have concluded that they are valid,
^''^
25
Ibid.
, particularly pp. 45-65,
26
Ibid.
. pp. 50-61.
2?
Tv7o of the most specific tests of the theory are
provided by Gilbert R. Wlnhara. "Political Development and
Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model," The
American Political Science Review
, LXIV (September, 1970),
810-818; and McCrone and CYiudde, op. cit. Both confirm
the essence of Lerner's theory.
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Lerner freely ad.its that his
.odel i. based on the
western European industrial tradition, but he ar.ues that
it is not ethnocentric because the process is a historical
fact Which is verifiable.28 His Justification really does
not confront the question of ethnocentricity
. The fact
that his model can be verified in terms of the experience
Of developed societies does not necessarily mean that
societies of differing cultures will develop in the same
way. It should be noted that his analysis is of the
Middle East and thus questions of applicability to Latin
America may be raised. He does not limit his conclusions
to the Middle East, however. His analysis has been
adopted by many students of development regardless of
their particular geographical interests.
Gabriel Almond is among those generalists who have
accepted Lerner 's thesis as it applies to urbanization and
the development process. Almond notes that urbanization-
28
Lerner. op. cit.
. p. 46.
29
See Almond and Powell, op. cit.
. pp. 93-95 in
mt^^l.^^}^^* ^'^^^ Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.).lj2e__Pqll tics of the Developing Area s (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. I960) particularly pp. 536-
537 of Coleman's "Conclusion."
ers
s
19^
can have a...nteeratl.o efrocts. but he and his coauthors
tend to e.phaslee the Idea that the cities are the cent
Of .odernlty and that they also provide the Instrument
for modernization of the countryside. 3° m their
arBUment, the cities tenrt ^„ v,„i-itie nd to be the centers of national
life, but they provide help for modernisation of the
countryside because the urbanltes maintain family ties
With the rural areas. In addition, a greater flow of
information, of political participation, etc.. emerges In
the urban setting.
All of these developments are Integral parts of
increasing pluralism of society. Increasing urbanization
creates different types of needs on the part of the
population. As needs and differences of elements of
'
society become apparent, group identity emerges. As
people recognize solidarity with others, demands can be
made on the system and then compromises posited by the
plurallsts begin to emerge. 31 Political participation and
modernity (stable democracy) are produced by these forces.
30
Almond and Coleman, op. clt.
31
Almond and Powell, op, clt.
. pp. 9k, 97,
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Many students of urbanisation echo these Ideas.
Luolan Pye and Louis Wlri-h h^n, 4. ^x wirt both tend to equate modernity
and urbanization or at least see urbanization as the
springboard to modernlzatlon.32 For the., all that 1,
inodern la associated with the growth of cities, m hr
"crises" Of distribution and penetration. Pye sees the
cities as Playing key roles as they do to a lesser extent
in the other cri <;p«j ^3 t*^ ^n ses. In regard to group organization
and political participation. A. P. K. Organskl is yet
another who adopts the Lerner and Almond theses.^'^ His
idea Is that urbanization pulls the working class
together physically for the first ti.e providing them with
greater opportunity of becoming organized. With large
numbers of the workers together in one place, they can
become effective forces in the political system. Warren
Thompson echoes these thoughts In noting that Increased
economic opportunity in the cities provides for greater
32
Pye, op. clt.. and Wlrth. op. clt.
. p. 1.
Llttle/^^:;,^TflfT!'
Develon..nt (Boston:
A. F. K. Organski, The Stapres of Poljtip.ni
Development (New York: Knopf. 1965 ). pp. 1^2-1^3.""*
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rreedo. because of increased alternatlves.35 inereasing
eoono.lc opportunity also opens new social doors and, as
has been noted in Chapter Hi. social equality is
productive of political participation and equality in the
consensus approach. Numerous others adopt the foregoing
position on the process of urbanization.^^
The most significant feature of the consensus
approach is that urban areas are viewed as the agents of
modernization and consensus-building. Very little
emphasis is placed on the gulf which exists between the
city and the countryside except to indicate how cities
are forces for decreasing that gulf. Many Latin
Americanists have adopted the consensus approach to
urbanization and attention will not be turned to them.
The_literature on La tin Arnerica . As with the
argument concerning the middle sectors. John J. Johnson is
Thompson, op. cit.
. p. 192.
36
HQ
.
-, M^^^'ff
Significant works include Karl W. Deutsch.Social Mobilization and Political Development " TheArn^rlcan Politi cal Science Review . LV ( September. T96I),
^93-51^; David Apter, The Politics of Moderni zati nn(Chicago: The University of Cnicago Press, 19^TrBindSamuel P. Huntington, Political Order in ChangingSocieties (New Haven: Yale University Press, I908).
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one of the latin A.-nerlcanists most closely identified with
the consensus model view of urbanization. 3? His argument
on the middle sectors is that industrialization helps to
create the middle sectors. Industrialization also brings
about iirbanization and it is in the urban centers that the
middle sectors are found. The urban centers provide the
forces for modernization, development, and new hope for
democracy and stability. Many Latin Americanists, without
evaluating all the evidence, accept this argument with the
result that the urbanization process is seen as the
creator of modernization in Latin America.
In addition to Johnson's V7orks. the literature
often stresses the fact that the middle sectors are most
closely associated with urban areas. Urban development is
seen as the place in which middle sectors develop, with
all the implications usually associated with the middle
37Johnson (ed.). Continuity and Changre in Latin
America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), and
Politi cal Chan^7e in Latin America; The Emerp:ence of the
Middle Sectors (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958) present a consensus argument on urbanization.
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38sectors argu^ent.^^ Even Glno Ger.anl notes the tendency
or urbanization to produce growth of the middle sectors.^?
Again, the fact of growing middle sectors In urban
centers cannot be denied; however, the role played by
those sectors In the developn,ent process Is questionable.
Since the Issue of the role of the middle sectors was
analyzed In the previous chapter, it will not be discussed
further here.
Michael Micklln adopts the urbanization thesis of
Tnodernlzation by analyzing the demographic characteristics
of Latin America. In his analysis, demographic
modernization (low or decreasing infant mortality, low or
decreasing population growth) is directly affected by the
urbanization process. As a secondary factor, economic
modernization is similarly positively associated with
38
T.
Franolne P. Rablnovitz. "Urban Development and
'
Political Development in Latin America," in Daland, op.
9±L*.* PP» 88-123 at p. 96. Also see Michael Micklln"
Demographic, Economic, and Social Change in Latin
*
America: An Examination of Causes and Consequences, "The
Joij^ngJL-O^ Dgveloplnp- Areas, IV (January, 1970), l^^^loZ"
at p. 183»
39
Germanl. op. clt.
. pp. 199-225, particularly
pp. 199-202 concerning Latin America.
40
Micklln, op. clt.
. pp. 183-185.
demographic modernization In I^tln A.erlca.^^ These Idea
consensus theorists for modernization of latin America.
The arguments concerning demographic modernization
as defined by Mcklln. and urbanization are based on
studies Of developed systems. The facts Indicate that
birth rates in developed nations are lower in urban areas
than in rural areas.^^ ^^^^^^^ mdicate. however, that
the birth rates of latin American urban populations have
shovm no significant decllnes.^^ This is not to say that
these trends will not eventually occur. What is
emphasized, however, is that the tendency of some scholars
41
Ibid.
42
pp. 276-278!
^^"^ ^"ited Nations Dempirraphlc Yearbook IQ^.Q
,
43
J^l^ Also see United Nations PopulationBranch. Bureau of Social Affairs. "Demographic Aspects ofUrbanization in Latin America." in Hauser (ed.), op. cl t •Carmen A. Miro. "The Population of 20th Century Latin
'
America." in American Assembly. Population Dllenma ofLatin America (Washington. D. C. : Potomac Books. 1966):and 0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America; NewEstimates of Histori cal Trends and Fluctuation.':: ^R^r-k^l^y.
Institute of International Studies. University ~ofCalifornia. I965). Collver 's discussion is particularly
good. He cites Venezuela. Chile, and Mexico to supporthis argument.
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to apply pre-concelved notions to analyses of differing
societies provides distorted results. If the scholars
were to take into consideration the Catholic heritage of
I^tin Anierlcans. the concept of i.achis.q. and suggestions
of some Latin American nationalists that population
control is a scheme for keeping Latin America weak, they
might be more willing to recognize that the facts are
different for Latin America. Perhaps the hope of
modernizing tendencies provides too great an attraction to
such scholars for them to be objective. Eventually,
birth rates may start dropping and other modernizing
tendencies may develop, but that is not sufficient for
solving the problems of the present. To do that, an
understanding of the present is essential.
Perhaps more widespread than the idea that
urbanization will produce declining birth rates is the
belief that it will provide modern values for most of the
population. An indication of the popularity of this view
is the fact that many authors state the view without
offering any further explanation. They assume this to be
self-evident. The idea takes the form of an argument that
urban centers are the effective nations of Latin American
systems and that all modernizing forces are found in the
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cities. The .odern values and Institutions are found in
the Cities and. beyond that, the leaders and organizers
for modernizing society are also found in the urban areas.
These leaders also stimulate the countryside through
contact Kith families left in the rural areas. Thus, the
urban centers are viewed as producers of a type of
political leadership for modernization.^^
Closely associated with this aspect of urbanization
in I^tin America is that urbanism or "citification" of the
rural elements comes about through contact with the urban
centers. Andrew Hunter Whiteford states this argument
quite nicely:
44
See Jacques Lambert, I^tin America; Snojal
Structure and Political Instl tmTTnn.c:, t.-r. Ky pqI"—-^ t e 1(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1967). pp. 184-199: Kalman Sllvert, "Leaders,
Followers and Modernization," in Roy C. Macridis and
Bernard E. Brovm (eds.). Comparative Politics: Notes and
Readin£S, rev. ed. (Horaewood, 111.: Dor c ey Pre s s
,
"l 90^77,
pp. 649-658 at p. 649; and Joseph Maier and Richard W.
Weatherhead (eds.). Politic s of Chan,?e in Latin America
(New York: Praeger, 1964). pp. 8-9; and f^anclne fl
Rabinovitz, op. cit.
, p. 99,
45
Lambert, op. cit.
, pp. 145-148; and Margot
Romano Yalour de Tobar, "El proceso de socializacion
urbana," in Hardoy, op. cit.
. pp. 234-256.
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Througn contact with the city a vague
conception of "progress" is instilled inthe minds of village folk.
. . .Theprocess of "ci tificatipn" or urbanizationseems to be universal. ^6
^^aniza
A quote from George I. Blanksten Indicates a similar
position with emphasis on the urban people and also an
aspect of the Western bias to the argument:
Urbanization.
. .contributes to the
development of common sets of political
attitudes and experiences on the part
of the people who live in the growing
cities of Latin America. Although in
some instances urbanization aggravates
political conflict between large
municipal centers and rural areas—as
in Cuba. Uruguay, and Argentina--the
over-all effect of the movement to the
cities is integrative, and Westernizing,
so far as the urban folk are concerned.^7
The major consideration is that the familial contacts of
the urban migrants are maintained and the urban migrant
provides a channel of communication to the countryside •
in his contacts with family left there. There seems to
Andrew Hunter V.Tiiteford, T;^o Cities of Latin
America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 2. Pages 1-4
provide the general assumptions he uses in his two case
studies.
4?
Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America," in
Almond and Coleman, op. clt.
, pp. 455-531t at p. 475,
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be substantial evidence that such Is the case and that
breakdo™ of family tles-to be discussed in the next
section-Is not a necessary effect of Latin American
h,Q
urbanization. m such a situation, the urban
population has the potential to be an effective force for
raodernization.
Another feature of urbanization often noted by
consensus theorists among Latin American scholars is the
potential political role of the urban migrants. They do
not stress the potential violent threat of the favelas or
^^^^o^. but the constructive, development-oriented
political pressures which they might bring to bear on the
kg
system. Andrews and Phillips argue that the people in
Rabinovitz. pp. clt. . p. 95; Richard Morse,
"Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and
Structure," Comparative Studies in Society and History.
IV (July. 1962)7^^73-^93. at p. 485 f"Joan Nelso'nT^^^
Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third
World Cities," World Politics
. XXII (April, I970), 393-
414. at pp. 396-399; and Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization
Without Breakdown: A Case Study." Scientific Monthly
.
LXXV (July, 1952), 31-41. Lewis argues that family ties
actually strengthen in cities as one means of protection
against the strangeness of urban life (p. 36).
49
This is a continuation of Organski's argument,
op» cit. See Rabinovitz, op. cit.
. p. 96; and Frank M.
Andrews and George W. Phillips. "The Squatters of Lima:
Who They Are and What They Want," The Journal of
Developing Areas
. IV (January, I97O), 211-224.
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the barrios of Peru are Just the ones »ho are »ost
necessary for change In soclo-econo.lc policies. They are
the ones most llkelv tn h^s>^£>f»^+. ^o benefit and represent those who
Show a certain amount of initiative by the very fact that
they ^.igrated to the urban centers in search of a new life
in the first place.^^ Rablnovitz carries the argument
further, notin, that political opportunities may attempt
to direct attention to the needs of the shanty towns as
suffrage is broadened. Such a move would encourajre
greater participation by the poor migrants as they see
chances for specific changes beneficial to them.
The consensus theorists have an attractive argument
if it is valid. If their view were to be accepted, we
could look forward to gradual modernization in the
plui-alist tradition. Many, however, reject the consensus
argument on the question of urbanization as on other
issues. Attention will now be t'orned to some of the major
differing points of view.
50
Ikld^. pp. 212-213. Nelson, op. clt,
, p. k06
and 411. however, stresses that the poor see their needs
as very individualized and argues that this keeps themfrom taking unified action.
51
Rablnovitz. op. clt.
. p. 96.
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The Effect of Urbanization on Political
Development According to the
Conflict Model
The e^neral litera ture. It is difficult to discuss
the role of urbanization in the conflict model among
generalists because the generalists have not directed thei
attention to the process in any appreciable degree. Thi
lack of attention supports the thesis that the model has
Western biases— it will be remembered that the model is
developed from association by Marx with an industrialized
and urbanized society. While most general conflict
theorists do not pay specific attention to the process of
urbanization, the process has an implicit role in their
model. This discussion is based on the assumptions
implicit in the model and the logical implications of the
model itself.
The conflict model, as v/as noted before, is usually
based on the idea of class conflict. When we analyze
Latin Americanists, it will be found that they broaden
this approach to Include conflict among many types of
groups. For the generalists, however, the tendency is to
206
base analyses on economic class conflict
.
o ij.i . Economic class
differences, of course, were most associated with the
industrialization process for .arx. m that process, the
capitalists began exploiting the working
.asses. Since the
society Marx was :.ost familiar with was the urbanized
industrial society of Western Europe, particularly Great
Britain, his analysis tended to accept urbanization as an
inseparable part of industrialization. The analysis is
relevant to this chapter in that it happened to be in the
urban areas that class conflicts were most manifest.
Urbanization may not be the cause of conflict, but
conflicts might tend to increase in number and intensity
in urbanized societies partly as a result of greater
concentration of people. In addition, as larger and
larger concentrations of the poor masses emerge, they may
become increasingly impatient with their lot in life as
they are exposed to the amenities of modern life while
also recognizing that they are unattainable in the system
52
^
^' ^* Feuer (ed.), Basic Writings on Poli tics
^d Ph ilo sophy; Marx and Engels { GiH:i?rCityl Doubleday.
1959;; Karl Marx. Friedrlch En-els. and V. I. Lenin. The
Essential Left (New York: Barnes and Noble, I96I); and~an
excellent interpretation by Shlomo Avlnerl, in the
Introduction to his edited volume, Karl Marx on
Colonial ism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday,
1968).
207
as It exists.^3
^^^.^^^ly, the urban' centers provide the
greatest opportunity for exposure to .odern life styles.
•
The emphasis of the "conflict^ generalists Is
Placed on the de-personallzatlon and alienation which exist
in the urban society. Again, they are not necessarily
concerned with urbanization Itself, but with modern
society as a whole, which encompasses the urban settlng.^^
In the urba.n society, people become much more Independent
from one another and more Isolated from familial
relationships. ^5 This has been a common assumption of
sociologists of the industrialized society. A form of
alienation from the society emerges and societal bonds
1959) for
class structure.
/o^ Essays on The Theory of Soc iety(Stanford: Stanford University Press. I968). Also Lomas.
op. cit.
. p. 33.
55
See William J. Goode. ••Industrialization and
Family Change, •• in Hoselitz and Moore, op. cit.
. pp. 237-255 for a good analysis of general theory on family
relationships In Industrial society.
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disintegrate, leading to social disorganization.
,ui
be noted below. latin Americanists have very readily
accepted this analysis but much evidence also exists to
indicate that the idea may have been greatly exaggerated.
Another more commonly accepted assumption about
urbanization concerns the role of the urban migrants
themselves. According to many analyses, the urban migrant
Is supposed to be a disruptive force in the society and
also provide a large source of recruits for radical
movements. Because developing nations have such large
56
Eric Josephson and Mary Josephson (eds.). KanAlone; Alienation in Modern Sooio.t.v (New York: Delf"1^;62; presents an excellent collection of essays on theissue. See also Glaucio Soavp.r^ «nH R^^Ko-^+• t
57
Nelson. on_^i_u, pp, 396-399 who argues thatthe theory has some validity, but it has become accepted
to the extent that conflicting evidence is not even
recognized anymore.
58
See Hauser. "The Social. Economic and
Technological Problems of Hapld Urbanization." pp. 210-
211; Scares and Harablln. op. clt. ; and Joan Nelson.
j^-gTf^ri ts. Urban Poverty, and In .stabili t y in Developing
Na t i on r. ( Cambr 1 dg-e ; liarvard Univcrcity Center for
International Affairs, I969) devotes Chapter I to analysis
of the theory of disruption by the migrants and Chapter II
to analysis of radlcallzatlon theory, rejecting both.
Also see S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protc;:t and
Change (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. I966). pp. 20-
22.
migrant populations, the role played by the
.l^rants
becomes very Important. The poverty of the recent
arrivals, the Impersonality of the mass society of the
cities, and the Increasing class consciousness of the
workers all contribute to the posslblUty-^or even
lnevitability--of accelerated conflict and class warfare.
Unfortunately, however, the evidence often contradicts
these most commonly held assumptions about the role of
urbanization. Studies of Mexican urbanization, for
instance. sup:gest that there is little evidence to support
the idea that urbanization is a radicalizing force. -^^
Joan Nelson's consideration of urbanization on a world
scale leads her to reject this commonly held sociological
assumption as well.^^
Yet another feature of the conflict model position
on urbanization is emphasis on the differences between
rural and urban areas. Instead of economic class
59
Wayne A. Cornelius. Jr.. "Urbanization as an
Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case
of Mexico," Anorican Political Science novlow
. LXIII
(September. 19^97713X3-857, and Lewis, op.~t.
.
Concerning I/itin America generally. see'Margot Romano
Yalour de Tob;\r. op. clt., and Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 1^5-
148 and 184-^199.
Nelson. "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political
Integration in Third World Cities."
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differences between groups within the urban areas, conflict
may be seen between the urban centers and the
countryside/^ Whereas the consensus model emphasizes the
modernizing Influences which the urban centers provide for
the countryside, the conflict model emphasizes the
differences between the two and how the expectations of the
rural inhabitants may lead to disruption in the system as
they are exploited to an ever greater degree by the urban
areas. Differences in culture and economy are noted, with
the emphasis on the idea that a system of ••internal
colonialism" exists in which the rural elements are
exploited by their urban brethren.
Harrington Moore. Jr.. Social Ori gins of
Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, I956)
indicates a belief that the peasantry is often exploited by
the more modernized urban dvieller particularly during the
period of colonization. Also see Bert Koselitz,
'•Generative and Parasitic Cities," Economic DevG 3op?rpnt and
Cultural Chanpre.
.
Ill (1955), 278- 29^^~and
. Brian J.' sirry;
"Some Relations of Urbanization and Basic Patterns of
Economic Development," in Forrest R. Pitts (ed.), Urba.n
Systems and Economic Development (Eugene: University of
Oregon School of Business Administration, I962), pp. I-I5,
at pp» 12-14.
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See Rodolfo Stavenhagen. "Seven Fallacies About
Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.),
I^'atln America; Reform or Revolution? (New York: Fawcett,
19r8l, pp. 13-31.
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In addition, the deterioration of the physical
environment brought on by urbanization in often noted by
the conflict oriented scholars/^ A. mi^^ration continues
and urban i:;^Qt ion increases at an ever faster pace, the
environment keeps deteriorating. The deterioration of the
environment only increases the squalor of the poor and as
a result, the likelihood of violent disruption p;rows. As
with the other features of the model regarding
urbanization, it seems that the ideas have been too hastily
accepted. As Oscar Lewis and others have noted, the new
environment, despite the squalor, is often much better
than the migrant knew in the rural area from which ho came^
A new culture emerges with the migrants developing close
ties to new people in their shanty towns and finding new
types of patr6n relationships with employers or others.
The conclusions of the conflict model have been
attractive to many Latin Americanists. The tendency to
63
Hauser. "The Social, Economic and Technological
Problems of Jiapld Urbanization," p. 20?, and Weissmann.
op, cit. . p, 6?, The International Union of Local
Authorities, op. cjt.
. p, 15 discusses this effect,
Lewis, op. clt
.
; Rustow, op. cit.
, p. 2^5 argues
that chaotic riots and such may be the short-run result
of the process but not necessarily a long-run effect.
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consider I^tln America as constantly in ferment or as
revolutionary has Increased the tendency to accept the
analysis put forth by conflict theorists regarding the
effects Of urbanization and its accompanying class-based
changes. Exactly how such analyses have been applied and
with Khat implications is the concern of the rest of this
chapter.
Tl2e_l_iterature on r.at1 n America
. While a number of
Latin Americanists have been associated with the consensus
view on urbanization, it seems that even more of them
accept a conflict analysis. In contrast to the
generalists who are often implicit in their approach to
urbanization, many Latin Americanists are quite explicit
in noting the conflict-producing tendencies of the
urbanization process. V/ayne A. Cornelius provides a
convenient summary of the prevalent ideas concerning Latin
American urbanization and its consequences,^^ He sees
three basic themes in urbanization theory as it has been
applied to Latin America:
Cornelius, op, cit.
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1) Urbanization breeds economic frustrationamong the migrant population, whichaspires high but fails to participate Inthe material rewards of urban society.
2) Migrants experience major difficultiesin adjusting socially and psychologically'to the urban environment.
3) Urbanization, increased awareness ofgovernment and politics, and mobilization
hLr^S^^ opposition forces go hand in
While he summarizes the general beliefs about Latin
American urbanization, however, he concludes that the
evidence in Mexico does not support them.^"^ In fact, many
recent studies have questioned these generally accepted
assiiraptlons.^^
Much has also been written regarding the suggestion
that urbanization breeds economic frustration among the
migrant population. There are many people who just cannot
be absorbed by the economic systems which attract them to
66
Ibid.
, p, 833.
6?
Ibid.
, p. 855.
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Morse, "latin American Cities: Aspects of
Function and Structure,'* p. ^85; Nelson, "The Urban Poor:
Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities,"
pp. kO^'-^'ll•, and Rablnovltz, op. cit.
. for consideration
of the evidence.
the urban areas.^^ Many authors tend to discuss the Issue
as a problem of over-urbanlzation-in the sense that larger
portions of the populations live in urban areas than are
justified by the level of economic development .^^ The
Idea is that as people swarm to the urban centers in search
Of a better life and find no doors to economic success open,
they turn to violence as a last resort. The evidence
certainly indicates that masses of the migrants are unable
to find work.*^^ However, a member of studies also indicate
69
See Anibal Quijano Obreg6n, "Tendencies in
Peruvian Development and in the Class Structure." in JamesPetras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.). op. cit
.. Dp 289-328at pp. 308-309 and 312-315; Talton ir-W.^Th e Politics ofthemrivios of Vejiezuela (Berkeley and Los AFgTIiTr~University of California Press. I969). p, I76; and
HobbswaiTOi, op. eit.
. for a discussion of the issue.
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See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and
Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization." p. 203, and~
N. V. Sovani. "The Analysis of 'Over-Urbanization,'"
Economic__Develppmqnt and Cultural Change. XII (January,
1964), 113-122. Sovani notes that this concept of over-
lirbanization takes the Western urban societies as the
norms indicating cultural bias. p. II7.
71
Obregon, op. cit.
. pp, 313-31/^-,
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that they have not generally turned to violence and are in
fact politically quite passive,^^ Yet it is difficult to
believe that violence can be avoided, m this sense, the
economic frustration of the people .ay be a very important
consequence of the urbanization process. However, if
policies were developed to relieve the economic
frustration of the people, the assumptions of the conflict
model concerning inevitability of revolution and chaos
would require si;?nificant modification.
Closely related to the economic frustration argument
is the idea that improved and increased channels of
communications provide a ready means for the exploitation
of these masses of people by radical elements. "^^ As the
people become more aware of what is potentially available,
they are likely to aspire to it. Not being able to
achieve what they aspire to. the masses are likely to
revolt. Communications media are viev/ed as the immediate
causes in this argument, but the real cause is still
economic frustration.
Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political
Integration in Third World Cities, pp. 396-399.
73
See Jose Luis Romero. "La ciudad latinoamericana
y los raovlmientos pollticos," in Hardoy and Tobar. op.
Git.
, pp. 297-310, at pp. 298-302, and 308.
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The predicted breakdown in social organization or
the alienation of the individual fro. the system has been
accepted as fact by n^any Latin Americanists. In this
argument, the traditional family setting is viewed as a
positive social integrating force. As the individual
moves to the urban area he loses contact with much of his
family and he is too busy and the urban society is too
impersonal for him to develop new social ties. At times of
crisis, he is incapable of finding people to help. As a
result, social disorganization and disruptive behavior are
found. "^^ As with many other aspects of the model, however,
the latin American experience indicates that the degree of
social isolation stemming from urbanization is slight at
present. Field studies indicate that urbanization does
7^
See Dorselaer and Gregory, op. cit.
. pp. 67-74.and Germanl. op, cit.
. pp. 149-I51,
"
75
See Goode, op. cit.
. for a complete examination
of the process,
76
Rabinovitz. op, cit. , p. 95; Lewis, op. cit.
.
pp. 36-38; and Cornelius, op. cit.
. p. 855. The question
is also discussed by Germani. op. cit.
. pp. 149-I51.
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not weaken family ties and .ay actually strengthen them.
In addition, in latin America, there seems to be a
substitute in the patron system which exists even in urban
areas. The £a^ may be the boss or a friend in the city
or the trade union or the government agency.
Perhaps the most important feature of the
urbanization process is the tremendous demands it brings
upon the system. Urbanization, itself, creates different
types of problems and only Increases the types and quantity
of demands with which the system must cope.'^'^ This feature
of urbanization is related to the rising expectations and
economic frustrations noted above. It goes even further,
however, in that the question of urban services is brought
in. The conflict approach tends to emphasize physical
deterioration of the environment as well as social
deterioration,''^ The new demands created by physical
deterioration Just help to overload the system. The system
is expected to break down eventually and then explode.
77
See Luis Ratinoff, "The New Urban Groups: The
Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari,
Elites in Latin Ar.erlca (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967). pp. 61-93, at pp. 62-64.
See Hauser, "The Social, Economic and
Technological Problems in Rapid Urbanization," p. 20?, and
Weissraann, op. cit.
. p. 67.
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Yet another thei.e of the conflict literature on
latm A.^erica is the
.^ulf between the urban centers and the
rural areas. m this view, the urban areas are seen as
centers of modernity and the rural areas as backward, A
common theme is that the urban centers, representing the
elite elements, only exploit the countryside. The
expectation is that as the gap continues to grow, an
explosion will occur. The suggestion that the urban
sectors might actually be leaders in the process of
modernization through the promulgation of modern values and
ideas is rejected by the conflict approach. The gaps
between the two societies are unbridgeable. Richard Adams
notes that this is an oversimplification of the social
system of Latin America. He contends that there is as much
79
See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Electoral Politics.
Urbanization, and Social Development in Latin America," in
Glenn Beyer. The Urban Explosion in Latin America (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 19^7), pp. 215-253. and Floreal
H, Forni, "Aspectos sociales de la urbanizacion, in
Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit.
. pp. 205-234,
• 80
Horowitz, op. cit.
. pp. 216-220, and George
Jackson Eder, "Urban Concentration. Agriculture, and
Agrarian Reform," in The Annals; Latin America Tomorrow
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences, Vol. 36O, July, I965), pp. 27-47,
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difference between society in "private" cities and smaller
Cities as there is between rural and urban centers.^l
The sulf between the rural and urban sectors often
leads to discussion of primate versus secondary urban
centers of I^tin America. The primate cities are the ones
which usually constitute the effective national life of
the country. The primate centers were usually the seats of
government for the Spaniards and Portuguese colonizers. ^2
These primate cities exploited the other cities and
polarization between urban centers developed. Even
outside the primate cities, the urban centers were
primixrily oriented toward using the available resources of
the surrounding countryside and never replenishing them.
They were exploitative in nature and many argue that the
same relationship exists now. ^3 ^oday the concept is
described by some as a system of internal colonialism in
which the elite elements of the urban centers prey like
81
Richard N. Adams, Th e Second Sowing; Power and
Secondary iDeYelovment in Latin America (San Francisco:
Chandler. 196? Chapters 3, 9. and 10 particularly.
82
The Economic Commission for Latin America, op.
clt_^, pp. 18-23 provides one of the best discussions on
the subject.
Ibid.
. p. 18.
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parasites on the countryside. This factor Is often
considered to be the greatest obstacle to development In
Latin America. ^
There is a wide variety in the conflict analyses of
latin American urbanization. However, the emphasis is
placed on conflicts created by the urbanization process.
Conflicts are seen to emerge within the urban areas, among
different urban areas, and between the urban areas and the
coimtryslde. Tremendous problems of assimilating migrants
into the system usually attract a good part of the
attention of the conflict analysts. There is little doubt
that many of the tendencies suggested by conflict analysts
actually exist. The evidence suggests that the case is
often over-stated. The concluding section will analyze
the role urbanization has played in Latin American
political development.
8^4
See Romero, op. clt.
. pp. 299-301; Morse, "Latin
American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structui'e, " pp.
^7^-^79; J* M. Houston, "Foundations of Colonial Towns in
Hispanic America," in R. P. Eeckinsale and J. M. Houston
(eds.). Urbanization and Its Problems (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1968), pp. 352-390; and Ronald Classman, op.
clt.
. pp. 246-24?.
85
See Stavenhagen, op. clt.
. p. 30, and Stanlslav
Andre ski
, Parasitism and Subversion; The Case of latin
America (London: Weldenfeld and iMicolson, 1966), pp. 1-2.
Many of the authors in the Petras and Zeitlin volume take
this position.
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The Effect of Urbanization on Latin
American Political Development
One of the most Important con.slderatlons about the
urbanization process in Latin America is that its
historical roots are quite different from that of the
Western or industrialized nations, Latin American cities
were developed with the explicit purpose of providing a
center of focus for the colonizers of the area. They
served as commercial and cultural centers for the European
settlements. In effect they were transplants of European
cities to the New World. Thus, in contrast to the
Western European and United States experiences,
industrialization did not produce urban centers.
Instead, Latin American cities were often points of
86
Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of
Function and Structure," pp. k7k^>iQ0; John Kander. The
Unrovolutlonary Society; The Voviev of Latin AmerlcafT
Con.^igJ'y^^ti-'-^m A ChnnfrintK World (New York: Knopf, I969),
pp. 260-261; Glajisman, op. clt.
, pp. 246-262; Romero, op.
crt,_, pp. 299-301; and The Economic Commission for Latin
America, op. elt.
, pp. I7-I9, among m.any others provide
evidence on this point.
87
See Milton I. Van.ocer, "Politics and Class In
Twentieth- Century Latin America, The Hispanic Amerjcnn
HI fitor leal Royjow
. XLIX (February, I969), 8O-93, at p. 83,
and Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American
History," p. 329.
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departure for exploitation of the rural countryside. As a
result, the assumptions based on social change brought
about by the industrial process are not always relevant,
unfortunately, scholars in both the conflict and consensus
traditions often ignore this fact. Because
industrialization was not the producer of urbanization in
I.. tin America, it must be recognized that the modernizing
tendencies produced by the industrialization process are
not existent in many latin American urban centers. As a
result, there are not necessarily strongly united labor
groups able to articulate the wishes of the people as
opposed to the capitalist elite. The working class does
not necessarily recognize a difference in its Interest from
that of the employer. Instead, the employer may also be
the patr6n and as such the worker may actually see a
coincidence of interests and thus not be interested in
radical activities.
The argument that urbanization creates various
modernizing tendencies is even more confusing than the
argument noted above for the Latin American scene. There
is no doubt that expanding com.munications and
transportation grids have an accelerating effect on the
urbanization process. Urbanization also broadens the
communication of ideas and values, however. Such an
expansion in the communications process helps modernize
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the population in the sense that more and more people
become aware of modern values and the wonders of modern
technology. To that extent, modernization certainly
occurs, but the problems are Intensified because increased
communication of modern ideas encourages even greater
migration to the urban centers where the wonders of modern
society are available. Besides further compounding the
problems of urban life, migration also drains the
countryside of youth and efficient labor.
Directly related to the question of modernization
is the fact that many of the urban migrants cannot be
employed. The economy Just cannot absorb the many migrants
into the system. ^ These elements provide a potential
threat to the system because their needs cannot be met.
Some arg-ue, however, that they are not potential
troublemakers because their conditions in the squatter
88
See Eder, op. clt.
.
and Nlro, op. c3t. .
89
Scares. "The New Industrialization and the
Brazilian Political System," in Petras and Zeitlin, op.
c i t
.
. pp. 186-<!01, and Ray, op. clt. , pp. I6I-I76 provide
two of many studies of this problem.
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settleirents are acti^ally l^prover^ents over their ri^al
exiotonce.90 ^hus, the suggestion that radlcall.atlon of
the squatter settlements Is to occur does not seem borne
out by the experience of latin America. There may be a
difference In reaction from one generation to the next.
The first generation of urban migrants may be content with
What they find in their new homes, still being peasants and
Impressed with the advantages they have over their previous
rural existence. Succeeding generations, however, may
become more radicalized. As the children grow up In the
urban environment, they do not have the old rural
environment with which to compare their own experiences.
Thus, they may not think in terms of how much better off
they are, but of how much they still lack. The result may
eventually be radlcallzatlon.
Another supposedly modernizing tendency of
urbanization concerns the birth rate. According to the
literature, birth rates are supposed to go down in urban-
centers. Both conflict and consensus theorists have
90
Sec Alfred Stepan. "Political Development Theory:
The Latin American Experience," Journal of International
AffnJrs
, XX (1966). 223-23^. at p. 230. See the preceding
section of this chapter for more detailed discussion of
the evidence.
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accepted this idea,
.et the evidence In latin America
indicates that there are no significant differences in
birthrates between r«ral areas and urban centers. 91
However, it cannot be ass^ed that such changes ^l^ht not
occur in the futiire.
All of the above indicates that the long accepted
assumptions about urbanization are not easily applied to
Latin America. Many questions have to be raised about each
assumption. The only conclusion which can be reached is
that latin American urbanization varies from the generally
accepted pattern. Commonly accepted beliefs about
urbanization have to be modified if the process in Latin
America is to be understood. Differences in the history
and culture of Latin Am.erica have to be considered in any
analysis of the area. There also may be considerable
differences between specific countries. As has been noted,
some of the assumptions and conclusions of the models
provide useful insights, but neither can be applied to
'
Latin America in toto.
91
See Zulma Recchini de Lattes, "Aspectos
demograficos de proceso de urbanizacion on America
Latina»" in Hardoy and Tobar, op. cit
.. pp. 273-29^)-. at pp.
283-289; and Demo^-raphic Yearbook 19^ . pp. 276-278.
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CHAPTER VII
BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Issue
Of the three issues used as case studies in this
work, none is more important to development than the
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is strategic to the process
of political development precisely because the bureaucracy
is responsible for fashionin^r and implementing the varied
policies which produce and accompany the development
process. The direction and scope of development policy
(all government policy, for that matter) is directly
controlled by the government workers. Thus, the role they
choose to play—obstructive or facilitative—will have
tremendous implications for the success of such programs.
For that reason, it is important to understand the
bureaucracy and the role it plays in the development
process.
The study of comparative politics has, until recent
times, treated public administration and the study of
22?
bureaucracy as somewhat of a stepchild. Many of the
traditional works often included analysis of administrative
institutions, but systematic study of bureaucracy as a
Viable institution in comparative analysis was slighted.^
Much of the work in comparative administration is done by
the Comparative Administration Group (CAG) in the form of
monographs. While comparative public administration as a
whole has been slighted to some extent, the same is also
true of the relationship between bureaucracy and political
development. Recalling that the process of political
development has gained detailed attention only lately, it
is little wonder that the study of bureaucracy as a factor
in political development is still in its infancy. Even
though the study of bureaucracy and political development
1
Carl Priedrich, Constitutional Government and
2§HIocrac;^ (Boston: Ginn. 1950), and Herman Finer, Theory
and Practice of Kodern Governr.ent (London: Metheun, 1951)
are two of the traditionalists who direct attention to
public administration agencies as institutions to be
compared in study of government. One of the first major
works to deal with the subject exclusively is William J.
Siffin (ed.), Tovrard the Comparative Study of Public
Administration (Bloomington ; Indiana University, 195? )
•
It has been followed by Ferrel Heady »s Public
Administration ; A Comparative Perspective (Englewood
Cliff si Prentice-Hall, I966). To'lhis date v/orks on
comparative public administration are somewhat scarce.
The next footnote indicates a greater amount of attention
paid to the subject in developing societies, however.
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Is rather new as a subleoi- nr c.,^*-,,bUDject of systematic study, it has
received zauch .ore attention of late than the
.ore general
area of comparative public administration,^ Even though
attention was focused on the subject relatively recently,
there are indications that students of political
development are becoming aware of the pivotal status of
bureaucracy in the development process,
Deflnitlori. Defining the term bureaucracy does not
present the problems we found in dealing with the other
two Issues studied here. In this study, bureaucracy refers
to public bureaucracy as opposed to bureaucracies in
private enterprise. Bureaucracy, thus, will be used to
2
As V7lth the study of public administration
generally, the study of bureaucracy and politicaldevelopment has roots in Weberlan studies to be notedlater. Some of the earlier works on this specific top^
c
were done by Fred Rlggs. See his "Agraria and Industria—
Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in
Siffln, op. cit.
, pp. 23-116; and Mm i n 1stra t i on lii
Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic Society
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964} among many other of his
works. The great Interest in the topic is evidenced by the
following works among many others: Joseph La Palombara
(ed.), Bureaucracy and Poli tical Development (Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 1963); Pialph Eralbantl. et al.
.
Political and Administrative Development (Durham, N. C. :
Dui^e University Press. I969): and Dwlght Waldo (ed.).
Temporal Dimensions of Developnent Administration (Durham,
N. C.
: Duke University Press, 1970)/ Martin Henry
Greenberg, Bureaucracy and Develoopent; A Mexican Case
Study (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, I97O) is a recent stud"y
Involving a Latin American nation.
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refer to people in public or government employ, Rrom time
to time, different segments of the bureaucracy will be
noted as pertinent to particular discussions. For example,
there may be some instances in which the national, as
opposed to regional public employees are pertinent, still
other distinctions may be made between upper levels and
lower levels of the bureaucracy, m dealing with
different authors, it will be noted that some direct their
attention to all public employees^ whereas others may be
concerned with only a particular sector of the bureaucracy.
This is the point at which definitional problems arise in
the use of the term.-^
As might be expected, most analyses of bureaucracy
and political development deal with the upper echelon of
bureaucracy since that echelon is more concerned with
policy-making activities than the lower level. It is to be
expected that the cabinet ministries or agency heads would
have more impact on the direction of policy change than
V7ould the office clerk. When implementation of policy is
La Falorabara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development," in La Palombara, op. cit.
. pp. 3-
33 presents an excellent discussion of problems of and
varieties in definition, especially pp. 6-8,
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in question. hoKever. the lower levels of the bureaucracy
r^y be more important. Thus, the questions under
investigation help to determine which part of the
bureaucracy receives the greatest attention of the
analyst.
One aspect of the definition of bureaucracy is the
differentiation of the formal structure and informal
factors in the operation of the system. ^ The formal
organization is that spelled out by the law or by the
organization chart. It is common knowledge that more -
informal lines of communication and association often
develop and some scholars place more emphasis on this
aspect of bureaucracy than on the formal organization.
This study focuses prim.arily on the formal aspects although
the informal arrangements which affect formal operations
Ibid.
. pp. 6-8.
5See Jonathan A. Slesinger, A Model for the
Comparative Study of Public Bureaucracifis (Ann ATbor •
Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration,
1957), pp. ^-6. Robert V. Presthus, The Organ Ir rational
Society; An Analysis and. A. Theory (New York: Handom
House, 1962) ; and Peter M. Blau, The. Dynamics of
Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955)deal with some of the informal aspects and functions of
bureaucracies. In addition see Eugene Lltv/ak, "Models of
Bureaucracy V/hlch Permit Conflict," American Journal of
Sociology
.
LXVII (September, I96I), 17?-18^ at p. 1??.
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and expectations are included. Pc-n^^^^n
-Lr-cj.uQea-.especlally ;,rhen considering
Latin American bureaucracies.
.
Closely related to the problem of definition is the
lament of many scholars that we have not had precise
enough formulation of a framework for comparative study of
public bureaucracies.6 The usual argument is that while
studies of bureaucracies in many different systems are
conducted, there is often little commonality between
studies facilitating comparison. Jonathan Slesinger
suggests a framework which will be employed here in
analyzing studies of bureaucracy. His fairly simple,
straightforward model uses the following questions:
1) Bureaucratic Orpranizatlon : The Nlodel
Description ^ "
a) V/hat kinds of ends, personal and
societal, are served by the
existence of bureaucratic
organizations?
b) What form or shape do bureaucracies
typically take?
IM^iL* PP» 3-^; Heady, op. clt. . Chapter 1;
Herbert Emmerich, "Administrative Roadblocks* to
Co-ordinated Development," in Egbert De Vrles and Jos6
Medina Echavarrla (eds.). Social Aspects of Economic
Development in Latin America (Paris; UNESCO, I963), pp.
3^5-360, at pp. 3^5-346; and Slesinger, op. clt.
. pp. 1-3
among many others.
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a) Who occupy the positions in
bureaucracies, and what is their
relationship to the total society?
b) How do bureaucracies ODerate. i.e
what are the internal mechanisms
"
Of control and decision-making?
c) What is the relationship of particularbureaucracies to their institutional
settings, i.e., what is the
relationship and balance between
control by the bureaucracy over its
setting and control of the bureaucracyby society?? ^
All of the questions have implications for the role of
bureaucracy and thus the model provides a good starting
point for the analysis of bureaucracy. This study will
go beyond use of this general model and Investigate the
relationship of bureaucracy to the specific aspect of
political development. While Slesinger's framework is the
basis for analysis in this study, the question will be
considered in the general discussion instead of going
through each question in a systematic v^ay for each author
studied, thus avoiding too stilted an analysis.
7Slesinger, op. cit.
. p. 3,
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Another factor vmich should be noted here Is that
.o.t scholars dealing with the subject of bureaucracy note
that the sl.e of bureaucracies Is growing rapidly. As
governments are forced to deal with
.ore and »ore types of
problems, new agencies must be created and/or additions of
personnel must be made to PYic-n>no.dQ ZQ existing agencies. This growth
trend in bureaucracy seems to be more evident in
developing societies than in the already developed ones.^
What growth in bureaucracy implies for political
development will be noted as the various approaches are
discussed. The important point here is that the increasing
size of bureaucracy only increases the potential impact it
might have on development, whatever the role it plays.
Governments, particularly in developing societies, are
increasingly under pressure to provide new services for
their people, and bureaucracy grows with the increase in
services.
8
-o T"^^
""^^^^^ ^^^^ ^i^^s* "Bureaucrats
and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, op> cit., pp. 120-16?, and Joseph La Palombara,
'Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries,
and Dilemmas," pp. 3^-6l, at p. 3^ in the same volume.
Also S. N. Elsenstadt. "Problems of Emerging Bureaucraciesin Developing Areas and New States," in Harvey G.
Kebschull (ed.). Politics in Transitional Society (New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, ly6d), pp. 239~24"6; and
Emmerich, op. cit.
, pp. 3^5-346.
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The Effect of Bureaucracy on Political
Development According to the
Consensus Model
^h^£^-eral^^ Pe^^aps more so than in any
other aspect of the consensus model. Hax Weber is the
primary so'orce for the assumptions and conclusions
regarding bureaucracy and the political process. Weber,
of course, is the founder of the classical study of
bureaucracy and public administration. His studies have
provided the basis for study of bureaucracy in Western
society. 9 While Weber himself realized that his ideal type
of bureaucracy would not exist in any society, implicit in
his theory was the belief that this was the norm to be
'
9
See Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Kcnnnn^io.
Organization, tr. by A. M. E^^rson and Talcott Parsons.(New York: Oxford University Press. 19^7). particularly
pp. ;)2^!-3^5 among others of Weber's works. Reinhard
Bendix. Max.J/feber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City:Doubleday. 1930). pp. 1^23-^57, and S. M. i<liller (ed.).|teix_Keber (New York: Crowell. I963), pp. 59-82 provides
excellent selections and interpretations from his work.
Of course, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (translators),
From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19^6} is perhaps the best volume of
selections of Weber's writings.
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The rational.legal model he suggested became
the model associated with modernity, and now many
theorists suggest that if that model is not approached, a
nation cannot be considered modern. The elements of the
Weberian ideal type bureaucracy include: 1) a
hierarchical system; 2) responsibility for actions reposing
in the bureaucracy; 3) rationality; Zf) achievement
orientation; 5) specialization and differentiation in
functions; 6) discipline; and ?) professionalization.^^
Quite often, the development literature accepts these as
the norms to be attained.
10
See La Palombara. "An Overview of Bureaucracy andPolitical Development." and "Bureaucracy and Political
Development: Notes. Queries, and Dilemmas," both in LaPalombara. op. cit,
.
for a discussion of this interpreta-
tion. Gerth and Mills, op. clt.
. particularly in the
Introduction, provide an excellent discussion of ideal
types in Weber's works.
La Palombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development," p. 10 discusses this point and also
some of the implications of such a position. Also see
Michael V/alzer. "The Only Revolution: Notes on The Theory
of Modernization." Dissent
. XL (Autumn. 1964), ^32-440.
12
These are La Palombara 's condensation of the
characteristics of bureaucracy from "An Overview of
Bureaucracy and Political Development," p. 10. The list
varies from author to author, but this list contains the
Fiajor elements. For Weber's discussion see Bendix, op.
cit
.
.
and Miller, op. clt.
236
One of the most comnon themes of political
development consensus theorists Is that the bureaucracy
becomes more and more functionally specialized as systems
become more developed. In effect, modernization and
specialization are oftpn Pmia+-or^ ^3 oiLe equated. Some suggest that such
specialization keeps the bureaucracy from attaining too
much power because specialization has the effect of
circumscribing the goals of individual bureaucrats. Since
their goals are limited in scope, they have to compete
with others with similarly limited scopes of activity.
The competition is supposed to provide an element of
control over the bureaucracy. Of course, others argue
that concern with limited goals serves to inhibit
co-ordination of needed policies and thus is detrimental to
development. This argument will be considered later in the
chapter.
There is little doubt that bureaucracies become
more specialized as societies become more complex and
13
For example, see Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of
Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in La
Palombara, op. cit.
. pp. 168-198.
1^
David Apter. The Politics of Modernization
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. I965),
particularly pp. 218-220.
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governments provide more services. The effect of
specialization, however, may be questionable.
Specialization, as Weber note^A r.-^«^„w o ed, produces greater expertise
m particular areas of activity. Greater specialization
may also blind the bureaucrat to the overfall objectives of
the system. There is at least a potential obstructive
role here. The evidence seems to indicate, however, that
most developing nations suffer from domination by too many
generalists in bureaucracy and from too few specialists.^^
Fred Riggs is perhaps the most widely known student
of bureaucracy and its relationship to the development
process. Riggs views society in terms of two poles—
"Agrarian" and «Industrlan»
; later, this typology was
changed to "fused" and "diffracted. "^^ Both typologies
outline differences between a "developed" and "undeveloped"
15
R. S. Milne. "Comparisons and Models in Public'Administration." Political Studies
. X (February, I962),
mZ} ^""^^ ^ ^^^^ discussion of this point.This will be discussed more fully in considerinc: the
conflict model.
16
Fred Riggs. "Agraria and Industrla—Toward a
Typology of Comparative Administration." in Slffln. op.
PAt».,t pp. 23-116. The new typology is put forth in
Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory of
Prismatic Society .
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society. The Agrarian society (undeveloped) has the
following characteristics:
1) Predominance of ascriDtive
particularistic, diffuse patterns.
mobiiitj!''^'^
groups and limited spatial
3) Relatively simple and stable
"occupational" differentiation.
4) A deferential stratification system ofdiffuse impact.
and Industrian society the following characteristics:
1) Predominance of universalistic, specific
and achievement norms. *
2) High degree of social mobility (in general
—not necessarily vertical sense).
3) Well-developed occupational system.
Insulated from other social structures.
^) "Egalitarian" class system based on
generalized patterns of occupational
achievement.
5) Prevalence of "associations," i.e.,
functionally specific, non-ascriptive
structures*!?
17
Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology
of Comparative Administration," p. 29.
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This characterization has munh iv, «n c In common with Talcott
Parsons* concept of a modern social system.^^
While the Agrarian and Industrlan patterns only
suggest some of the particular aspects of bureaucracy, the
fused and diffracted models provide explicit discussion of
the bureaucratic system. The essence of the argument Is
that m the fused system, the bureaucratic structure is
highly generalized with one or a few structures conducting
a large number of activities. In the diffracted model,
however, structures become differentiated and specialized,
thus, approaching the Weberian model. \Vhlle Riggs
disclaims any normative position, his analysis, in fact,
indicates that he expects societies to move from the fused
to the diffracted types. Thus, a unilinear development
process seems implicit in his analysis. Of course, he
notes that no societies fit one or the other extreme and
thus he uses the prismatic model for analyzing developing
18
Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of
Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), and
Societi es; Evolutionary and Com.parative Perspectives
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentlce-Kall, 1966).
His disclaimers are found particularly in the
Introduction and first chapter of Administration in
Developing Countries; The Theory of Prismatic Society
countries. This moael recoRnl^es that elements of both
extremes exist and are "fused" in any one society and must
be studied with that In mind. The particular prismatic
society under study Is affected by its own culture and
history.
While Riggs claims to be developing a model free of
the biases of the Weberlan model, in fact his model Is no
less value-laden. The society to be achieved is the
Industrian or diffracted. These are In effect the
societies Weber considered to be the goal of modernl?:atlon.
In this respect. Rlggs and Weber actually complement one
another. Rlggs only articulates a model for studying those
societies on the path to the ideal type; whereas Weber, for
the most part, dealt with the ideal type itself.
Another common characteristic of the consensus model
theorists is the idea that bureaucracies are the neutral
servants of the political leaders in pov/er. This view, of
course, follows from V/eber's idea of professionalism and
neutrality or impartiality in office. This particular
aspect has been discredited, especially in developing
societies, but some continue to argue that the bureaucracy
does and will play a neutral role in the political system
or at least that this role is the proper and appropriate
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20bureaucratic goal.^O
^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
the bureaucrats might become overconcerned with legaliom.
procedures, and efficiency, and not sufficiently concernld
With the objectives of their policy. At any rate, the
argument from this perspective is that the bureaucrats can
serve the cause of development best by being neutrally
subservient to the political leadership. If society is
moving unilinearly toward development in a deterministic
fashion, as some consensus theorists have suggested, a
neutral role by bureaucrats would be adequate.
Some theorists of the consensus persuasion, seeing
that bureaucracy is not a neutral force in developing
societies, argue that it is or must be a leader in the
modernization and development process. Quite often the
20
A. F. K. Organski, The Stares of PolitJcal
DevelopmejTt (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 44-46 imolies
this position while noting that problems emerge because thebureaucracy in new nations is usually untrained and cannot
function as it should. Harold F, Alderfer, Public
Adminis tration in Newer Nation s (New York: Praeger, 196?)
seems somewhat naive in his contention that bureaucracies'
refrain from political roles in these nations. Robert A.
Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political
Development," V/orld Politics
, XVII (October, 1964), 108-
120, at pp. 113-115 discusses this idea.
Packenham, op. clt»
, p. II5, and Walzer, op. clt. ,
p. 439.
educational and cultural backgrounds of bureaucrats are
emphasized in the analysis of consensus theorists. The
urban background of the bureaucrat and the fact that he
tends to be fro. the Mddle sectors is used as evidence of
his tendency to foster modernization of the system. ^2 This
approach, of course, must rely on the assumptions of the
consensus model concerning the middle and urban sectors,
which have been discussed in early chapters. If the
consensus theorists* arguments about those values are
valid, then the bureaucrats might be leaders for
modernization. As has been noted in the previous two
chapters, there are many questions about the argument.
Consensus theorists have also emphasized the
strategic location of the bureaucracy. If bureaucrats are
agents for modernization, the positions they hold in
society provide a good location for spreading modern
values. Almond and Powell note that the bureaucracy is an.
Karl W. Deutsch. "Social Mobilization and
Political Development." The American Political Scien ce
Revijew. LV (September. 1961), ^93-51^. at pt). 495-5017
notes some of these tendencies. Gabriel Almond and G.
Bingham Powell, Jr.. Comparative Politics; A
DeZg.lo£inen t_a 1 Appros cYTTBo s ton ; Little. Brown. I966).
pp. 96-97, and S, N. Eisenstadt. op. clt.
. pp. 243-246.
2^3
effective force In improving the flow of cc.unlcatlons in
the systeiB. As was noted In the previous chapter.
cootnunloations flow Is Important tr, „iioj-orcan o the consensus analysis
Of the political developirent process. But it is not
altogether certain that bureaucracies in developing
nations actually perform this function.
Another modernizing feature of the bureaucracy is
its tendency to provide a certain modicum of stability to
the system. Those authors emphasizing institution-
building as an aspect of political development stress this
feature of bureaucracies The bureaucracy is one
institution which tends to survive even when political
leadership changes. If stability of institutions is the
objective to be pursued by the system, the buj-eaucracy 's
persistence would be a welcome sign. As will be discussed
later, however, some argue that the reasons for and
23
Almond and Powell, op. cit.
. pp. 96-97.
24
See Samuel P. Huntington, "Political DeveloDment
and Political Decay," World Politics
. XVII (April, I965),
386«430; Apter. op. cit.
. pp. 218-221; and Ricgs.
"Bureaucrats and Political Development," in La Palombara.
op. Pit., pp. 120-167. Riggs particularly notes that
bureaucracies often become over-institutionalized and that
emphasis should also be placed on building other political
institutions.
2kk
l.pXlcatlone of bureaucratic stability
.ight actually be
detrimental to development.
Obviously, the various consensus authors recognize
that there are differences in bureaucracies in developing
societies. Even those theorists accepting a .ore or less
deterministic approach indicate that historical and
cultural factors affect the type of bureaucracy which is
likely to emerge in any one nation.^S Bureaucracies differ
according to the colonial history of the nation and
according to the "stage-, of development. S. N. Eisenstadt
notes that nations with a history including strong
colonial rule find themselves dominated by the remaining
administrators of the mother country left in the newly
independent nation. If the colonial bureaucrats have not
stayed behind, there is often a vacuum existing in the
structure and chaos is likely to ensue. The consensus
theorists, however, often feel the colonial powers do a
service to the dependent nations by training bureaucrats
25
See Seymour Martin Lipset. "Bureaucracy and
Social Change," in Robert K. Merton. ct al.. Reader in
Bureaucracy (Glencoe: The Free Press'. 1962). pp. 221-232,
at pp. 227-231; La. Palorabara. "An Overview of Bureaucracy*
and Political Development." pp. 19-20; and Riggs,
Administration in Developing Countries; The Theory of
Prismatic Society . '
Eisenstadt, op. clt.
. pp. 2^0-243.
2^5
in the Classical tradition. Perhap. a neutral bureaucracy
is not „Hat is nee.e. m .an.
.evelopln« nations. Western
nations too often atte.pt to bull, up the administrative
framework and leave the social, economic, and other
political institutions undeveloped. This .ay lead to
bureaucratic domination and be a hindrance to
development,^''
The foregoing discussion Indicates that the
consensus theorists stress the integrative role of
bureaucracy in developing societies. By providing for
increased specialization of function, greater amounts of
work can be done, m addition, the neutrality and
professionalism of public servants means that government
functions can be carried out efficiently and fairly.
Moreover, the consensus theorists argue that bureaucracies
are integrative forces because they are staffed by middle
class urbanites embracing modern democratic values.
Institutionalization of bureaucracies also fosters
stability. All of these elements represent features of the
27
A v.-n.^
fee Riggs. "Bureaucrats and Political Development:
1^ r ?f ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^111 be discussedmore fully later as it is a m.aj or theme in the conflict
analyses.
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consensus
.odel. It would unfair to l.ply that these
authors disregard the negative effects of bureaucracy
because many of them note that bureaucracy also has
disintegrative tendencies. However, these theorists do
stress the Integrative functions and usually only note that
the opposite tendency exists. As such, this discussion has
highlighted the factors emphasised by the theorists under
consideration.
The literatip^ e^_on__I.atin America
. Bureaucracy in
Latin America has been neglected in political studies to an
even greater extent than in the general literature. In
1959 George Blanksten went so far as to say that
bureaucracy had actually been ignored in studies of Latin
America, thus making evaluation of its role a difficult
28task. In fact the bureaucracy has been put under some
scrutiny, but the data are rather scarce. The consensus
theorists among Latin Americanists have been particularly
guilty of neglect on this issue. Perhaps the reason is
that the consensus view on bureaucracy really does not fit
Latin America very well.
George I. Blanksten. "Political Change in Latin
America," The American Political Science Review
. LI I
I
(March. 1959), 106-12?, at r>. 108.
2^7
John J. Johnson once again leads the list of
consensus theorists dealing with Latin American
bureaucracy. He notes that the bureaucracy has grovm in
size and scope and thus in influence. Not surprisingly,
he finds a close interrelationship between the middle
sectors and the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are part of the
middle sectors, 29 Remembering Johnson's arguments on the
middle sectors outlined in Chapter V. it is not surprising
that he believes the present bureaucracies of Latin
America to be committed to social change and progress. ^0
Because the bureaucracy is in a very strategic position, he
argues,, it tends to be very effective as a modernizing
force. It can and does spread the values of the urban
middle sectors--as envisioned by Johnson.
Johnson believes that other aspects of the
bureaucracy are important besides the fact that bureaucrats
are largely from the middle sectors. He argues that they-^
have also developed a loyalty to development programs for
John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin
America: The Emerp-ence of the Middle Sectors (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 13. and pp. 24-25.
To be fair, it must be noted that Johnson viewed the
bureaucrats as servants of the elite sectors in the period
of I8IO-.I85O, but he feels it has now become a force for
progress.
30
Ibid.
, pp. 193-194.
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historical reasons as well as econnmi
.
^x o c ones. In Uruguay
for example, he argues that the Colorado party helped
create a large bureaucracy through the enactMent and
implementation of .any social welfare progran,s.31 This
fact along „ith the creation of a widespread middle sector
as a result of these programs, has .ade the bureaucracy
loyal to the Colorados-the more liberal of the two
.ajor
Uruguayan parties. Arguing m a similar view, he feels
that the large number of jobs created by progressive
programs throughout latin America has created a tendency
for the middle sectors and bureaucrats to become committed
to progressive development. 32 i„ ^^y^^^
appreciation for increased numbers of Jobs and for
employment security, these groups support development
policies. While there may be some truth to the argument,
it seems Johnson may be over-stating the case when he says.-
31.
Ibid.
, p. 59.
32.
Ibid.
, pp. I93.i9i(,,
2k9
r^^rr l^ ^^^reaucrats] have becomefirn^ converts to progress through
technological advance. 33
The Pan American Union commissioned a recent study
on administrative arrangements in Latin America which was
grounded on many of the same presuppositions.^^ The basic
assumptions of the study were that efficiency in the
administrative apparatus would produce a bureaucracy
productive of democratic stability. Although the study
recognizes problems in latin American administration, it
sets as a goal a bureaucracy on the order of the Weberlan
or Western model. Much of the concern is with economic
development, and an efficient neutral bureaucracy is
viev;ed as an instrument of economic development.
33
IbicU, p. 194. Robert J. Alexander, Latin
American Politics and Government (New York: Harper and
Row, 1965) makes a similar point, pp. I33-I34.
3^
Pan American Union, Public Administration in
Latin America (V/ashington, D. C. : Organization of
American States, I965),
35
Ibid.
. The assumptions are implicit in the
study's discussion of the limitations of Latin American
bureaucracies, pp. 13-23.
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Robert scotf s analysis of Latin AB>erican
bureaucracy indicated ¥ha^y a s that some aspects of the consensus
model are found In the I.tin American syste.. For example
the bureaucrats are drawn mostly from the educated, urban,
middle sectors. Urban values and experiences are
predon^mant In the bureaucracies. 3^ The bureaucrats are
also effective forces for stability but. as Scott notes,
the reasons may be Inconsistent with the consensus
assumptions on the issue. While they my view themselves
as modernlzers, the bureaucrats are in fact often trapped
by the fact that their Jobs depend upon the continuation
of the system. 37 Thus, they tend to support the status
quo from fear that change may cause loss of Job security.
In a study of Bolivian policy-malcing, Albert
I^pawsky is optimistic that Bolivian administration will be
a force for effective development
. His view is based
36
Robert E. Scott. "The Government Bureaucrats and
Political Chanp^e in Latin America," Journal of
International Affairs
. XX (I966). 289-308, at pp. 29^-295.
37
I^ld.
, pp. 295-297.
38
Albert Lepawsky, "Revolution and Reform in
Bolivia: A Study of the Root and Branch of Public
Administration in a Developing Nation," in Siffln, op.
cit.
. pp. 219-252.
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prlmrily on the types of policies developed by the
bureaucrats, indicating a belief that bureaucracy plays
more than a policy Implementation role. He feels the
greatest problem will be in timing public policies for
development in such a way that policies will be
coordinated.^^ If too many policies are developed at one
time, resources will be thinned out and thus all may be
doomed to failure. It may be comparable to the idea of new
nations now having to face all six of Pye»s crises of
nation-buildins at once. When too many demands come all at
once, the system tends to break down. With greater
coordination of policies, the chances for effective
development will be Increased.
Because of the limited attention paid to
bureaucracy by Latin Americanists using the consensus
approach, the role of bureaucracy In such analyses is
difficult to evaluate. Many analyses, as will be noted in
following sections, actually tend to accept more of a
conflict analysis approach to the bureaucracy. Such is
the case concerning analysis of bureaucracy as it exists
now. However, the consensus theorists still believe
Ibid.
, pp. 228-229.
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bureaucracy should play the role assigned to it by the
Weberian construct. The problem, of course, Is that the
acceptance of the Weberian construct often
.akes it
difficult to see the situation as it exists. It also
.akes
it difficult to accept a bureaucracy more attuned to
pushing for political change rather than to being the
servant of the political leaders.
The Effect of Bureaucracy on Political
Development According to the
Conflict Model
The general literature. The Marxian view of the
bureaucracy is not difficult to imagine. Marx sees the
bourgeoisie as the holder of power in the system. The
state, of course, is viewed as the instrument of the
40
Scott, op. cit.
. pp. 298-299.
kl
See "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and V. I. Lenin. The Essent ial
Left- (New York: Barnes and Noble, I96I), pp.' 7-/^7, at
pp. 16-17. Also see Shlomo Avineri (ed,), Karl Marx on
Colonialism and Modernization (Garden City: Doubledav.
196a j. pp. 125-13IT
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bourgeois capitalist class, m the power stru,.le between
the capitalists and the proletariat, the bureaucracy is
unalterably opposed to the proletariat. Marx stated that
the bureaucracy must be destroyed because It Is the
instrument of the power centers-the capitalists.'*^ With
the conflict model emerging from Marx's Ideas, It Is only
natural that this model should conceive of the bureaucracy
as operating In the Interests of the elite elements of
society.
Some of the most Important work on the bureaucracy
employing neo-Marxlan analyses have concerned the United
States. The work of C. Wright Mills, for Instance, views
the economic Interests of the United States as being in
league with the governmental bureaucracy to the
disadvantage of the poor or the people in general. ''^^ John
Kenneth Galbraith is another one who coroes to mind.^^
Although he probably would not be classified as a Marxist,
^2
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Correspondence
1846-189^ (New York: International Publishers. 193277"
p. 309.
C. V/right Mills, The Power Elite (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959 )
.
John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 196? ).
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his analysis of the
' interlocking of governmental and
economic interests is supportive of Marx's Ideas. With
evidence indicating such collusion in a nation priding
itself on hu^nltarlan and democratic values as does the
united States, it co.es as little surprise that the conflict
theorists find much evidence to support the conflict thesis
in developing societies. A measure of the potency of the
argument is the fact that many consensus theorists concede
that the conflict analysis of bureaucracy deserves a great
deal of credibility.
Barrington Koore. Jr., recognizes that
bureaucracies have had an integrative effect on developing
societies because centralized bureaucracies have overridden
the fragmenting tendencies of local nobilities. ^'-^ In
addition to these integrative roles, according to Noore»s
analysis, bureaucrats have also been the instruments of
the landholders and have actually provided means of
attaining wealth. Even though some Integrative functions
45
:^rrington Moore. Jr., Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Dem.ocracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
p. 417.
46
Ibld^, pp. 168-170. and 179-180. Milne, op. clt.
.
pp. 10-11 notes the fragmenting effects of
decentralization of administration in developing societies
suggesting that it tends to strengthen traditional power
bases.
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are served by burea^,cracles. they have also acculred a
position Bore concerned with self m.erest than In serving
the people as a whole. They serve themselves or the elite
who put them in power Tn «. I this sense, bureaucracies do
not aid the process of political development. These
practices of bureaucracies instead become the focus of
radical, particularly Communist, movement s.''?
On the surface, Dahrendorf 's analysis presents a
Marxian interpretation-^the bureaucrats are in league with
the capitalist class against the laboring elem^ents.^^ The
issue is further refined by Dahrendorf in his suggestion
that constraint is the only way of holding societies
together. Since societies are held together in the
interests of the upper economic levels of society, the
4?
Moore, op. cit>
. p. 169,
Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Cla ss Conflict ln
Industrial .Society (Stanford: Stanford "University Press
1959). particularly the Introduction and first chapter.
*
k9
Dahrendorf. "Out of Utopia: Toward a
Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," in Lewis A, Coser
and Bernard Rosenberg (eds. ). Sociological Theory; A
Book of Readinp-s. 3rd ed. (Toronto: The Macmillan Co.,
1969). pp, 222-240. at p. 237.
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bureaucracies which hold the oocietiP. t-s es together do so asinctru.ents of the capitalist classes. A.ain. the
analysis is a fairly clear application of Mar.-s ideas
Many essentially consensus theorists, however, pay
see homage to conflict analysis in their perceptions of
the bureaucracy, s. N. Eisenstadt. for instance, ta.es a
consensus position but recognizes that the bureaucracy is
Often a roadblock to effective development.^^ In its
original role in a newly independent nation. Eisenstadt
sees the bureaucracy as a defender of the status quo. He
also Cites the rigidity of the bureaucracy as an inhibitor
Of development.^^ Others argue that it retains this role,
while Eisenstadt, in the Weberian tradition, feels it
eventually becomes a positive force for political
development and is representative of and responsive to the
people.
50
See Eisenstadt, op. cit.
. and "Breakdowns ofModernization. " jgcono and Cultural nh.nc..XII (July, 196^07355-307, and ''Bureaucracy and Politica lDevelopment." in La Palombara. op. cit.
. pp. 96-II9
51
.V, n •,
^}s^"s^adt. "Problems of Emerging Bureaucraciesin Developing Areas and New States," p. 2^6.
52
Eisenstadt. "Bureaucracy and Political
Development." For the position that bureaucracy tends to
remain a defender of the status quo. see Emmerich.
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The theme of the rifl-iditv nr <J-g a y of the classical model ofbureaucracy is recurrent In the development literature.
The ar.u.e„t is .ade that the classical
.odel e.phasi.es
procedures and legalisn,. As a result, bureaucracies In
developing societies often follov, very rigid rules and
regulations, thus bringing constructive change to a
Virtual standstill. Part- r.r +-up rt of the problem is traced to
the idea that there are too mny administrative
generalists in the bureaucracy and not enough specialists
in particular problem areas. The generalists tend to
stress legalism and procedure, whereas it is felt the
specialist is more likely to be pragmatic in reaching his
specific objective. Whatever the motive, stress on
procedure and legalism obviously leads to much red tape'
and slowing down of activity.
Many of these authors seem to make a complete
turnabout in indicating that bureaucracies in developing
societies do not follow the classical model prescription
gP* P« 355? Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher CivilService As An Action Group in Western Political
Development," in La Falombara. op. cit.
. pp. 62-95;Hoselltz op. cit., pp. 168-169; and La Palombara. op. cit..
PP» 55-59 among many others.
La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political
Development," pp. 5^-55; and Milne, op. cit.
. p. 9 arejust two of many who adopt this stance.
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of neutrality and profe^oi n /.Pi i oslonallsm (m terms of ethics)
nather. they often view the bureaucracy as highly
politicized and highly corrupt. Of course.
politlci.atlon
.akes the bureaucracy partial in U.
dealings with the people and thus causes distrust and
disruption, corruption helps rake off economic resources
and causes the system to suffer in the long run. it also
fosters distrust and increased costs for the system.
The idea that bureaucratic centralization Is an
mtef^ratlvo force was discussed briefly above. However,
many scholars indicate that centralization is a major
roadblock to over-all development. They argue that too
much centralization of administration discourages
development In the hinterlands. The nation becomes too
oriented to the needs of the capital or major cities and
Ignores other regions of the nation. It is not
difficult to Imagine how some parts of the nation can be
completely omitted from policy considerations If
54
See La Palombara, "Bureaucracy and Political
Development." p. 59. and "An Overview of Bureaucracy andPolitical Development." pp. 25-26; and Eisenstadt.
Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas
and New States," p. PM5.
55
Emmerich, op. cjt.
, p. 356 makes particular note
of this. Also see Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging
Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," p. ?J^^,
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administration Is centered In one spot and not accountable
to the nation as a whole, m addition, conflict between
the bureaucracy and the rest of the nation might easily
emerge
•
Many conflict themes have been noted in the
preceding analysis. Generally, it might be said that the
conflict analyses emphasize the relationship of the
bureaucracy to the upper economic groups of society in
opposition to the poor. The other factors mentioned
usually relate to this one main theme in some way. So.
for the conflict analyst, bureaucracy serves the
conservative forces of the status quo and actually
inhibits productive change in society. Some of these
themes are even more fully developed in the literature on
Latin America, to which attention will now be directed.
The literature on I^tin America . Because control of
government is commonly seen as the route to economic
prosperity in Latin America, the govermient is usually
viewed as the private preserve of the economic elite. This
includes the bureaucracy, vjhich is often vievjed as the
instrument for retention of control by the economic
56
elite. Andreski notes that conflict and Instability are
See Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and
Political Instability in Latin American Society," Western
Political Quarterly
. IX (March, 1956), 21-35 at pp.
260
Inevitable in a situation in whiov,^J-on m ich governmental power is
the major or only road to wealth p." . Because government
xvork is a route to economic power itai.o«. .^
»
-"-^ als acquires a
certain a.ount of status or prestige. Thus, the
.ureauorao.
Of latin A.erioa is often described in te^s of its display
of power, rudeness, keeping people waiting, and
personalisno .^
In addition to the direct acquisition of wealth by
the bureaucracy there is another theme quite common in the
conflict analysis of bureaucracy m Latin America. The
theme is that the bureaucracy has. in fact, been absorbed
by the oligarchy. ^9 Because the oligarchy often controls
political life, it controls the Jobs in government; and
57
The r^o.
Stanislav Andreski. Parasitism and Suhv^r .^nn.
.
ilf^SfHry^ (LoHdHHT-lviid^^
58 . •
•
Richard N. Adams. The Second Sowin^o-; Pnwf^-r and
S^.^t'; ''"^S'n^'J^- Irvinrilorowitz. Revolution
Tir-^-^^-^ P^^^-^^^- SoclGtv in a DGvelopln;r~Tj;nT^TNeFl:ork; Button. 19oWTrT8j notes how thebureaucracy is often more interested in splendor andprestige citing Brazil's new capital. Brasilia, as a
moniment to bureaucratic dysfunction."
59Among the many suggesting such are Fernando H.Cardoso, Cuestiones de sociologla del desarrollo en
America Latim (Santiago, Chile; Editorial UnlverTl tarla
.
S. A,, 1968), pp. 66-6?; Luis Mercler Vega, Roads to
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the theory is that bureaucrats are unU.ely to push for
very .uch social or political chan.e for Tear of losing
their jobs, in addition to ordinary bureaucracy, the
state involvei^ent in much of Latin American economic
activity provides a similar type of control over
entrepreneurial bureaucrats as well.^O when Job security
depends on the oligarchy, the bureaucracy is likely to
serve oligarchic interests. This particular argument
goes hand in hand with the middle sectors argument of the
conflict theorists. It will be remembered that
bureaucracy provides the means for entry into the middle
sectors for many people, and the conflict position on the
middle sectors thus carries over to their conception of
the bureaucracy. ^1 Since the middle sectors are viewed
as emulators of the upper sectors and are not interested
in real change in the society, it is logical to conclude.
Power., in latin^America (New York: Praeger. I969). pp. 62-63; and Charles Wagley. The La.tin American Trgditinn:
^ssays on the Unity and Diversity of Latin Anieri o.r. n
£iilt|re (New York] Columbia University Press. 1968"). pp.
M- and 207, t^i
60
Vega, op. cit.
. pp. 6O-65.
61
Wagley, op. cit.
, pp. 10^ and 207.
sew
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.iven Its ^iaaie
.eotor cHaracter. that t.e bureaucracy
would react similarly.
Because many conflict theorists see control over
the institutions of government, including bureaucracy a
the road to economic wealth, there is a tendency to vi
the system as constantly being in turmoil. Intense
struggles are the direct result of the desire for control
over this strategic element of the system/^ Even though
such conflicts emerge, conflict theorists suggest that
instability exists primarily at the political level and
that the bureaucracy only changes its allegiance to
leaders. ^ New political leaders In Latin America are
not usually faced with bureaucracies intent on frustrating
their programs. If the existing bureaucracy refuses to
cooperate with the new leader, he shuffles bureaucrats
around and increases the size of the bureaucracy by
adding his ovm followers to it.^^^
Vega, op. cit.
. pp. 64-65.
• 63
John Mander. The UnrevolutionQ rv Society: The
(N^- York: Knopf. 1^6<rrri^2^Ti:^m^
p. yu
64
Laurln L. Henry, "Public Administration andCivil Service." in Harold E. Davis (ed.). Governmont andPoIiUc s In I/ttln America (New York: Ronald Prcns. 19 ')0).
pp. 477-495. at pp. mr^Q^i and Scott, op. cit.
.
pp. 298-303.
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conflict theorists frequently mention the size of
bureaucracy in I^tin America. As noted above,
bureaucracies are often increased in size so that the
leader can insure his control. The Increasing scope of
government activity also causes increased
bureaucratization, v/hatever the cause, the expanding
bureaucracy has a negative effect on development because
it is an economic drain. The money to pay salaries and to
operate bureaucracies could perhaps be put to better use
in needed programs. The greatest criticism on this issue
is directed at the increase in size resulting from the
desire of political leaders to insure their control over
the system by placing their friends, relatives, and
cllentela in official positions.
No discussion of bureaucracy in Latin America
would be complete without mention of corruption. The
political factors mentioned above provide an atmosphere in
which corruption may flourish. The usual descriptions of
bureaucracy in Latin America make the assumption that no
action is free of favoritism. Low salaries as well as
general acceptance of personalismo in government make
65
Henry, op. clt.
. pp. 83-^84.
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corruption rampant/^ Ar-aingai , regardless of the cause,
on a
there Is little question that government oonduote.
basis or
.avorltls. benefits those «lth economic power an.
eood connections and tends to Ignore others. As a result
there Is also a tendency for people to lose faith In the
'
political system. Any attempts at change .ay be accepted
With .uch sicepticis. if at all. of course, the argument
may also be made that this type of corruption is
functional in the sense of generating loyalty to the
system among government workers.
Still another problem emphasized by I^tin American
conflict analysts is the tendency to worship procedures
and legalism. This is a result of the adoption of the
Weberian model of bureaucracy with no attention to the'
fact that there is a tremendous cultural difference
between latin America and the Western developed nations.
Another reason for this development is that there are
many administrative generalists in the bureaucracy and
technical specialists are us-aally few in number. Thus.
66
I^id^. James L. Busey, latin America: Political
Institutions and Processp.c^ (New York; Random House.
1964}, p. 7; Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Reflections onlatin American Development (Austin: University of Texas
Press. 1967). p. Z|7; and Wagley. op. cit.
. p. 78.
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attention is divorte^A +-«IS a rocted to procedures rather than to
substance .^"^ Such attpn^-^ r^v. +.i:>ucn tention to procedure often has the
effect Of slowing the governmental process down
considerably. A inore important consideration is that
procedures do no good if the goal for which the
bureaucracy exists is not reached. All are aware that
this is a problem hardly exclusive to developing
societies. But. because of the inordinate power of
bureaucracies in latin America, it creates a very
difficult problem.
Yet another concern of conflict theorists is the
question of centralization of bureaucratic authority.
Some suggest that It is the major roadblock to development
in Latin Anierica.^^ One of the reasons centralization of
authority is such a problem is that it provides a means
of Insuring direct control by political leaders. Where
political power results in Intense competition for
control, it is not surprising that centralization remains
6?
Scott, op» clt.
. pp. 296-298. and Henry, op.
cit.
. pp. 485-48^7
68
See Emmerich, op. cit.
. p. 356, and Henry, op.
clt.
. pp. 484-485.
69
Ibid.
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a feature of the bureaucratic structure. The proble. is
that an efficient bureaucracy controlled by a dictator
can easily inhibit any sort of progress in political
development. jr bureaucracy is highly centralized, it
tends to become isolated fro. the nation as a whole and
the effective nation becomes that of the bureaucracy
»
s
world no matter how limited that world might be.
The conflict analysts (and many consensus
analysts) adopt several different approaches to the
analysis of bureaucracy in Latin America, m general,
they tend to stress the obstacles put in the path of
development by the Latin American bureaucracies. In doing
so. they tend to stress the interlocking of the
bureaucracy and the oligarchy. Noting that the
bureaucracy is often middle class, the middle sectors
argument of the conflict theorists is accepted. In
addition, emphasis is usUc'Uly placed on the inefficiency
and corruption of the bureaucracy and on
. its self-
interested and self-serving nature. All of these factors
indicate to the conflict theorists that the bureaucracy
70
Henry, op. cit.
. p. k9k.
26?
cannot be counted on as a forcp fr>T^ . .^ l e or constructive social
and political change in Latin America.
The Effect of Bureaucracy on Latin
American Political Development
Bureaucracies in latin America display
Characteristics suggested by both the conflict and
consensus models. Neither model by itself provides a
complete picture of the situation. This section will
outline some of the features of bureaucracy in I^tin
America and their relevance to the two models.
Both the conflict and consensus analysts note the
constantly increasing size of Latin American
bureaucracies. The effects of increasing size are the'
determinants of the differences between the approaches.
For the conflict analysts, increasing size represents an
increasing economic drain on the system and increasing
control by the oligarchy through the absorption of greater .
numbers of people. The consensus analysts, on the other
71^
0R< OOP
Emmerich, op. clt.; Horowitz, op. clt.
. pp.
^»5-2«b; and Wagley, op. cit.
. pp. 104 and 20?.
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*^ana. note t.e increase. oppo.t.nUy Tor aispers.on or
n-icaie Class ur^n values „Uh Inoreasin, bu.-eauoratle
size. The evidence see.s to Indicate that the
bureaucracy's size Is certainly larp-er than n»J xctxg n necessary and
that It does cause a drain on economic resources. ^3 The
suggestion that It provides a foru™ for dissemination of
.odern values does not see. valid, especially v,hen It 1.
noted that this ar„t Is based on the consensus
.odeLs
middle sectors ar„t. Consensus theorists argue that
the middle sectors, dominant In the bureaucracy, cause the
bureaucracy to be an Instrument of progress. The arguments
about the middle sectors, with questions concerning the
consensus model, have been discussed In Chapter V. The
limitations of that argument serve to limit the
applicability of their conclusions about the bureaucracy.
Both models are wrong for ]U.tln America. To understand
latin American bureaucracy, we must look at the functions
It actually performs. Bureaucracy serves as a means of
'
employment, as a social security agency, as a patronage
72
iQT TO),
Johnson, op_. clt., particularly p. 13 and pp.193-19'*, and Scott, op. clt.
. p. 303.
" >" 'i'-
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r-r, -^no -,1%^
^^'^^y. PP- cit-., pp. 483-48/H Scott, op. clt.
.
pp. 302-303; and Pan American Union, op. clt. .
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a«ency. and as a .eans or buying off political foe. l„
I^tln
..e.loa. The oarrnn, out or erreotlve developmental
programs .ay be a distinctly secondary function.
The idea that Z^tin American bureaucrats tend toward
legalise and proceduralism also provides for dirrerent
perspectives. The conrilct analysts stress the rigidity of
such attitudes and ho« it inhibits pragmatism in the
development of new programs. On the other hand,
consensus analysts emphasize the idea that a neutral
professional bureaucracy is necessary for effective
development policies. Since the industrialized societies
have functioned Hell with the classical bureaucracies,
analysts assume that the latin American nations should be
striving for similar bureaucratic systems. '''5
It is very difficult to evaluate this dirrerenoe in
the models because of the lack of surfioient evidence.
However, it does seem that excessive legalism becomes a
substitute for substantive programs in many oases in Latin
7't
Horowitz, op. clt.
. p. 287, for instance.
75
Johnson, op. cit.
. p. igif, and p. 59. The PanAmerican Union, op. clt.
. bases its analysis on the
assumption that administrative efficiency will produce a
society conducive to development in all sectors.
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Glen Dealy^s analysis indicates that much of
the administrative and le.al fra.ewor. of Latin America
.ay not represent what United States scholars tend to think
they do or ought to do.^^ The value systems of the Latin
Americans may Indicate that the institutions and legal
provisions of constitutions have different purposes than
Anglo-Americans would assume. Nevertheless, legalism
undoubtedly does provide some inhibitors to the process of
development. It may be found that, in the long run. the
bureaucracies actually produce a fusion of modern values
throughout the society.
Related to the rigidity of bureaucracy is the fact
that bureaucratic centralism is a fact of life In Latin
America. There seems to be no argument on this point.
Again, the effect is the differentiating factor In the
analyses of the two models. Centralization does have an
advantage in Integrating society in the sense that it can
assure universal practices throughout the system. This'
76
Henry, op. clt.
. pp. ^85-^86, and Scott, op.
clt.
, p. 296.
77
Glen Dealy. "Prolegomena on the Spanish American
Political Tradition," The HlsDanlc American Historical
Review
. XLVIII (February. 1968), 37-58.
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contention is ^se. on .He assumption tHat tHe centraUee.
bureaucracy considers the whole nation in its policy.
leaking. In reality, however, the burePi....
.
n reaucracy may limit it-
sphere of activity to the large citie<, ^v.t ies or the capital city.
When such Is the case, there Is lutZe stimulation of
strong regional Institutionalization. As a result, a
fragmented syste. ™ight emerge, m i^tln America, much of
the evidence Indicates that bureaucracy Is centralized for
the purpose of .ore direct political control, rather than
for purposes of political integration. it .ay be argued
that latm American government systems are centralized
because they are Hlspanlc-Iatln-Iberlc. not because they
conform to Weberlan or Marxian models.
The role of the bureaucracy In political development
Is dependent on many factors. Some have been discussed In
detail but there are also many others of Importance. The
relationship of the bureaucracy to the socio-economic
elites certainly raises questions as to the likelihood of
bureaucracy being a positive force for political
development. Petras notes that in Chile, the bureaucracy
78
Henry, op. cit.. provides a particularly gooddiscussion of the evidence.
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no« acu^esoea
.n representing
.,e interests or t.e
.ia.ie
and upper sectors. He argues that It Is actualJv^ -Lu S ly somewhat
schizophrenic in puMicX. representing a modernizing rolebut in fact acting to support the status quo.^^
Scott echoes this position, suggesting that the hureaucrac.
or I^tin America sees itselr as a modernizing force,
.ut
out or fear or losing Jobs, bureaucrats become obstacles
to change.
People who degrade I^tln American bureaucracies
Often forget that the United States and Western European
nations went through some of the same problems. The
United States did not formally embody the ideals of
Weberian classical bureaucracy until passage of the
Pendleton Act of I883. Yet we analyze Latin American
bureaucracies in developing stages in terms of our
twentieth century "Weberian" model, a model that does not
even correspond to our own situation. No one can argue
79^
chM.rr. n
Petras. Politics and Social Fnvr.^. in
•
n -^^-^^^
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Universityof California Press. I969). pp. 307-33?.
u
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Scott, op. Pit.
, p. 297.
81
rbid^, p. 298 makes this point.
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that corruption or Inefriclency never
' existed In our
systezn. Perhaps we should view the bureaucracies In ter.s
Of the Whole social and cultural value systems. Certainly
bureaucracy can e.er.e as a leader In the modernisation
process, but it is unrealistic to think that it can be
completely free of the values of its society. Indications
are that in most developing nations it is in fact ahead of
the other political institutions in the sense of being
firmly implanted in and integrated with the larger society.
Because it is often the only stable Institution, it
provides tremendous opposition to the development of other
political institutions since it does not want opposition
for political control. It opposes development of other
effective political institutions such as political
parties, courts, or even effective legislatures for fear
of losinr its own privileged position.
82
See Higgs, Administration in Developing
Countries; The Theory of PriniT:at3c ^Jociety .
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CHAPTERVIII
LATIN AMERICA AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Applicability of Political Development
Models for the Study of Latin America
.
Inslp:hts provided by the modelr. . Both the conflict
and consensus models for the study of political development
provide some valid insights for the imderstanding of Latin
America. Some mention has been made of such insights in
the previous chapters, although the discussion has
emphasized deficiencies of the models.
Both the conflict and consensus models tend to
accept the idea that societies are "progressing" or moving
toward societies like those in the modern Western v^orld.
While much of the experience in Latin America indicates,
that a unidirectional movement toward political democracy
is not occurring, the fact is that many of the governments
of Latin America have attempted to emulate the United
States or other Western societies and thus have adopted
this sort of progression as their goal. To imderstand
275
the motives of the ffovernmpni-c. i-io^™ tgov ments themselves, it is necessary
to understand what they hope to accomplish. Unfortunately
the consequences of latin American governments acceptance^
of the models have often been negative.
The acceptance of Western models by the Latin
American nations has usually meant placing- an inordinate
emphasis on economic development. Because both the models
tend to accept economic development as a prerequisite to
or a producer of political development, it is felt that
once economic development takes place, all other problems
Will be easily solved. What usually happens is that
economic institutions are developed but political and
social institutions are ignored except to the extent to
which they foster economic development. Consequently, the
economic interests concentrate wealth in their hands and
leave the rest of society outside the system. Supposedly,
the economic wealth is concentrated primarily for the
purpose of providing for further economic development a la
Rostow»s pre-conditions for take-off and take-off stages
of economic growth."^
W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I960).
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since economic power is concentrated, it is UKely
that political po«er also beco.es so. The political
system becomes a „eans for achieving wealth, power, and
status. As was noted In the previous discussions, the fact
that people acquire wealth through politics
.eans that
they tend to bend to the win of the economic elites,
secondly, of course, many of the govern:„ent workers are
directly dependent on the economic Interests for their
livelihood and. therefnrp nvo
,
uncx io e, are loyal supporters of the
ruling groups.
The people left out of the effective political
system provide another force. The likelihood is that they
will come to resent the concentration of pov^er in the hands
of the elite and eventually become agents for chanee->most
likely violent change. Whether they have in fact
developed this stance at present is not the question since
our interest is in what type of development can be
expected. Of course, we have to recognize the existing-
situation, as i^ell, for a full understanding. It does seem,
though, that unless some change is made in distribution of
wealth and political control, that those outside the
system may eventually feel no stake in maintaining the
system. When a group is outside the power system, it may
feel that it can afford to be radical and activist, but
2??
when It Yuir. some uov/or ifr. ,,^4 4 .p we Its notlvlr^m may be blunted for foar
of lonlnpr what it has.
In t.rmr. of the ovor-all charaotor of tho
.ooloty
tho oonfllot modol. m ,„any way., offor. a better
per.pootlve than tho consensu,
.odol. Tho confUot
.odd.,
analy.l. In tor,„. of tho bl,-polarlty of Latin Amorloan
society 1. very In.tructlvo. It doo3
.cem that I^tln
American society and poUtlo. are characterized by a .pUt
between tho.e who have aooc. to wealth and po«or and tho.e
Who are out.ldo tho cy.tcm for tho n,o.t part.=^ m,oh of the
activity of the society can bo viewed a. productive of
maintenance of power by thor^e who already have It and
continued subordination of those without power. If and
when the subordinates feel they are being exploited,
conflict may result.
While the general characterization of society
presented by the conflict model may provide valid
ln«i/Thtr>, it docs not moan that the conflict model is
2
For evidence on this point, see Richard N. Adams,
The Second TJow lnp-; Pov7er and Secondary Developmont in
lnt\n AmojiVca (/Jan Francisco; Chandler, 19^^; Kalman
^^•^vei't. Tho Conriic t .Socioty (New York: Harper and How.
I960); Luis Merc lor Vcp;a, Heads to Power in J/it in
Amor
1 eg (New York: Praegcr, I909 ); and "Claudio Vellz
( od
.
)
.
The Politics of Conformity in In
t
in America
(London: Oxford University Press, 196'7T.
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totally applicable. The base<, n-r 'in ses of the consensus model also
provide some points of departure for analysis. The
consensus approaches emphasis on plurality of interests has
some very significant implications for the study of Latin
American politics. There is no doubt that more and more
groups are emerging in Latin America.
In analyzing the behavior of the newly emerging
sectors in the society, it seems necessary to combine the
ideas of both models. For instance, the element of self,
interest of these groups is recognized by both models.
Each presumes that groups (or people for that matter) will
operate to maximize their own self interests. With the
consensus model this presumption means that compromise
among groups takes place because they recognize the
collective benefit of working together. V7hat often happens
in Latin America, however, is that these groups perceive
their self-interests in aligning with the elite elements.^
It is often argued that various groups find that their
only hope for maintaining or gaining status is in being
3
See James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in
Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, I969); Vega, op. cit. ; and Adams,
op. cit.
. among many others.
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coopted by the upper sectors. This tendency Is
particularly true where
,over»„ent e.ploy.ent Is the
.ajor
road to economic success. Thus, the argument of the
conflict analysts that economic dependence on the upper
.actors creates a tendency for alignment with the elite
seen,s valid In analyzing the Utln American scene.'*
It seems that self-interest certainly plays an
important role In the activities of groups In latin
America. Because of the structure of economic and
political power, some of these groups perceive their best
interests being served by maintenance of the status quo.
TO do away with the system or to change It too drastically
might mean loss of security or at least a decrease in
economic benefits. Such pressures have an Important
bearing on keeping the groups from reacting as the
pluralists of the Western Anglo-American tradition would
expect.
mu
Stanislav Andreskl» Parasitism and Suhvf^r^inn.
The Case of latin America (London: V/eldenfeld andNlcolson. 1966;; Fernando H. Cardoso. Cuestlones deggclolop^ia del desarrollo en Ameri ca mtlna ?<^^n1-^^.'rr.^
,
Chile: Editorial Universitarla
. S. A.. I908). pp. 66-6?;Vega. pp. cit._. pp. 62-63; and Charles V/agley, The LatinAmerican Tradition; Essays on the Unity and Diversity of
i.atln American Culture (New York; Columbia University
Press. 1908). pp. 4 and 20?. All make this point.
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in looking at the three Issue areas which have been
examined In this .tudy it becomes obvious that both
.odels
present some valuable perspectives for the study of
political development In latin America. Perhaps the best
way to review the value of the models Is to reiterate
briefly the arguments on each Issue area for the t«o
models.
The middle
.sector... Regarding the middle sectors,
both models have some important contributions to make, if
we look at the Latin American middle sectors as they
behave today, it seems that the conflict model often
provides a better analysis of what is actually happening.^
Because the society of Latin America Is often bi-polar. the
middle sectors find it easier and more advantageous to
align with the ruling oligarchs as a way of maintaining
economic security/ As Batinoff argues, the middle
5
See Chapter V of this study for a review of theseissues. Some excellent summaries of the character of
Latin American middle sectors of today are: victor Alba,
"Latin America: The Middle Class Revolution." New
Politics
.
I (Winter. 1962). 66-73; James Petras~The
Latin American Kiddle Class." New Politics
. IV (Winter.
1965). 7^-89; and, of course. John J. Johnson, Political
Chanpre in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle
Sectors (Stanfordl Stanford University Press. 1958).
See Petras, "The Latin American Middle Class";
Vega, op. cit. ; and Veliz. op. cit.
.
among many others.
281
sectors tend to ally „Uh those groups which are able to
provide the. with the best chance of attaining so.ethlrg
tangible from the syste.-at one point It was the lower
class Which see.ed
.ost Ui^oly to provide the middle class
with some power. But as the middle sectors gained In
size, access to the upper sectors became available and the
middle sectors perceived their best Interests In allying
with the upper elen.ents.^ The conflict analysis
perspective on this point seems Instructive in understanding
Khat is presently happening in the Latin American middle
sectors.
The conflict model does not provide a complete
picture of the situation, however. Instead the roles
played by the middle sectors seem to differ, depending
upon the stage of development of the society. At the stage
of development when the middle sectors are extremely small
and outside the centers of power, they tend to ally with
the laboring elements and tend to be more reform oriented
See Luis Ratinoff. "The New Urban Groups: The
Middle Classes," in Seymour Martin Llpset and Aldo Solar
(eds.). Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford
University Press. 196?;, pp. 61-93. at p. 69.
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than sees to be the case today m much of latin A.erica.^
The role played by the middle sectors depends on what they
perceive to be in their ovm best interests. When the
middle sectors are outside the system, they can afford to
attack it. once they themselves are a part of the system,
they become coopted by the oligarchy and/or ruling groups
which wish to reduce the negative impact of the middle
sectors. Then the middle sectors become defenders of the
status quo,^ The time, context, and political
circumstances have to be considered if we are to
understand the role of the middle sectors completely. The
8
Two people employing vastly different approachestend to reach this concluGion. Johnson, op. cit.particularly Chapter 9 reviews some of thr^lTaTTies oflabor and the middle sectors with analysis of the shift
away from that alliance as times changed. Petras,
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Develop^.pnt !particularly in Chapter ^ notes how the changing 'society
requires changing roles for the middle sectors.
Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States. 138 0-1962(Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete. I967) makes similar —
observations.
9
The author is indebted to Jane Lee Yare, a
graduate student in the Department of Political Science,
University of Kassachusetts, for some of the ideas here.
In a paper, "The Middle Class in I^tln America,
(Unpublished paper. Department of Political Science,
University of Massachusetts, 1971) and in discussions with
me, she helped me form some of these conclusions.
283
laea Of
.axl^lzlne self-Interest
.ay Involve
.o,„e decree of
Playlne the ga.e according to the oonnensus
.odel. but
has been Illustrated 1„ present-day l.tln America, the
middle
.sectors see. to help themselves
.ost by playln. the
role Of supporting the elitist syste.. clearly, this role
is not In accord with the t-n r^^ aT:n pa riotic, progressive picture
of the middle sectors as painted by Johnson.
Obviously it would be only speculation to suggest
What might happen in the future with the Latin American
middle sectors, but some prediction might be in order, it
seems that as the middle sectors grow in size-something
which appears to be inevitable
— they will be able to
exert ever-increasing influence over public policies. In
Guch an event, there may be more of a tendency toward
liberalization of regimes, if Johnson's views on the
values of middle sectors are correct. He ascribes a
liberal democratic character to this sector, although
noting that, for reasons of survival, such values are
often suppressed. If the society were to become
overwhelmingly middle class, hov/ever, tiiclr "true" values
should come out. As people become more and more educated
and exposed to more alternatives, they are no longer
going to accept rigid control over their activities.
Thus, it could be expected that the systems will move
toward greater democracy, although this does not mean thoy
2Qk
will copy United States or
' democratic processes.
The consensus theorists who expect the .^^P^ z Latin American
middle sectors to mimic their United Stat.u es counterparts
are
.ost n.ceX, to
.l.appo,„tea. On t.e ot.er
.an.
those conruot t.Heo..3t3 «.o expect tHe
.,,aXe sectors'to
.amtam a state of war with the lower classes are
probably also wrong. A .ore realistic view is to
reco«„l.e that they are ,oln, to do what contributes
„ost
to their positions and self-mterests at the tl„e. As
times and contexts change, the middle sectors' roles
change also.
The_urban CToups. Consideration of the urban
sectors In Latin America reveals even more evidence that
neither model by Itself is capable of giving a complete
Picture Of the situation. There are many factors to be
considered In analyzing urbanization In Latin America.
First of all. there are the differences between urban
areas. The major city or cities of a nation constitute
one element of the urbanization factor. However, there are
medium and small-sized urton centers which must also be
considered. The differences In life style and political
practice between cities often provide competition between
285
ur^n cente.s in I.tin
..e.ica.^O
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
there Is the split between rural and urban sectors.
Usually, the conflict theorists tend to simplify the
analysis in ter.s of urban versus rural elements.
Obviously, such an analysis is incomplete. The vast
"
differences between urban elements
.ust be considered.
There seems little doubt that the urban areas and
especially the primate cities have dominated politics to
the detriment of rural areas. To understand the whole
story, however, the differences among urban areas must
also be recognized. Perhaps a certain amount of compromise
among urban areas occurs, thus approaching consensus model
behavior. In political life, the urban areas have to
recognize one another's needs, although there certainly
are instances in which one city may overshadow all of
national life, as in Uruguay (Montevideo) or Paraguay
(Asuncion).
While the conflict theorists have a valid point
"
concerning urban domination of political life, the
evidence Indicates that the process of urbanization may
'
actually provide for greater integration of the society.
10
See Adams, op. clt.
. Chapters 3, 9. and 10 in
particular.
11
See George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin
America." in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.),
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The argunent is that as ^ore people
.igrate fro. rural
areas to urban centers there is a greater amount of
communication between thec^p t-^rr. ^« *T;nese two major sectors of society.
The new urban dwellers transmit modern values back to thl
families they have left behind in the rural areas. This
argument, of course, follows that of Daniel Lerner who
says that urbanization provides the stimulus for
modernization, with communication the Instrument for the
spreading of modern values. "^^
Another feature of urbanization is the change in
social structure which occurs simultaneously. It had been
assumed that the conflict theorists were correct in
suggesting that urban society creates breakdoivn of primary
social units such as the family. With such a breakdown
comes turmoil in the society with the dispossessed
elements becoming violent. Recent evidence suggests that
The PolitlCG of the Developing Areas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, i960), pp. ^55-531.
12
Lerner. The Passing of Traditional Society !
Modernlzinfr the f^iddle East (Glencoe: The Free Press.
1950 K See Chapter VI of this study—particularly that
section dealing with consensus model literature—for a
detailed discussion of this idea.
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this development may not be true in r.. nDC I Latin America.
While maioauons are t.at t.o now u.^n
...Uers
.avo notlost ra^uui l.entuy and are transputers or ^o.ern
values to the countryside, u see^s Inevitable that they
win also be instruments In the revolution of rlsln«
expectations.
Perhops the author's view of hu^an nature clouds
his expectations here v.n^ ^ 4-. n . but It seems that as people become
more aware of what j q avnnnKi^ «IS ailable In society, they will want
It. As they also come to realize that It Is out of their
reach In the present system, they may turn to more radical
movements to acquire It. When people have nothing, they
risk nothing in taking radical action, if urban slum
dwellings continue to Increase In numbers. It Is expected
that the conflict model would be most capable of predicting
what will happen. On this particular Issue, the conflict
model may provide Insights on what will happen, but misses
the mark on what exists at the present time. Once again,
there seems to be some validity to parts of both models In
analyzing this sector of society.
A P„ T l^^^yp^, "Urbanization Without Breakdown:A Case Study," Scientific Monthl y. LXXX (July. I952), 31-
as one among many noting the situation jn LatinAmerica. See Chapter VI of this study for furtherdiscussion of the Issue.
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^^^^^^^^^ The arguments on bureaucracy are
quite Similar to those regarding the
.iddle sectors.
Regardless of what value systems bureaucrats take into
their positions, it see.s that enough pressures exist to
bring them under the control of the ruling elites. Because
the ruling elites control the livelihood of the
bureaucrats, they also control the roles played by
bureaucracy in the political process.
With some similarity to the arguments on the middle
sectors. James Petras argues that the bureaucracy's role
changes as different periods of national development are
1^
studied. Generally, it seems that Uireaucracies have
been Instrumental in integrating political institutions in
Latin America, but out of personal security and self-
interests, they have not been very active in seeking social
and political change. Because the economic security of the
bureaucrats may be dependent upon the support of the
oligarchy, the tendency is for the bureaucracy to support
the status quo. In that sense, the conflict model often
seems most appropriate to studying Latin American
1^
Petras, Politi cs and Social Forces in Chilean
Development
, pp. 30?''33?* For discussion of this point,
see Chapter VII in this study, especially the last
section.
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bureaucracy because it emphasizes th. .xiwjaize e economic self-
interest of bureaucracies.
In reviewing the three variables and their
treatment by the two models i t- i . .^ a i . is obvious that neither
model is adequate bv ltc:(.ir 4-uoy I self, on the other hand, both
provide some instructive insights into the relationship of
the variables to I.tin American political development.
Any model which can be used to understand I^tin America
would be expected to incorporate some features of the
conflict and consensus models.
Gaps in the mo
.
dels. Perhaps the greatest
deficiency in the models under consideration is that they
both ignore the cultural peculiarities of the Latin
American nations and the differences between the Latin
American tradition and the Northern European-Anglo American
tradition. It is the latter, of course, from which both
the conflict and consensus models discussed here were
derived. It will be recalled that both the conflict and
consensus models were developed in the Northern European
or Anglo-American environment and reflect the value
systems found in that cultui-al tradition. Many
refinements to the basic models of Marx and Weber have been
made, but again this has happened in the Intellectual
climate of the Western industrial nations and their
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cultural tradltionc^ ^ ^ain s. The major advocates of these
respective models have trad i +- 1 ov,« t i .ti nally been Northern European
or united States intellectuals. Where l.tin Americans have
used the
.odels. it has been a case of ,raftin, the
.odels
onto the I^tin American scene rather than developing the
models from the I..tin American experience itself/^ This
Northern-European-Anglo-American tradition assumes a
Protestant ethic toward work and accomplishment. It also
assumes a rational approach to problem-solving with
carefully constructed plans for the accomplishment of
specific objectives. The Iberian cultural tradition of
Latin America differentiates it from those societies on
which the models are based.
In order to Justify the assumptions of the models,
certain circumstances have to be present in the society.
Certainly, the populace. has to have a certain minimum
level of physical satisfaction. Intellectual reasoning
about rational goals does not occur if the physical
necessities—particularly food—are not met. Secondly and
Howard J. Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis; The Decline
of the Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin
America. A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativist
Model." an unpublished paper, n.d., presents an excellent
discussion of the cultural biases of the models.
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perhaps
.ore importantly, there has to be a mini.am level
or education or at least understanding in the populace.
Without the ability to perceive problems and possible
solutions to them, this process of making rational plan,
for action to solve the problems cannot occur. The
populace must have access to information and have the
ability to digest that information. This requirement is
particularly true for the consensus model approach,
however, it also applies to the conflict model in the sense
that the people in constant battle with one another have
to recognize the source of their problems in their
enemies. Thus, even the conflict m.odel requires some sense
of understanding of the problems.
For the consensus model to operate effectively,
some special political conditions must exist. The
consensus model assujnes that channels for communicating
needs and demands exist. If the system is to accommodate
demands of varying groups, these groups must have the
means for making their demands known. A fairly free and
open system of communications would seem necessary. More
importantly, it is presumed that people are free to
participate in the political process to bring about
satisfaction of their demands.
The advocates of the two models usually do not say
that such conditions exist. Eventually they expect this
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particular order of soci^^fv i-^iety to emerge as a result of the
models they use for perceivw sociei-«i u^ng ietal change. The fact
Is, however, that these mnriii-^^n conditions are implicit in the
analytical framework used bv th^^ y e advocates of the models.
If the society is to prorre<.<, ^r. .^ ogress in the unilinear way they
propose, certain pre-existing conditinv.o^x tions, as outlined above
are required* *
The point of the current discussion Is that the
value system of latin Americans and the circuMstances
extant In their societies are vastly different fro. those
presupposed by the conflict and consensus models. There
has been much discussion of the colonial and cultural
traditions of latin America and the impact of these
traditions on societal development. These traditions
have been extremely Important in shaping political beliefs
and practices in much of Latin America. Some of the
characteristics most frequently noted in studies of Latin
Hanke f«ri^r4^ T °^ ^'"""^^ include: Lewis '
yI^I.
'f^-TDo the Americas H«ve A Common Hl.tnr.v>
L°!^.'^;->?°Pf'..^96'). ;; .J. ri. Uarins. The Spanish En^o lreAs^risa (New York: Harcourt, Brace
, and World. Inc..
ITrL T^^^ Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Hectare
^'^^^i'--?. (Ne" ^ork: Columbia-University Press
^
1970'; and Ronald Glassraan, Political n.1 storv
'
r iHlnArasrlca (Mew York: Funk & Wagnalls. 19&9). Obviously
,this Is only a very partial mention of numerous such
worK s
•
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America., poutioaz development are that t.e I.c.an
tradition lert latin America wUK an authoritarian,
centrau.ed. hleraro.lcal system with e.phasls on oa.te
and Class systems throughout the soolety.lV
the Reformation had lutle Impact on the tradition In
I^tm America-even less than In the Iberian peninsula
Itself. Therefore, the Catholic tradition of Latin
America was not modified hn^uxi a as it had been in much of Western
Europe. Consequently, much of the hierarchy of Latin
America remained extremely conservative and orthodox in
theology. All of these forces have critical implications
for the development of modern societies. The so-called
"modernizing" forces identified with the emergence of the
modern age and order in the "West" took different forms' in
I^tin America. The Bourbon reforms, which resulted in
liberal democracies in much of the world affected by them,
had a very different impact in I.ain America. The Cro.^i
extracted the ideas from the Enlightment which helped
consolidate its power in the Latin American colonies. As
was noted in Chapter II, the Bourbon reforms in Latin
America helped create some of the forces leading to
17
See Wiarda, op. cit.
. for a fuller discussion ofthese Issues. In addition, of course, most Latin Americahistories include accounts of these cultural
characteristics.
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independence,
.ut the reror.s were primarily oriented to
improving the efficiency of the colonial administration.
As a result, the conditions and fundamental framework.
I^tm American society are strikingly different from tho
of North America or most of Western Europe.
To great portions, of the population, the stratified
class system was considered natural. If it were yoLir
misfortune to be born poor, t'nat was by design of the good
Lord. The Church taught the peasants such, and there is
little doubt that the coincidence of Church-^state
relationship in maintaining one another's position played
a great role in such teaching. The main thing is that
people in Latin America were slow to question the
naturalness or God-given inevitability of the rigid class
system. As a result, many of the modernizing ideas of
Western European society were fiirther retarded in Latin
America,
Although the clergy was often at the forefront of
education in Latin America, its influence on the life of
the population was limited. Except in Brazil and a few
other instances where the Jesuits were Independent of the
conservative hierarchy, the Church resisted education of
the common man. More importantly, the Church vjas able to
lend its ovm interpretation to the ideas of the
Enlightenment and because of its loyalty to the Crown, as
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described in Cha-nter tt +-v,« /-.iua pt II. the Church usually used Its power
to support the Crown. VhilA +-h^v>«l^nlie there were many Jesuits who
did not follow the leadership of the hierarchy, their
over-all impact on I^tin American development was very
limited. With such a situation, some of the prime
ingredients for operation of the models under consideration
are missing in latin America. Illiteracy is still
extensive in Latin Am.erica and thus the ability to perceive
problems and rationally pursue a course intended to solve
them becomes impossible. With the Church's hesitation to
educate the populace, much of human life is built on
spiritualism and superstition. Trying to pursue
rationally conceived processes becomes difficult at best
under such circumstances.
Obviously, the authoritarian tenor of much of Latin
American society has meant that participation in the social
and political systems has been rather limited.
Participation is limited to those who agree to go along-
with the power structure. As a result, the oligarchy or
elite elements usually tend to coopt the various sectors
of society as they emerge as identifiable forces in these
nations. The elite elements are able to quiet any
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disruptive or opposing forces in the society. The
conflict and consensus models both find It difficult to
explain such behavior. The consensus model views emerging
groups as making demands on the system which are
accommodated in some way. The conflict model sees such
groups as struggling with the power centers, but these
groups most often tend to become supporters of the elite
elements because of the advantages of such behavior.
Wiarda has discussed this aspect as part of the corporatist
nature of Latin American societies . '"^
It was noted earlier that if political
participation is to occur, there must be minimum physical
satisfaction. Even if all were permitted to participate
in politics in latin America, there is so much poverty and
hunger that large portions of the populace cannot conceive
of anything beyond food for the next meal. In addition.
18
See Wiarda, "The New Developmental Alternatives in
Latin America; Nasserism and Dictatorship with Popular
Support, '* an unpublished paper delivered at the Annml
Meeting of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American
Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa
Barbara, California, November 6-?, 1970, pp. 5-6.
19
Wiarda, "Elites in Crisis: The Decline of the
Old Order and the Fragmentation of the New in Latin
America, A Dominican Case Study and the Corporativj st
Model,"
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™ost Of the poorer elements are entirely outside the
political and social systems, their demands are never even
expressed, let alone acted upon.
Perhaps the largest problem in the cultural gaps is
that the advocates of the models are Just talking past the
latm Americans, took of a common frame of reference for
social science terms makes it Impossible for these models
to be effectively applied to I^tin America. The Spanish
language lacks a strong social science tradition and, as a
result. English terms are often Just adopted by Latin
Americans. Problems occur in the meaning of such terms,
however. The same term- "rights. •• "dem.ocracy, "
"representation," etc
.-conjures up greatly disparate
visions to United States and Latin American social
20
scientists. Social scientists studying Latin America
often mistakenly assume that when they speak of democracy,
rights, or other such political concepts, these words
correspond to the English meanings. Unfortunately, such is
20
See Jmn F, Marsal, Ce.mbio social en America
.
La^^n?
-
(Buenos Aires: Solar/Hachete. I96?), pp. 225-226
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not the case and it has led to much confusion and
misinterpretation of Latin American politics.
Another problem of the models is that they tend to
assume that changes in political leaders mean vast changes
in the power structure. In fact, what usually happens is
that changes occur only at the top while the basic
structure remains Intact. Exceptions exist, but even
regimes oriented to vast change such as Castro's in Cuba
have had to accommodate many existing power centers and
have remained in the corporatlst-elitist tradition.
Usually, coups mean replacing one group with another
representing the same power groups in society.
One last point regarding the gaps in the models is
in order. Usually when the models are applied to Latin
America, we expect the Latin Americans to react to the
grafting on of our institutions in the same way we react to
them. Both the conflict and consensus models tend to
forget that the societies of Western Europe and the United
States have not alviays existed in the form they take today.
See Glen Dealy, '*Prolegomena on the Spanish
American Political Tradition," The Hispanic American
Historical Review
, XLVIII (February, 1968), 37-58 for an
excellent and detailed discussion of the problem for
United States students of Latin America.
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Instead, there have been many problems in the evolution of
those societies. The fact is that even if these r..odels
were appropriate for understanding latin Ai^erica. we would
have to take into account that todays latin American
society is not comparable to our own and so cannot be
'
evali^ted in terms of today's standards in the United
States or V/estern Europe.
Factors which must be con sidered jn v.^r^^
Arrierica. The preceding discussion notes some of the
important factors which must be accounted for in any
framework purporting to provide for the understanding of
latin American political development. From the discussion
of the cultural differences, it seems clear that any
complete study of Ditin Am.erica must consider the
differences produced by cultural disparity. There is no
question that cultural differences produce differing value
systems. When value systems differ, the political system
is bound to differ.
It is folly to expect that Latin Americans will
react to efficient administrative or political systems In
the same manner United States citizens do. The latin
American heritage puts more emphasis on familial factors.
It is more important that one take care of his family and
friends than to have a modern efficient political system.
Who is to question which value system is better?
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Obviously if efficiency of operation, impartiality, and
lack of corruption are the ends the society is striving for.
the political systems of Latin America would rate low on
any evaluation of them. However, if the human factors of
concern for fellow beings is considered, there would be a
difference in the rating of administrative systems. This
discussion is not meant to imply preference for the Latin
American way of governing. Rather it is meant to
illustrate how a difference in culture and values can have
a very specific impact on the operation of the political
system. More importantly, by evaluating I^tin America in
terms of our own political system, we tend to criticize
those systems because they do not measure up to our
standards. Perhaps we should ponder whether our standards
are relevant to Latin America or. in any case, whether
they are the standards v/hich systems should be striving to
emulate
.
The idea that the Latin American nations should all
be striving for a democratic equality also conflicts with
the Latin American cultural tradition. The implied
assumption of many students of Latin America is that
democratic equality is being sought by the elements outside
the realm of political power in Latin America. As some
studies on urbanization have indicated, many of these
groups Just do not have an interest in participation in the
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22political process. The fact that .uch of the historical
tradition of I^tin America is based on a stratified social
system means that inequality in the political system is
Often accepted as natural. People Just do not question the
inequality of power because they have been acculturated to
believe it is the natural state of affairs. It must be
recognized that there are exceptions to such a
generalization in that groups in some Latin American
nations are demanding a share of the pov:er. as in Chile and
Uruguay. But for many Latin Americans, concern with
democracy is still of limited importance.
Another consideration which has to be made is the
difference between the indigenous and the colonizing
populations in Latin America. Compared to the United
States and Canada, some Indian populations of Latin America
were much larger and more highly civilized. Most
importantly, some of the Indians in Latin America were not
eliminated or assimilated by the society as they were in
North America. As was noted in Chapter II, there was a
variety of Indian cultures in Latin America with a variety
See Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor: Disruption or
Political Integration in Third World Cities," World
Politics
. XXII (April, 1970), 393-4li^,
Of effects for the political system. There are so.e
nations, such as Parag^aay. and some parts of Colombia,
where the population Is still primarily of Indian culture.
As a result, some Intln American nations have large
populations of Indians living independently of the rest of
the nation. In other societies. Mexico for Instance, the
Indian has become a part of the society and his cultural
traditions have made an imprint on the society, m cases
where the Indian has not been assimilated, it must be
recognized that political integration is extremely
difficult because two separate societies exist side by side
but often with almost no Interaction. The expectations of
the models concerning political integration are certainly
affected by this fact.
Somewhat related to the "Indian question" is the
geographic character of Latin America. Because of its
extremes in geography, political integration has been
difficult. The United States, of course, has geographical
extremes as well, but it is not so chopped up as Latin
America. The mountain ranges prove impassable barriers in
many nations of Latin America. The problem of
communications and transportation across natural barriers
complicates political integration. In addition to the
mountains. Latin America has almost im.penetrable jungles to
cope with. In some of those regions live Indian tribes
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almost unknovm to the rest of the nation. Obviously they
feel themselves no part of the over-all political system.
In addition to the Indian populations in these inaccessible
areas, there is the problem of merely trying to keep
communications networks across such barriers. As a result
of the peculiar geography of Latin America, there is a
great deal of Isolation of segments of the population.
They just do not have much contact with the rest of the
society.
Complicating the communications problem is the fact
that the technological revolution did not affect Latin
America as it did North America and Europe. Latin
Americans do not have the communications or transportation
networks V7hich exist in the so-called "modern" nations.
As a result, the spread of common values and identities is
more difficult. Certainly the transistor radio has
provided some impetus to such integration, but it has not
been able to solve all the difficulties
—
particularly the
integration of the various political units.
In short, to provide an understanding of Latin
America, a framework must permit consideration of all of
the factors which make Latin America different from other
areas of the world. This suggestion sounds like a plea
for the political cultirre approach and to some extent it
is. General models can explain only so much. To complete
the picture, differentiating factors must also be
considered. The discussion here has provided sorae
suggestions on issues which must be considered and which
have often been Ignored. Obviously it is not a formal
framework for the analysis of Latin America. Instead, this
study has attempted to point out the shortcomings of
currently used models and indicate what factors should be
considered in formulating a framework uniquely attuned to
the Latin Am.erican ambience. Perhaps future work will
provide more explicit analytical frameworks embodying some
of these suggestions.
Implications of this study for Latin American
governments* policies
. The nations of Latin America have
often depended on the United States to Initiate programs,
and when these programs proved ineffective, they blamed the
United States. Obviously many United States policies have
been tied to United States economic and political-
strategic interests, and as such have not taken the
Interests of the I^tin Americans very seriously. As a
result, much bitterness toward the United States has
developed. Perhaps the greatest problem, however, has
been that the Latin Americans themselves have accepted the
assumptions and expectations of the models which have been
discussed in this study. Consequently, the Latin American
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government officials have also been guilty of ignoring
special circumstances in Latin America.
As Victor Alta notes, before there can be much hope
for change in Latin America, the political leaders of the
area have to become committed to their own nations.
Certainly, they speak in terms of progress for their
nations through economic development and increased
political participation, however, the actions of the
political leaders belie a lack of confidence in their
political systems. More importantly, in Alba's view, they
often indicate a complete disregard for anything but
personal gain for the leaders and their friends. As
evidence. Alba uses the tendency of many Latin American
oligarchs to accept United States aid for investment in the
economy while putting their own money in Swiss bank
accounts for their ov;n future use.^^ In other words, they
are imwilling to invest their o\m funds in their own
economies, yet expect the United States to provide aid for
Victor Alba, Alliance V/ithout Allies (New York:
Praeger, I965), and The Latin Americans (New York:
Praeger, I969).
Alba, Alliance VJithout Allies
,
Chapter IV in
particular.
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such. As usu?.l, there are many exceptions to this
situation, but the point is that the Latin Americans have
to bring the chanj^es about themselves. The United States
cannot do it for them. In order for the changes to take
place, the Latin Aicericans must want them.
Because many of the young and the dispossessed have
become frustrated with democracy, it seems that the route
to change and stability in the region v?ill be different
from the democratic vjay. The young people have become
disillusioned because they see democracy supporting
oligarchs in their countries rather than aiding in social
and political reform. As a result, it is even more
Important that vie understand the character of Latin
American society. The assumption that Latin American
nations v^ill em.ulate the United States political system Is
no longer tenable. The Latin Americans will follow the
path calculated to serve their best interests. Of course,
it is almost impossible to predict precisely what the path
Ibid.
,
Chapter I, Also see Wlarda, "The New
Developmental Alternatives in Latin America: Nasserism
and Dictatorship with Popular Support," and its discussion
of the frustration of Ju^an Bosch regarding the role the
United States played in killing a democratic experiment
in the Dominican Republic. Bosch is one of the better
known "democrats" who has given up on the ideas of
democracy for his country.
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will be. but It Is likely to be unappealing to the United
States unless attitudes here change significantly.
Implications of this study for United 5^f..^oo_^wn^
toward I^-tm Amen.qa
.
The most important implication of
this study for United States policy concerning Latin
America is that virtually all the assumptions behind that
policy must be re-evaluated. As has been noted several
times, the belief that our political style will be copied
is based on faith rather than facts. Partly because of
our policies, such assumptions have become invalid.
Alba makes a very good point in noting that almost
all of our Latin American policies have been geared to
keeping the oligarchy and the elite-oriented middle
sectors in control. By building hospitals and schools, we
support the already existing political structure. Alba's
argument is that the Latin Americans must decide on what
direction to take in their own societies and then commit
themselves to the necessary changes. The United States
cannot bring the "revolution" about for them if it is to
be s"uccessful. We must be willing to help, but the
26
Alba, Alliance Without Allies
.
Chapter III.
current policies of u^^ing our power and influence to
prescribe policies of Latin Ai^erican governments or to
protect United States economic interests at the expense of
the Latin Americans is doomed to failure.
While the Cold War seems to be thawing gradually m
terms of the direct relations between the United States
and the Communist nations, we seem to keep the Cold War as
a basis for much of our Latin American policy. Another
needed change in our approach to Latin America is to
recognize that there are different routes to modernization
in various political systems and that every leftish
government is not automatically a part of the so-called
Communist bloc. Cuba and Chile, for example, are as much
Latin as socialist. The assumption that they are
automatically a part of the Communist bloc is no more
valid than the idea that every democracy is a model of the
United States. So to be realistic in our policy toward
Latin America, we must stop becoming hysterical about
every leftist who appears on the scene and instead treat
each government as unique.
Our support for any regime friendly to the United
States, including many military dictatorships, is only
going to cause further strain in United States—Latin
American relations. To stop the polarization v/hich often
occurs between the United States and Latin America, the
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United States must re-evaluate its assumptions about our
Latin American neighbors. With our help, some of these
governments, as in Chile, may encourage profound changes
Without engendering total alienation from the United
States. Otherwise, we may drive them into anti-United
States and anti-democratic positions such as occurred in
Cuba, our intransigence on the issues only makes it more
difficult for the Latin Americans to manoeuver out of
anti-United States postures even if they should desire to
do so.
There is no easy solution to the dilemmas faced by
United States policy-makers. It is also obvious, though,
that past policies have been riddled with unfounded
assumptions and expectations. The current lull in interest
in Latin America is probably even more damaging than all
the rest. Kany Latin Americans seem to be wondering if
the United States cares at all anymore. With a seeming
lack of interest on our part, the latin Americans may
become more alienated from us. The rising popularity of
Castro among Latin Am.erican governments may be an
indication of such a tendency.
What is needed is a recognition that the United
States cannot dictate the character of development in
Latin America. Instead, we have to demonstrate a sincere
desire to help in bringing about changes instigated by
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the I^tm Americans ther-.selves. Secondly,
„e have to
recognize that each Lntln A:cerloan nation will foiXo„ its
o™ route to developr=ent depending on Its ovm background
and needs.
Conclusion
.
So far this chapter has dealt with
conclusions about the specific models under study and their
relationship to political development. One further point
concerning the use of these models seems in order. Models
themselves are aids in studying phenomena. It is not
expected that any system ever fully replicates or is a
mirror image of the model. Secondly, the general models
provide a very vague outline or order to the study and
thus are not appropriate to very intensive analysis of any
system. To make in-depth analyses of specific systems,
adaptation of the models becomes essential. These
criticisms can be made of any general model or framework.
Indeed, if the suggestions for study of Latin America made
in this study are ever formulated into a full-fledged
model, the criticism will undoubtedly be made that not all
the Latin American nations can be made to fit into it.
The model v/ould likely be more conducive to the study of
one nation than to that of all the others. Consequently,
the only complete model for study of any nation or system
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Is the one prepared specifically for the study of that
system*
While the preceding paragraph notes the difficulties
of using models, it is not meant to imply that models are
useless. Instead, the limitations of the models should be
recognized by those v7ho use them. We must also be careful
not to reify the models we use. Rather than rely blindly
on the consensus and conflict models. Latin Americanists
must develop new approaches, concepts, and frameworks for
the study of Latin America consistent with the history
and culture of Latin America.
I
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